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INTRODUCTION
MI

therefore knew," wrote Cordell Hall in his
Memoirs, "that implementing the Good Neighbor policy
proclaimed by President Roosevelt would Involve a
tremendous undertaking in the Western Hemisphere.
But this fact was also a challenge«"I
It is the purpose of this study to trace in part
Hull's role as impleaienter of the Good Neighbor policy
particularly in the Western Hemisphere. Hull was an
internationalist. His ultimate goal was to lead the way to
a better world order that is built upon cooperation and
mutual respect. This was the original meaning of the Good
Neighbor policy as stated in Mr. Roosevelt's first
inaugural address. It was the mood of good will and
cooperation that was to characterize America's foreign
relations. However, if nations outside of this hemisphere
were to take America seriously and follow her example,
that policy must be made to work in the Americas.
"We could not look for closer cooperation throughout
the world," Hull concluded, "until we showed that
cooperation could work in the area of the Monroe
Doctrine."2
The first three chapters of this study is background^
fox the remainder. They deal with the personal growth of

1 Cordell Hull, Memoirs, p. 309.
2

Loc. cit.

Hull and his emergence in political power; the growth or
American intervention in Latin America from Theodore
Roosevelt to Calvin Coolidge, and the consequent
deterioration of good feelings; the first steps In the
improvement in United States-Latin American relations that
took place under Wilson, Harding, Coolidge, end Hoover; and
steps in the crystallization of the better pattern of
hemispheric relations in the creation and culmination of
the formulation of the Good Neighbor policy.
Chapter IV attempts to follow Hull in his supreme
task of committing the United States at the Montevideo
Conference to the liquidation of the interventionist
policy, and the establishment of cooperation and mutual
confidence among the American nations.

It was here that

the ideal and goal of trade and tariff reform, due to
Hull's influence, became a possibility.

As a sequel to

this pronouncement, in Chapter V, we trace Hull s part in
pushing through to legislative enactment the Reciprocal
Trade Agreement Act,

This was a provision for th

establishment of the tariff rates by negotiations end
agreements made through the Executive.

This involved the

control of tariff policies by the President and State
Department rather than by Congress.

vll
Chapter VI presents Hull at the Buenos Aires
Conference, laboring tirelessly to establish the basic
principles upon which the peace of this hemisphere must be
based.

His ideas were particularly clear in his famous

"Eight Pillars of Peace" speech.

The principles of the use

of consultation as an established Inter-American practice
were agreed upon through his influence.
In Chapter VII, the study follows Hull in his
struggle at the Lima Conference to promote solidarity in
the defense of the hemisphere, and to refine the practices
of consultation among the American nations.

The contest

for a more efficient and flexible consultative machinery
was pressed to successful conclusion.
The Collective Security Consultative machinery
provided for by action of the conferences at Montevideo,
Buenos Aires, and Lima was put to work at the Panama
Conference.

Hull was unable to be present at Panama, but

he gave the greatest of aid in planning for the necessary
agenda, and kept in close touch with the American delegate,
Under-Secretary of State Sumner Welles.

Great effort was

made to establish effective neutrality in the American
Hemisphere end agree on measures towards financial and
economic stabilization in the face of the war in Europe.

viii
Hull was present at tbe Second Consultative Meeting
of the Foreign Ministers of the American Nations.

This

meeting was held at Havana to secure collective action
against Axis subversive activities in Latin America.

Action

was to be taken to prevent the transference of American
territories to Axis control, and an Inter-American
Provisional Administration was to administer the affairs of
American territories that were made orphans by the war.
Hull again saved the conference from a stalemate by using
the tactics of appealing over the head of an obdurate
Argentine delegation to their home government for new
instructions.

The result was success for those things for

which the United States worked.
The Hull-Welles controversy came to a climax over
the political action of the Third Consultative Meeting of
the Foreign Ministers of the American Nations.

Hull was

unable to attend this conference for it met only a few days
after our entrance into World War II.

However, he had

helped formulate the plans for the conference.

It was of

utmost importance that the American nations take en
unequivocal stand for breaking off political and economic
relations with the Axis powers, and Hull insisted on this.
At the conference, however, Welles chose to put unanimity
first, and, as a consequence, he came out of the conference

with a very undecisive statement regarding breaking the
political ties with the Axis powers*

Hull considered

Welles* action a betrayal of American interests.

Welles

resignation a few months later came as a result of Hull*
influence against him.

CHAPTER I
PREPARATION AND EMERGENCE OF CORDELL HULL
AS A POLITICAL LEADER
Cordell Hull's place in the Roosevelt Administration
was based upon his political weight in the Democratic Party,
We shall briefly trace the process through which Hull came
to bear this extraordinary weight,

He had chosen and

prepared himself for the law as a profession, but as the
years passed politics increasingly came to press for
dominance In his life, until politics finally won out,
Hull called these departures from the practice of law his
evotion to "public service."

This devotion to public

service drew him into at least seven important positions.
After we have considered some aspects of his early life, we
shall briefly survey the nature of his performance in these
seven positions.

These positions were:

member of the

Tennessee State Legislature, one year in the American Army,
Judge of the Tennessee State Fifth Circuit Court, United
States Congressman from Tennessee, member and Chairman of
the Democratic Party National Committee, United States
Senator from Tennessee, and, finally, the American Secretary
of State.

Cor dell Hull was born In the foothills of the
Cumberland Mountains of Tennessee, the third of five sons.1
His father, William Hull, managed by hard work, shrewd and
frugal management in storekeeping, logging, rafting, money
lending, and farming, to amass a sizable fortune.

He thus

moved from the condition of a poor mountain farmer 2 to that
of a comfortably rich man.3

Cordell gained valuable

experience in many of his father's enterprises.

His

father was convinced that Cordell had the makings of
greatness.

When Cordell on an important occasion

demonstrated exceptional ability as a public speaker, his
father was so greatly impressed that he determined that
Cordell should get the best training that the Hull fortune
would allow.4
Cordell proceeded in his preparation for a law
career.

He read law in a Nashville law office5 for a while

and later finished the legal course at the famous Cumberland

1

Cordell Hull, Memoirs. p. 3.

2 Ibid., p. 4.
3

Ibid., p. 13.

4

IM-d.. p. 15.

5

Ibid*» P. 24.

3

Law School.6 Upon graduation, he was immediately admitted
to the bar.7

Before he was twenty years old he began to

practice law with an older lawyer,

fbr a while he

continued in this relationship, and then for a time he
practiced law alone.

But Hull's law career was destined

to have some serious interruptions through his various
forays into politics.
The first of these Interruptions to his law career
was his election to the Tennessee State Legislature Just as
he turned twenty one.8

But his interest in politics had

had its beginning at an earlier time.

When only eighteen,

he had been elected county chairman of the Democratic
Party.

He was thus laying the foundation for a career in

practical politics.

At this early time, Tennessee's United

States Congressman, Benton McMillin, became his hero and
example in political life.®

During one election campaign

young Hull became so absorbed in the congressman's
political instruction, example, and technique that he hired

8

Hull, o£. cit., pp. 26-27.

7 Ibid., p. 27.
8

Ibid..pp. 28-29,

9

Ibid.. p. 26.

4
a span of horses and a buggy and drove him about for seven
days in order that he might more closely observe him in
action and absorb his political wisdom.^

served two

terms in the Tennessee State Legislature and then
returned to his law practice determined to give it his full
time and attention.11
For a second time his law career was interrupted,
this time by his call to military service in the SpanishAmerican War.1^

He raised Company H of the Fourth

Regiment, Tennessee Volunteer Infantry, and was commissioned
a captain.

Although his regiment was sent to Cuba, he was

more concerned with the legal activities of the army than in
combat service.13

He helped to get local government

restored and operating in his province.

He continued for a

year in the army then turned back to the law for some four
years.1^

In the meantime Hull was approached by a personal

friend, Judge W.T. Smith, who was on the point of resigning
and desired Hull to consent to fill out his unexpired term.

^ Hull, op. cit., pp. 27-88.

11 Ihld., p. 33.
12

Ibid., pp. 33-34.

13

Ibid., p. 34.

14

Ibid., pp. 27-28.

Thus it happened on the retirement of Judge Smith that
Cordell Hull succeeded him,15

At the end of this term,

Hull stood for re-election and won,

Through strenuous

application Hull made a marked showing during his eight
years on the state bench.

His reputation for strict law

enforcement followed him.

To many of his friends he ever

remained "Judge" Hull,
At the insistence of his political friends, Hull
became a candidate in the primaries in 1906 for United
States Congressman in the Fourth District in Tennessee,
He won over all competitors in the November elections in
1906.17

He took his seat in Congress in 1907 and

continued there for the next fourteen years.
After he had become a Congressman, he determined to
apply himself to the mastery of the financial and economic
field in government.

He undertook careful and thorough

studies that made him an expert in this field.

As a result

he had a large part in obtaining the lnuome tax
legislation,Is and consistently fought for lower tariff.

15 Hull, 0£. cit«» P16

Itid.. p.

39 •

17 Loc. cit»
18 Ibid., pp. 58-61.
19 Ibid., pp.

59 »

70*

58#

6

Within three years Hull was a political force in Congress.
He was a member of the all-important steering committee,
the House Ways and Means Committee.

20

Thus, by the time he

was thirty nine years old, Hull was an important cog in the
key party wheel and had a share in the leadership of the
party.^l

Within seven years of his election to the United

States Congress, Hull was elected to membership on the
Democratic National Committee.
the next fourteen

years.

He held this position for

22

During these years when Cordell Hull was advancing
in political power and influence, his political creed
continued to grow and emerge, and he arrived at convictions
on some vital Issues of his day.

In 1916, for instance,

Hull became thoroughly convinced that lower tariffs were
the solution of problems of the domestic and world economy
and of the highest priority to the public interest.

He

arrived at a firm conviction that shooting wars for the most
part were the product of economic wars and that, equally
Important, peace is the result of harmonious economi

20 Hull, cj&. Clt., p. 63.
21

Ibid., p. 64.

22 Ibid., p. 74.

7

relations.

He said:

. . . From t h e n o n , t o m e , unhampered t r a d e dove
tailed with peace; high tariffs, trade barriers, and
unfair economic competition, with war. Though realizing
that many other factors were involved, I reasoned that,
if we could get a freer flow of trade—freer In the
sense of fewer discriminations—so that one country
would not be deadly Jealous of another and the living
standard of all countries might rise, thereby
eliminating the economic dissatisfaction that breeds
war, we might have a reasonable chance for lasting
peace.23
This doctrine became a basic and essential part of Hull's
political creed for which he battled for the next twenty
eight years.

He committed himself to the task of

persistent verification of his philosophy of peace:
. . • whether as Congressman, as Senator, as Secre
tary of State or as an American citizens. I carried it
to the London Economic Conference in 1833 and to the
Montevideo Conference later that year. And when I came
hack from South America I pressed it on Congress and
saw the enactment of the Trade Agreements Act in
1934, 24
In the Harding landslide following the first World
War, Hull, was swept out of office.

Nevertheless, he

resisted the many offers to get into more lucrative business
and continued to prepare himself for public service.
practiced law in a small way.

He continued a careful

23 Hull, ££. cit., p. 81*
24 ibid., pp. 84-85.

He

6
student of national and international affairs

and became

firmly convinced that the policy of Isolationism, which was
basic to the successful fight of the Republicans against
Wilson's League of Nations, headed the country to eventual
disaster.25
Cordell Hull made several political speeches that
were severely critical of the policies of the Republican
Administration.

He was elevated to the position of Chairman

of the Democratic National Committee and in this capacity he
was really titular head of the Democractic Party.26

I**

this

position he took over a party that was heavily in debt and
dispirited by defeat.

Hull took his work most seriously

and travelled throughout the country, making vital contacts
with Democratic party leaders, working to lift the
financial debt, and endeavoring to stir the party's faith
and enthusiasm.

To his relief the debt was eventually

paid.27
Soon, Hull was masterminding the campaigns of the
combined National and Congressional Committees.

One

strategy that he learned to use was to keep up an incessant

25

Hull, 0£. cit., p. 112.

25

Ibid., p. 113.

27

Ibid., p. 114.

9

attack where the Republican Party was most vulnerable and on
issues that could be most clearly presented.

Some of these

issues seemed to be ready made, such as, the high tariff in
the Fordney-McCumber Act, or the scandals and maladminis
tration of the Republican Party.

As a result, the election

of 1922 saw the Democratic Party showing considerable
gains.23
Hull was returned to his old seat in Congress in the
elections of 1922.29

He took his place in Congress on

March 4, 1923, and continued to hold the Chairmanship of the
Democratic National Committee until 1924 which was an entire
year after he had resumed his place in oongress.

This

position gave hfm special opportunity to study the currents
of domestic and international developments.

Of no small

part in his position was that it brought him into intimate
contact with such distinguished democratic leaders as
Wilson and Bryan.

Particularly did he value his close

relations with Wilson.

These relations were continued until

Wilson's death in February, 1924.In the capacity of the

26 Hull, op. cit., pp. 114-115.
29

Ibid., p. 115.

30

Ibid.. pp. 117-118•

leader of the opposition party, Hull continued to assail the
Republican administration.

He considered his speech in

Woodward, Oklahoma, on April 13, 1927, to be one of his
"most important addresses• w3l

it contained, he felt, a

statement of the principles that should be kept alive at
that time.
He fought with all his might against the passage of
the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Bill.

While it was in Committee he

fought it vigorously and, finally, when the majority favored
it in the Committee Report, he made a minority report
against it.38
In 1925, Hull had gone as a delegate to the World
Congress of the International Chamber of Commerce in
Brussels, Belgium.

He used this Conference as an occasion

for strenuous advocacy of his peace-through-economics
doctrine.

He seemed to havo carried the day, according to

the results as he reported them;

"The Conference

overwhelmingly supported all phases of the economic
policies in which so many of us were interested."33

Hull, op. cit., p. 128.
38

Ibid.. pp. 132-133.

33

Ibid., p. 125.

In that

11

same year, he introduced into Congress a resolution that
called Tor a permanent international trade agreement
organization to reduce trade barriers.34
Within the Democratic party, Hull's leadership
35
collided with that of the Smith-Raskob faction.
The latter
was essentially a manifestation of the Democratic party of
the cities.

It gained control of the convention that met

in Houston in 1928, and dictated the nomination of A1
Smith for the presidency, and stood against Hull's
convictions on tariff and trade principles.

However, the

election results were a flat repudiation of the SmithRaskob leadership, for the New Yorker carried only eight
states.
Hull was so discouraged over the continued frustration
of his principles in the United States Congress, and the
general outlook in 1939 was so dark, that he was seriously
considering retiring from public life.

However, the

death that year of one of Tennessee's United States Senators
induced Hull to try for the six year senatorial term soon
open for contest.

34

Hull said there were three factors that

Hull, op. clt., p. 126.

35 Ibid., p. 141.
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confirmed this decision.

They were:

. . . First, at Y/ashington the overwhelming
Republican rule was sending the country straight over
the precipice of political and economic isolation.
Secondly, the Democratic organization was tadly s p l i . c n
the whole question of international cooperation and I t s
related domestic questions such as high tariffs.
Finally, a powerful Democratic machine organization was
dominant in Tennessee and was known to rr«fer one of Is
own members for the Senatorial vacancy.
The August primary election proved to be the most contested
and most decisive of the elections.

It *as so c o n c l u s i v e

that Hull called it a -landslide."

He went on to an easy

victory in the November election.

Thus it vas that Cordell

Hull took his place In the United States Senate cn torch

4,

1931.37
Instead of the Smith faction accepting the dismal
defeat of the Democratic party in 1828 as marking the
..
ror them, they were busy, the early
handwriting on the wall lor
.
. „^T,+rryi of the Chicego
part of 1932, trying to gain con
.,«<= to call a meeting of the
convention. Their strategy «as
~1
^ ^
Democratic National Committee soon^af
Congress, and promulgate throug
^
n 4
nP their own creation,
of party policies of tnexr

36 Hull, o£. cit.» P*
57

13S'

Ibid., PP» 132-139•

36 Ibid., P* I41*

&

^ ^

^ ^

t

13
Committee would "be thus in reality usurping the prerogatives
of the Convention, for it was the Convention and it alone
that had the right to adopt a party platform.

Also, there

was the strategy for the continuation of Raskob as chairman
of the Committee.

Hull, in an effort to outmaneuver this

faction, called several National Committeemen together a
few days before the announced meeting time of the
Committee•

Here they devised a plan of counter attach to

frustrate the Smith-Raskob efforts to seise control of the
party.39
HuU

wanted to make economic policy rather than

prohibition the chief issue of the campaign.

He considered

that a concentration on low tariff and commercial policy
would be the most promising line the campaign could folic*.
Above all. be felt that the determination of the party
principles and platform should be left to the Conven

public statements In opposition to the Sm-th-Basko
proposals.40
Cn March 3. 1933. »*«*"»

and stated that Hull could depen

39

Hull, loc. cit.

40 Tbid., PP# 141-142'

noosevelt

^^

called Hull

14
Committeemen from Key York and James Farley from the New
York State Organization fox support in his stand against the
Smith faction,41

This was a clever move, for in making it

Roosevelt put himself in such a position that he became the
rallying point for all anti-Smith Democrats.

Hull felt that

Roosevelt's stand against Smith was decisive at last In
steering the party to Roosevelt,

Hull claimed that he work

ed hard to strengthen Roosevelt's support in the belief
that the best weapon against Smith was Roosevelt.4-2
Hull persistently worked on orienting the Democratic
party towards a tariff revision downward.

He continued to

speak out against any plans to commit the party to high
tariff policies.

In fact, with the aid of an old friend,

Hull formulated the essential parts of the platform of
1932.43

The Democratic party had been split since

Hull did what he could to bring unity to the party, but he
did not surrender any of the essential literal economic and
political principles for this purpose.
When the platform was finally adopted, the Wet Win*
of the party had succeeded in forcing In a plank that called

41 Hull, ££. clt,, pp. 142-143.
42 ibid., p. 145.
43 Ibid., pp. 150-151.

15
fox the repeal of Prohibition, but Hull had von on every
other economic and political principle.44

Hull, for

instance, had von in securing a reversal of his party's
stand on tariff, trade reform, and foreign affairs.45
In the struggle for a nominee in the National
Convention, Hull swung his influence behind the movement
for Franklin D. Roosevelt.

He helped to make the deal with

the California and Texas delegations who assured their
support of Roosevelt if Garner, their candidate, was given
the second place on the ticket.
Later, after the victory of the party in the
elections, Roosevelt surprised Hull with the offer of a
place in his cabinet as Secretary of State.47
offer under consideration.

Hull took the

This would be an alternative to

what he had deemed to be his opportunity for a career in the
Senate.

Hull had served only about one year of his six-year

term in the Senate.

Consequently, he bad to decide where

in the government he could best realize his principles.

44

Hull, op. cit., p. 152.

45

Ibid.. p. 153.

46 Ibid., pp. 153-154.
47

Ibid., p. 156.

48 Ibid., p. 157.

16

Furthermore, he was reluctant to accept the offer
until he had clarified what actually would "be his functions
in that Department. How free would he be to work?

He did

not propose to serve in the role of a figurehead nor as a
flunkey mechanically carrying on correspondence with
foreign governments with no important part in determining
policy.

He wanted to play an important part in creating

and determining policy.

Hull wrote in his memoirs:

What I did have in mind was that it would be my duty
to aid the President in every possible way in the
formulation and conduct of foreign policy.49
Hull presented in conversations with Roosevelt his
conception of the specific role of the Secretary of State.
As he saw it, if he took this appointment, he wanted to be
free to make use of the Department's lifelong experts in
the formulation of proposed policy.

According to Hull,

the President-elect listened intently and agreed fully that
their relations should be as he stated.

Concerning their

working relation, Hull wrote:
. . . I w o u l d f o r s e e and appraise to the fullest
possible extent questions and problems arising or about
to arise and would formulate my own ideas of policy, in
conference with my associates where necessary. I would
then recommend such policy to the President for his
approval or disapproval and suggest the necessary action.

49

Hull, 0£. clt., p. 158.

17
The President himself*, would of course, suggest a
policy on a given situation at any time he might see
fit, and I would develop all facts in relation to it
and then, if he adopted it, carry it out through the
State Department.50
Thus, with the agreement that Hull's part should be vital in
the determination of policy, Hull accepted the President's
offer.
Hull used the time between his acceptance of the
appointment and the inauguration by conferring with the
outgoing Secretary of State, Henry L. Stimson, and such
other key men in the State Department who could help him in
getting Hold of his new duties.51

Hull's background had

qualified him to move with a great deal of confidence in
the field of foreign affairs.S3

Over a period of years he

had followed with lively interest the development in
foreign affairs.

He had made a most careful study of

tariffs from 1888 to 1933.53

His Interest in foreign

affairs had been especially strong since the outbreak
World War I. He had maintained a close association
Wilson until his death., and had profited by Wilson's Insight
and experience in foreign affairs.

50 Hull, loc. cit»
51

Ibid., P-

52

Ibid., P- 162«

53 XjOC * cit.

16°*

His long and frequent

18
talks with Wilson and Bryan had bean very revealins to him.
As Chairman of the Democratic National Committee from
1921 to 1924, he had been a careful reader of articles and
books on the leading aspects of foreign affairs. Hull's
self-evaluation was as follows;
I was vain enough to believe I was not a novice In
foreign affairs when I entered the State Department. I
had some definite ideas on what our foreign policy should
be in the vital fields. I believed X had in mind the
methods to make these ideals work.54

54

Ibid., p. 163

CHAPTER II
THE DETERIORATION OF
UNITED STATES-LATIN AMERICAN RELATIONS
The first quarter of the twentieth century recorded a
continuing deterioration in relations between the United
States and Latin America, Much of the fuel that fed these
fires of animosity came from specific actions on the part
of the United States in intervening in the internal affairs
of Central America and the Caribbean Islands,

We propose to

survey sixteen of these actions that contributed to the
estrangement of the Latin American nations from the United
States,

The story begins with the end of the Spanish-

American War and closes with the Cooli&ge Administration,
1,

Fears of United States' imperialism, growing out

of the Spanish-American War.

The displacement of Spanish

power in the Caribbean and in the Pacific set in motion
forces that were bound to contribute their part in the
deterioration of United States-Latin American relations.
After Spain lost the remnant of her empire in the defeat of
the Spanish-American War and became aware of the startling
fact that she was without European friends, she decided to
seek new friendships in Latin America.
a well-developed propaganda campaign.

She put into effect
In this they

20

encouraged the rise of "Yankeephobia," the fear of the
United States among the Latin Americans, and suggested that
Spain was the natural comrade and ally of Spanish America,
This movement, known as Hispano Americanlsmo or PanHispanism, was an exclusive and combative pan-nationalistic
movement.

Like its antagonist, the Pan-American organization,

it became better known after 1900.1
Haring points out that Spain was determined to use the
Pan-Hispanic movement as a means to forward the spiritual
re conquest of its lost colonies and the formulation of a
union of Spanish speaking people similar to the Hapsburg
Empire in Europe.

The nature of the movement is further

defined in the following manner:
It is a movement for intellectual inter penetration,
diplomatic solidarity, economic cooperation, a sort 01
international federalism of the former colonies and
their mother country, perhaps ultimately approaching In
organization the Federation of British Commonwealths.
Thus, its purpose was to promote the racial, cultural,
economic, and political solidarity of the Latin American
races.

Its main appeal was to the racial consciousness of

the Latin American peoples in opposition to

Anglo-Saxon

1 Tom B. Jones and W. Donald Beatty, An Introduction
to Hispanic American History« p« 501*
2 Clarence H. Haring, South America Looks at the
United States, p. 168.

£1
domlnation.•3
Sllva, one of the more radical Pan Hispanists of
Latin America, stated a grand plan for Spanish world empire
revival. Such a proposed empire would include: Spain,
Portugal, Brazil, the Latin American Republics, Gibraltar,
Morocco, Puerto Rico, Fallcland Islands, and the Panama
Ganal. Rlppy. a scholar of Latin American History, details
further of Silva's plan:
The integrity of
^^^Cuba^ento*Domingo,
influence must be coun^^d the New Hispanic nation
And Central America.
the Strait of
r n _i
Soul* control both the!and all the
Magellan, as well as th3 ^ x
south American
Islands adjacent to the Centram ana
coasts A
the erowth of the power and aggressThe phenomena of the growm
iveness of the United States had molted Hispanic America to
attempt to form a united front against her.

More than one

conference of Latin American States *as held In th s
attempt.
.tha v0rth
Thus hatred and fear
J^^lplnic American
provided a subject upon
became one of
politicians could agree and this s
canism «s
the bases upon which Pan-Hisp^
built„5
, n H Wainhouse, A History 2^
3 J. H. Latane and D. H.^
American Foreign Polrc£, p,
•
Hispanic
4 J*F- T i l ^ ^
America,"
Political Scienc_
5

Jones and Beatty, 2E.*

4 0 1

*

'

4 0 8

'

J u M

''
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Spain has been the main creator and driving genius
behind the Pan-Hispanic movement.

However, some Latin

American scholars, writers, and politicians have
proclaimed this new doctrine with great enthusiasm.

The

Latin American exponents of Pan-Hlspanlsm play d«m Spain's
place in It and emphasize the Importance of the Union of
Latin American States.

Especially Is this urged as a

counterbalance to the penetration of the United States Into
Latin America and as an Instrument to combat the -YanEee
peril."

Several Intellectuals have championed Pan

Hlspanlsm In some form.

They Mere called:

only ie^oflavirl^^
the
deterioration,
Consciousness in a phrase,
disappearance of h±s^°^^fitlation, unless they avail
denationalization
to promote a vigorous
themselves of every opp
fullest and most glorious
revival of Hispanism in its iuxx«
sense.®
8.

Cuba.

The tempos feneriSSl

occupation oT

* v, of-nities between the Spanish end
At the end of hostili
th£t

American troops, and following the

sub^U®

¥8S

coimtry

agreed to. the American military occupied^th^^ ^
^
and administered the public aff

6

Rippyf ££• 23&»*

v* 406#

d.

This

lasted until 1902.
United States policy towards Cuba had been clarified
even before America went to war with Spain.

In the Teller

resolution the United States had made an unmistakable
avowal of American purpose relative to the future of Cuba.
In it the United States disclaimed all intention of annexing
Cuba, but certified that after pacification was achieved the
American purpose was "to leave the government and control of
the island to its people."

However, President McKlnley did

not interpret this American commitment to mean that Cuba was
to be cut adrift nor placed in a condition of unfettered
liberty with America completely washing its hands of her.
He held that the United States had "assumed before the world
grave responsibility for the future good government of
Cuba."
"The new Cuba," he said, "... must needs be bound
to us by ties of singular intimacy and strength if its
enduring welfare is to be assured."7
The American military governor of Cuba, General
Leonard Wood, responded to the impatience at the American
military rule in Cuba from both Cubans and anti-imperialists
in the United States by providing for municipal elections

Julius W. Pratt, American Colonial Experiment, p.
119, also, Richardson, A Compilation of the Messages and
Papers of the Presidents. XIV, p. 6377.
7
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foi June, 1900, end fox the election of delegates to a
constitutional convention to draw up and adopt a constitu
tion.

But the Governor's order went a step further, and

insisted on mailing provision for special relations to exist
Between the United States government and the government of
Cuba.

This appeal for such a definition of relations be

tween Cuba and the United States was overlooked by the
Cuban constitutional convention.

Ellhu Root, the American

Secretary of State, pointed out to Governor Wood the
specific items for which the American government considered
the Cubans must provide.

Wood reported strong Cuban

opposition to these proposals and pointed out that It woul
be easier for the Cuban delegates to aocede to these
proposals if the proposals should he presented In the form
of demands to which the Cubans were given little choice bu
to accept if they desired Cuban stability.

As a result,

Hoct.s proposals were introduced in and passed by the .ana
4 4-4 r\yi pill
end was known
as an Amendment to the Army Appropriation
as the Piatt Amendment.8
3.

The Piatt Amendment*

towards the deterioration o

8

Ibid., p*

120'

Ar^t-hPr contributing factor
An
States-Latin American
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relations was American diplomatic and political intervention
in the internal affairs of Cuba whereby Cuba was coerced
into acceptance of the Piatt Amendment proposals. The United
States officials insisted that military occupation would
cease only when these provisions were adopted as a part of
the Cuban Constitution, and later incorporated into the
United States-Cuban agreement that would define the
relations between the two nations with exactness, the
definitive treaty.
V/hen these proposals were brought up in the
Constitutional Convention the Cubans protested vigorously.
On the first ballot the Cubans turned them down decisively
by a vote of twenty-four to two.9 The Convention objected
to these proposals on the ground that they impaired the
independence and sovereignty of the island, and that it was
their duty to make Cuba "independent of every other nation,
the great and noble American nation included."1° Seeking to
justify the highly controversial Article Three, Secretary of
State Hoot pointed out that it was not synonymous with
American meddling with Cuban affairs, but would be resorted

9

Ibid., pp. 121-122:.

10 Latane

y/a 1 nhouse, op. cit.. p. 512.

to only in case of foreign threats or domestic dusturbances.
Aside from these conditions, Cuba would be left entirely
alone to control its own affairs. This article, so he
claimed, was:
. . . the Monroe Doctrine, but with international
force. Because of it, European nations will not dispute
the intervention of the United States in defense of the
independence of Cuba.H
After a series of conferences between Root and the
members of the Convention, the American proposals were
passed.

The United States was given the right of

intervention in Cuba and the specific right to build and
control naval bases in Cuba.

Thus, Cuba was left in the

condition of a protectorate of the United States.
4.

Intervention in Panama.

Another step that

strengthened the American hold on the Caribbean, but in the
long run became a weapon in the hands of anti-American
propagandists, was the Panama project. This was to bring
Central America into the sphere of American influence and
convert the Caribbean into an American lake.

One of the

fruits of the emergence of America as a world power was the
settled conviction that it was of highest strategic
H P. C. Jessup, Elihu Root, I, p. 219, crlted by Pratt
in American Colonial Experiment, p. 122, ^l£°, ^
^ *
Perfrins, Monroe Doctrine, 1867-1907, pp. 597-402.
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importance Tor national defense that a canal be built
speedily that would adequately take care of the oceangoing
traffic to and from the Pacific Ocean.

In the Hay-

Pauncefote Treaty, Britain withdrew from seeking the
predominant position in the Caribbean and left the united
States with a free hand to construct and defend a canal in
Central America.

Treaty agreements that were basic to the

construction of the canal had passed the United States
Senate only to be rejected by Colombia, which apparently
was holding out for more money from the United States.
When all likelihood of speedy action on the canal
project was "thwarted by Colombia's rejection of the very
treaty that would have authorized the American construction
of such a canal across the Isthmus of Panama, President
Theodore Roosevelt sought some way to break this deadlock
and get the enterprise under way.

Roosevelt's advisors

suggested that without a treaty he would be Justified in
moving in and building the canal at once.

Justification

could be found for such action, he was told, under the
fifty-year-old treaty with Granada that said "the right of
way or transit across the Isthmus of Panama* should be "free
and open to the government and citizens of the United
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States."13 Even without the old treaty the Dhlted States
might be justified in forcing Colombia to agree to this
construction of an essential link in the roads of world
commerce.

Colombia should not be allowed to bar the gates

on the great highways of the world.

This seemed to be a

kind of -Sight-of-eminent-domain argument,^
Should Panama remain quiet, the President was
prepared to recommend to Congress "that we should at once
occupy the Isthmus anyhow, and proceed to dig the Canal."14
However, Panama did not remain quiet.

With the adjournment

of Colombia's Senate without action on the Hay-Herran
treaty, Panama refused to "be a party with this decision and,
consequently, revolted against Colombia.

American naval and

military forces were so dispersed in that area that
Colombia's troops were denied free movement in pursuit of the
Panamanian rebels.

At this point Colombia promised

feverishly that she would speedily ratify the treaty, but
the American Administration chose to go along with Panama.
The third day after the beginning of the revolt the United
States recognized Panama's independence, and by the twelfth
12 H. F. Pringle, Theodore Roosevelt. pp. 316-317.
13 Piatt, op. cit., pp. 102-103.
14

Ifrid.. p. 103.

day a treaty had been signed that in reality made Panama a
protectorate of the United States.
Some years later Theodore Roosevelt»s evaluation of
his actions in this deal was:
let Congress debate."15

"I took the canal zone and

mj took Panama without consulting

the Cabinet."16
The United States received, under provisions of the
treaty,

. , in perpetuity the use, occupation and

control" of a ten-mile wide zone across the Isthmus.

Within

this area the United States could exercise all the rights
and authority of sovereignty.

It might use armed forces and

build fortifications to defend the canal.17
Roosevelt's policy relative to Cuba raised a storm
of protests in Colombia and in the United States.16

But so

little response did it arouse from Latin American States
generally that Ugarte, the super-patriot and consecrated
Pan-Hispanist, complained:

«

But the sanction was also offered by us when we left
Colombia to protest alone, and hastened to recognize, at

15 New York Times, March 24, 1911, and cited by
Pringle in Theodore Roosevelt. p. 330.
16 Theodore Roosevelt, Autobiography. p. 548.
17 Pratt, op. cit.. p. 107.
IB E. Ethan Ellis, A Short History of American
Diplomacy, p. 252.
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the promptings of Washington, the new state which had
just been artificially founded. No example exists of
greater precipitation in covering up a surprise and
making it irremediable and it had not even the excuse
of being imposed by circumstances. There was no obli
gation upon us to do so. If from one end of the
Continent to the other we bowed to events, it was out of
naive humility, which brought us no profits, which was
not extorted by fear of reprisals, but was duo to the
blind attraction exerted over us by the prestige of this
hypnotic power.
It is true that in certain places this abdication was
cloaked by the invariable formulas of "progress and
•civilization. • The imperialist tendency sometimes
seems actually to have as
uses
1arain-t in
countries which it injures as in the
it as a weapon. I have heard it more spoken again.* in
the Uhited States than in

who

govern

Spanish-American republics in which the men who g
confine themselves to drawing from the customs
^
loans the money necessary to help keep tnemsex
power. .. -19

There vas very little immediate resentment or fear
generated against the United States because of the policy
adopted by the United States in Panama for within a few day
ail except three of the Latin ^erican republics had
Tt would take considerable
recognized the new republic. It
-Latin American mind against the
agitation to incense the Latin am

united States and in the achievement of this, large cr
must be given to the organized Propaganda efforts o
Pan-Hispanist. Here is a sample of Ugarte-s technique.
nf a

19 Manuel Ugarte, The Des

It

Continent, p< 132•

is taken from an account of his tour through Latin America
in the interest of Latin American solidarity:
As I landed in Colon, I recalled the words pronounced
by Roosevelt at the opening of the St. Louis Exposition:
We have begun to take possession of the Continent.'
• ' * "is arbitrary and dictatorial manner made the
policy of the United States take a great stride, by
means of which Mexico and Central America have been
surrounded, the Pacific dominated, the absorption of
the Antilles insured, and the dominion of the United
States over the Caribbean Coasts guaranteed. Thus the
Bew Rome has rounded off her Mediterranean in the very
heari/ of the New Y/orld, and advanced her centers of
influence half-way along the route to the South.20
5. Intervention in Santo Domingo. The American
policy of preventive intervention in the Dominican Republic
provided the basis for serious charges from the antiAmerican forces in the hemisphere. In the effort at the
settlement of the problems that Santo Domingo posed,
Roosevelt affirmed his famous Corollary to the Monroe
Doctrine.
Through extravagant and unpractical administrative
policies> the Dominican Republic had built up, by June, 1905,
a staggering national debt of $40,269,404.38.21 This debt
was owed not to the business men of one nation, but it was
spread out over several nations: Italians, Belgians, French,

20 ibid.. pp. 138-135.
21 Jones and Beatty, op. cit., p. 633.
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and Americans. By 1903 the Dominicans had mortgaged their
general revenue to the foreign creditors and agreed to
present receipts from specific ports to apply on the debts
that were owed to a particular nation. For instance, the
ports of the northern coast were pledged primarily to
Americans and secondarily to Italians. In the event payments
according to these agreements were not met, it was agreed
that a financial agent that was appointed by the American
creditors should take over the administration of the custom
houses that were mortgaged. However, when the Americans
took these actions it was a signal for the Europeans to do
likewise. Thus appeared the prospects of Indefinite
European occupation of sections of this strategic Caribbean
island.

It was at this Juncture that Theodore Roosevelt, in

December. 1904. stated to Congress his famous Corollary to
the Monroe Doctrine.

Since the Monroe Doctrine forbid

foreign nations to keep order in Latin America, the United
States had a moral obligation to maintain order there::
. . . Chronic
ofPoiSime"sScie?^tS
l00
in a general
|®^g °£ere ultimately require intermay in America, as e^ewh
'
^ ^ the Western
vention by some ®Jviliz®d ^ the United States to the
Hemisphere the adherence
United States, however
r°e?uct8a££y'^ S»t cases of such wrongdoing or
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impotence, to the exercise of an international police
power. * . .22 ,
At this point and at the suggestion of the United
States, Santo Domingo invited the United States to intervene
end establish a custom receivership over the entire country#
To this effect, a treaty was signed by America end the
Dominicans that authorized custom collection by the United
States with 45 per cent of the fund to go to the Dominican
government and 55 per cent to go to the payment of debts#
When the United States Senate refused to sanction this kind
of American policy in Santo Domingo, Theodore Roosevelt
went ahead for two years, 1905 to 1907, and by executive
action provided for the collection of revenue with the
administration of the receipts# The debt was scaled down
from $40,000,000 to $17,000,000. The provisions for custom
supervision were written into the treaty which the United
States Senate finally accepted#

A new loan of $20,000,000

that would liquidate the old debts was extended by the
United States to Cuba. The general collector of customs was
to be an American, and no increase in the debt was to be made
23
except by American consent until the old debt was paid#
^ Henry Steele Commager, Documents of American
History. II, p. 170.
23
^ Faulkner, American Political and Social
History. p. 586#
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There seems "to be no evidence of the solidarity of
Latin American hostility to the American policy adopted
concerning the Dominican Republic,

Dexter Perkins nakos

the affirmation based on his careful examination of State
Department communications from the latin America! Statos In
1905 and 1906 that It is surprising that "evidences of
resentment are so few.
opinion."

There was by no means unanimity of

This historian of Latin American affairs wont on

to say:
. . . in opposition to the naw^do«g^;*t^9^e;heh#
doctrine was condemned it was 1
t±
The maneuvers
c^e^e to -.he United
foreign offices were
Of the diplomats constituted no cnaxx u,
States.24
In fact. Dexter Perkins makes an emphatic and
comprehensive denial of the existence of any exta..slve an
American agitation against the United States
Santo Domingo:

P

.rofound one to

It would be an e«°*'.i^ollary Lrks a netemcrn
imagine that the Roosevel
tjM states of ?£^ cf
phosis in our
is the scanty eviden =lR.5ter,
America. The
±n the ^^sr&t,c^Stover"'ay
cur
s
s
resentment which e^ $ +j!;J cress; tod vh£teT!f-t•I
and to the language
^hwi|d0m of the
-t3
re
a
t
views with
f ^t peJSit ourselves to e:»&,
policy we must not P®* . sheer romantlciconsequences. It ^^fllty to the American
that it created a new

~ 4.51-452.
24 perktos, ££a clt., PP*
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government* The policy was temporarily successful. It
was to lead on* it is true, to more sweeping and more
violent measures. The increasingly sensitive national
consciousness of the nations of the South was more end
more to react against American practises with the
passing of time. 25
The anti-American Pan-Hispanists were to use the
American policy of intervention in Santo Domingo again and
again as a small sample of what America intended to do to
all of Latin America.

When Ugarte, the famous Argentinian

Pan-Hispanist, was in Santo Domingo on his

self

-appointed

mission to tour and arouse all of Latin America against the
"American menace," he could use at a fitting moment in his
address the American Naval vessels within sight as graph!
cally symbolizing the American threat of domination:

-I had

spoken quite freely on the same subject, pointing
platform through the open window at the Cruisers anchored in
the bay." 26
m effort

to counteract any growing rears cf .he

Latin American States concerning the new American policy.
_
otated in the Third American
S e c r e t a r y of State,
Elihu Hoot, stated
conference cf the American States at Rio de Janeiro * i-~6.
We wish for no 'l^°ries butothose^f^eace^e"
territory except our own,

25

Ibid., p.

455 *

26 ugarte, o£* cit., p.

79 •

th9

Z6

sovereignty over ourselves. ... We neither dale nor
desire any rights or privileges, or powers that we do
not freely concede to every other American Republic.L?
The growing national consciousness oi scn.e or the
Latin American States caused them to take one of tho
following attitudes i

Y/e have become full-grown and are

quite able to take care of ourselves. There is really no
danger in this hemisphere from foreign aggressions, Too
fiat of the United States is not law upon this contlnont.
We resent the aggressive advancements of the United States
in the Caribbean region.^®
Latin American statesmen had said of tho Monroe
Doctrine when it was first proclaimed, "a gospel of the new
Continent" and a "benefit to all humanity* but vinen various
additions were made to this Doctrine their modified views
were expressed in the following descriptions of whe United
States:

"Colossus of the North," and "Yankee Imperialism.

Alejandro Alvarez classified the prominent Latin
American political leaders and publicists and their
respective ideas relative to the Monroe Doctrine in
categories:
A. Curtis Wllgus, The DevelosSnS.°Z
America, pp. 694-695,
27

28

Loc. cit.

29 Loc. cit.
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First, "They give the Monroe Doctrine its true mean
ing and consider that it has been beneficial to America."
These are:

Adarson of Costa Rica, Drago of Argentina,

Lastarria of Chile, Dr. de la Plaza and Deputy Emilio Mitre
of Argentina, and Senator Otero of Uruguay.
Second,
They confuse the Monroe Doctrine with the policy of
imperialism and hegemony, and openly condemn it as an
act of aggression on the part of the United States
against the weak states of Latin America.
These are: Saenz Pena of Argentina, Perez Triana of
Colombia, Carlos Pereya of Mexico, Policarpo Bonilla of
Honduras, Garcia Calderon of Peru, Leina of Brazil, et al.
Third,
They treat the Monroe Doctrine in conjunction with
the policv of imperialism and hegemony, with no
result than that of producing confusion in the mind oi
the reader.
This is the form in which nearly all the remaining
publicists and professors of international law in Latin
America treat the subject, such as:

Alfaro of Panama,

Clovis Beveloqua of Brazil, Mojica of Chile, Torres of
Brazil, Ulloa of Peru, and Wilmore of Argentina.
Fourth, "They make due distinction between the Monroe
Doctrine and the policy of imperialism and hegemony."
Exemplifying this point of view are:

Planas Suarez of

Venezuela, and Alejandro Alvarez of Chile.
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Fifth,
They declare that the Monroe Doctrine is out-worn,
that it has had its day, and that in any event well
organized countries, especially Chile, Argentina,
Brazil, Uruguay, and Peru have no need of it.
This attitude is voiced hy Dr. Zeballcs of Argentina and
Don Marcial Martinez of Chile.30
6.

United States intervention under provisions of

Piatt Amendment.

Another American action that contributed

to the deterioration of United States-Latin American
relations was the American military occupation of Cuba from
1906-1909.

The Cuban general election of 1906 ended by the

losing political party talcing up arms in revolt.

The Cuban

President appealed to the United States for help to maintain
domestic order.

'When the United States was convinced that

the Cuban political parties would not cooperate in the
establishment of a Cuban civil government, then reluctantly,
the United States established a temporary military
government in September 29, 1906, with William Howard Taft
as the Governor.

Such action at that time was particularly

embarassing to the American Administration.

The Secretary

of State was on a tour of Latin America doing his best to
build up good understanding between Latin America and the

30

Alejandro Alvarez, The Monroe Doctrine, p. 201

59

United States.

Such an intervention would make a mockery of

his strong protestations as a messenger of good will.31
Some Latin American countries were thoroughly
convinced, before this military intervention in Cuba in
1906, that America's design was that of a confirmed
imperialist. In the Cuban La Dlscusion and the Mexican
Herald this point of view was affirmed and "the Big Stick
bxandishment only convinced them the more of it."7>2. On
the very same date that the American military government
took over in Cuba, The Literary Digest printed its appraisal
of Latin American attitude toward the United States and the
ultimate- results of Pan-Americanism:
The South Americans regard with suspicious eye, to
judge from the South American Press, the Rio de Janeiro
Congress, and the ideas of Pan-Americanism, with
corollaries of inter-arbitration and closer trade rela
tions with the United States. . . • But suspicions
against the Northern Republic have not been allayed even
by Mr. Root's honeyed words. . • • The Lei (Santiago de
Chile) thinks that the advantages in the way of progress
reaped from Pan American Congresses have been nil. 0
This was one time that Theodore Roosevelt did not
relish bhe manipulation of the Big Stick. Instead, he was
thoroughly disgusted at being forced to use such means at

31

Ellis, ££. cit., p. 287.

32

Literary Digest, August, 19Q6.

33

Literary Digest. September 29, 1906.
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that time*

He expressed this in a letter to a friend:

Just at the moment I am so angry with that infernal
little Cuban republic that I would like to wipe its
people off the face of the earth. All that we wanted
from them was that they would behave themselves and be
prosperous and happy so that we would not have to
interfere. And now, lo and behold, they have started an
utterly unjustifiable and pointless revolution, and may
get things into such a snarl that we have no alternative
save to intervene—which will at once convince the
suspicious idiots in South America that we do wish to
Interfere after all, and perhaps have some land
hunger.
The sole purpose of the Provisional Government under
the United States in Cuba was to establish order and hold
elections so that government would be in Cuban hands.
advisory commission was established.

An

It drafted laws

covering various things, such as, municipal and provincial
elections, Civil Service, the judiciary.

Cubans finally took

over the government in the election of 1908.
7.
Justice.

Repudiation of the Central American Court of
Still another reason for the deterioration of inter-

American relations was the American support of diplomatic
intervention in Central American affairs by her approbation
of non-recognition policies of Central American republics.
For several years bad relations prevailed among the five

34 uieodore Roosevelt to White, September 13, 1906,
cited by Thomas H. Bailey, & Diplomatic History of the
American People, p. 349.
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Central American republics.

Wars and revolutions were the

rule rather than the exception.

In 1907 the threat of war

between Nicaragua and the other Central American republics
confronted the United States with a crisis,

A prolonged

period of political turmoil here might be the occasion for
the intervention in Central America by some European nation.
Such an event would endanger the security of the Canal Zone,
Mexico and the United States, conscious of this possibility,
joined in an endeavor to settle this political and economic
disturbance by inviting the combatants to a conference at
which America and Mexico would be the mediators.

Two

conferences were held with limited success in the Central
American area.

Finally, a fully represented conference met

at Washington,

At this conference, after due consideration,

several important agreements were made.

Among these were

the following:
First, a treaty was arranged.
Second, a Central American Court of Justice was
established.

It was to be composed of five justices, one of

which was to be taken from each of the five Central American
states.

It was agreed that all international disputes in

Central America should be submitted to this Court,

A

Central American Bureau was set up in Guatemala City.
Honduras was neutralized as a battle ground.
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Third, they agreed not to promote revolutionary
movements in other states or to recognize new revolutionary
governments until they were approved by free elections.
How the United States played a leading role in
bringing about the ultimate failure of the Court is in
fact an episode not entirely to our credit, but rather the
result of inconsiderate American actions. The United
States had actively engaged in encouraging the adoption of
these agreements, but was not a party to any of them. It
had been decided that a majority vote of the Judges would be
final in the decisions reached.
Under the Bryan Chamorro Treaty the United States
obtained 'a perpetual end exclusive right to construct
a canal through Nicaragua, a ninety-nine year lease 01
the Great and the Little Corn Islands in the
Caribbean, and a ninety-nine year right to establish a
naval base in Nicaraguan territory on the Gulf 01
Fonseca.l33
America, in return, was to pay Nicaragua $3,000,000 which was
to go on the Nicaraguan debt.36

But three of Nicaragua's

Centrsl. American neighbors disagreed with the provisions of
this treaty, and consequently filed protests against this
treaty before the Central American Court of Justice.37

35 Foreign Relations of the United States., 1916, pp.
649-850.
36

£bld.» P* 651.

37

Ibid., pp. 653-866, 893-898.

43

The verdict was against Nicaragua.3®

Since the

United States was not a party to the agreements that set up
the court she was not subject to the court's jurisdiction.
Neither Nicaragua nor the United States accepted the
decision as binding.39
Nevertheless, the United States was to be censured for
not conferring with the other Central American Republics
most vitally concerned and working out an agreement to the
interests of all.

Instead she was guilty of destroying a

valuable piece of hemispheric peace machinery in a somewhat
ruthless fashion.

Latin America did not forget this.

A

prominent Latin American political leader referred to this
as:
... the bitterly criticized dissolution of the
Central American Court of International Justice, the
first of its kind in the world, because of a decision
contrary to the interests of the United States.40
Dollar Diplomacy in Nicaragua. Another contribu
ting cause to increase bad feelings between the United
States and Latin America was the financial intervention
initiated under Taft in 1909 and strengthened by the signing

58

Ibid., pp. 886-898.

39

Pratt, 0£. clt.. pp. 137-138.

40 T. H. Reynolds, editor, The Progress of Pan-fce|icanlsm: A Historic Survey of Latin American Opinion, p. 126.
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of the Khox-Castrillo Convention June 6, 1911. Taft used
the full weight of the Executive to establish Dollar
Diplomacy in Nicaragua.
Dollar Diplomacy was practiced long before and long
since the Taft Administration, but it is especially
associated with his administration. It was the practice
of using diplomacy to advance and protest American business
abroad and the use of dollars abroad to promote the ends
and purposes of American diplomacy. Claims are made that
aside from United States-Cuban relations:
. . . the Nicaraguan intervention began earliest
and continued longest, was the least active, aud^
produced less local hostility than any to be studied.
The American financial aggression in Nicaragua was
provoked by the Nicaraguan dictator Zelaya's hostility to
American capitalists. He was working in 1909 to cancel a
mining concession that was controlled largely by American
financiers for whom Knox had served as attorney before he
became Taft(s Secretary of State. Worst of all, Zelaya
had passed up American financiers and had chosen a British
concern through which to refund the national debt. To
Taft and Knox this represented not only a loss of potential
profits, but constituted a probable source of outside
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intervention*42
In the revolution against Zelaya in 1909 two
Americans who were serving with the insurgents were captured
and executed*

Knox broke off diplomatic relations with

Nicaragua over this incident.4^

Diaz, in time, succeeded

in displacing Zelaya and a rapprochement was made that was
based upon the Khox-Castrillo Convention*

Provisions were

made for refunding the Niearaguan debt through American
financial loans*

Return payment was to be secured by

American operation of a custom's receivership*

Thus, it

gave to the United States the right of intervention.

The

agreement was signed June 6, 1911,
Within a month after signing the Khox-Castrillo
Convention, Nicaragua defaulted in its payment on its
foreign debt*

Without waiting for Senate action on the

agreement, Knox persuaded American financiers to advance
money for Nicaragua*

But the United States Senate adjourned

without ratifying the Khox-Castrillo Convention*
was desperate for funds.

Nicaragua

She finally obtained a loan of

$1,500,000; in return and for security the American bankers
who advanced the money secured control of the National Bank

42 XiOC* citrn
43
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of Nicaragua and the government-owned railway.

The contract

pledged the customs in payment and that the collections
were to be in the hands of an American. 44

A Claims

Commission squeezed down the American claims on the
Nicaraguan National Debt from $7,500,000 to $538,750, 45
and the total claims against Nicaragua were reduced from
$13,750,000 to $1,750,000. 46

YJhen ratification by the

Senate was still unrealized by 1912 the American bankers
were so involved that the Department of State felt dutybound to protest the banker's interest.

When domestic

dissatisfaction with the treaty in Nicaragua provoked a
revolution there, American intervention seemed the only
assured solution for the security of American interests.
Consequently, American Marines occupied Managua.

In time

Adolfo Diaz 1 need for funds combined with Knox's fear of
Germany and linked with strategic consideration over the
canal route produced another Treaty that was signed
February 8, 1913, but this came too late for action in
Taft's Administration.

Along with other privileges, the

Treaty provided for the granting of an option to the

44 Foreign Relations in the United States. 1912,
pp. 1078-1079.
45
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United States for the construction of the canal on the
American payment of $3,000,000.
Ugarte had the following to say of the Latin
American tour made by Secretary of State of Taft's Admin
istration, Philander C. Knox.

Noting that Knox's route

crossed or followed close behind his own, the Argentine
publicist noted:
By a curious coincidence, just after this campaign
of mine the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Mr.
Philander C. Knox, left the United States to make, in
his turn, the tour of all the Spanish-American
countries, beginning with the Argentine and ending with
Mexico.
It was plainly to be seen that the fraternal
character of the visit was a diplomatic facade. Only
in an idyllic world should a minister put himself out
to go and carry disinterestedly gentle messages of
tenderness from people to people. The real object was
to study on the spot the movement towards solidarity
which was beginning to be talked about. 47
Ugarte's type of distortion is indicated by the
following misquotation published under Ugarte's name in the
Panama Newspaper La Estrella de Panama, August 24, 1912.
The quotation was supposedly taken from President Taft's
a r t i c l e i n the McClure Magazine of May, 1909.

Taft's

statement as reported by Ugarte was:
Pprhanq the dav i s not distant when three banners of
t h e S t a r s a n d S t r l p e s «1U
the p e n s i o n of
territo ry a t three equidistant spots: one at the North
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Pole., one at the Panama Canal, and the third at the
South Pole: the whole hemisphere will be ours de facto
as in virtue of our racial superiority it already is
de jure.^Q
9. Diplomatic intervention in Mexico to displace
Huerta.

American diplomatic intervention in Mexico was

the basis for an increase in anti-American feelings in
Latin America. This kind of intervention by the United
States began on March 11, 1913.

President V.'oodrow Wilson

stood squarely against the recognition of Huerta's claim
to the office made vacant by the death of President Kadero.
Madero had been murdered in cold blood.

Wilson's objection

to Huerta was based upon his contention that Huerta was
only a military usurper who held power only because of
murder

of Madero, the legitime head of the Mexican state.

At best Huerta's regime was to he considered as being only
provisional and represented only a relatively minor
section of Mexico. United States' recognition, Wils.n
affirmed, should he reserved alone for the legltlmat
Mexican Bcecutive, who had heen duly and freely elected to
the office.49

AO

49

138.

tJgarte, o£. cit•, PP* -L^4 ^
a History of Latin America, PDavid R. Moore, A History __

49

Wilson affirmed that the American policy during his
administration was to be that of cooperating only with
governments that rest without a doubt upon the consent of
the governed.

He said:

. . . Just governments rest always upon the consent
of the governed. ... We can have no sympathy with
those who seek to seize the power of government to
advance their own personal interests or ambitions.
England had recognized Huerta.

Britain wanted a

more favorable policy adopted towards her regarding the
Panama Canal.

Wilson apparently had a deal with England

to the effect that he would see that the canal tolls 1
exemption was repealed if England would Join the United
States in diplomatic pressure upon Huerta.
determined to eliminate Huerta.^

"1

Wilson was

going to teach the

South American republics to elect good meni" Wilson
a?
announced.
One step in establishing Unite.. States1 Diplomatic
pressure on Mexico was Wilson's replacement of Ambassador
to Mexico, Henry Lane Wilson, who had established a close
relation with Huerta.

50
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representative, John Lind, went to Mexico.

Lind carried a

series of suggestions from the President to Mexican
authorities. These suggestions called for an early and free
election in which Huerta should not be a candidate. In
case of national acceptance of the results of the election,
Wilson would approve a banker's loan to Mexico.53

Huerta's

refusal to accede to any of these suggestions provoked
Wilson to make pronouncements designed ultimately to force
Huerta's resignation.
Wilson's diplomatic pressure on Huerta was increased
in the following fashion: First, there was a statement to
Congress in which Wilson enjoined "watcnful waiting.
Accompanying this statement was the application of strict
arms embargo. The next statement was made in the speech
that ha delivered at Mobile, Alabama, in which he reiterated
his faith in responsible government and affirmed that this
country would never again seek to conquer territory.

A

third statement was a note sent to Huerta affirming his
"immediate duty to require Huerta's: retirement from the
Mexican Government. . - .»54
with Wilson.

The British were new standing

Again, less than three weeks later,
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following statement was sent Huerta:
The present policy of the Government of the Unite!
States is to isolate General Huerta entirely; to cut
him off from foreign sympathy and aid end from domes
tic credit, whether moral or material, and to force
him out.55
A few days later Wilson stated to Congress: "There can be
no certain prospect to peace in America until General Huerta
has surrendered his usurped authority. ...

^

statements seemed to be unavailing. Diplomatic pressure
was not enough to force Huerta out. Wilson lifted the arms
embargo so that munitions could reach Carranza, a rival
claimant of Huerta's to the Mexican presidency, and
stationed United States Naval units off Vera Cruz to impede
European arms shipment to Huerta.
latin American resentment at Wilson's policy of
diplomatic pressure on Huerta was found in the latin American
press. Of Wilson's address to Congress regarding
La Prensa of Argentina stated that it merely served to
fortify Huerta's position in

-American public opin on.

latin

The policy of Mr.
f
that is to unite the La
hostile federation a reality
Uncle Sam and make such ^£
which it has hitnerto
instead of the political area^
been.57
55 Ellis, loo* cit.
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One of Latin America's most important papers, La
Prensa. of Lima, Peru, clarified its position relative to
President Wilson's policy of trying to throw Huerta out as
follows"
The President's declaration that he could not
recognize Huerta's Government because it was found-d
upon treason is extremely interesting. It would how
ever have had more effect if it had been, made immediately
on the death of Madero, at a moment when all civilized
nations were feeling a thrill of horror over the deed.
If President Wilson had spoken then, probably the
provisional Government of Mexico would never have been
recognized by the European and South American powers,
and the United States would not have been Involved in
these awkward complications which she is meeting today,
and whose end and solution no one can forsee. A frank
and energetic attitude would have nipt In the bud the
present growing peril. 56
Much of the Mexican press resented the Wilson policy
as outside interference in a family quarrel.

The majority

of Latin American press outside of Mexico affirmed its
sumpathy for Huerta's people.Another Peruvian paper,
Lima's Voz de Or lent e advised, "It is time for Mexico to
prepare for a struggle against the United States."

It

continued:
Far from mending the situation in Mexico is growing
more complicated and dangerous. This condition of
things results In a large measure from the attitude of
the Government at Washington in refusing to
Huerta, while Wilson sympathizes with tne rebels and
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even gives them his support. This is the ceuse of the
movement among the students in Mexico City. These
youngsters have made a grand manifestation against the
Yankees before the palace of the Governor vneri they
carried flags bearing the inscription 'Death to the
Yankees2 ' The irritation exhibited by the Mexicans is
amply Justified .60
La Prensa of Buenas Aires, Argentina, blaimed the
United States entirely for the crisis in United StatesMexican relations.

The United States u a s toe I n s e n s i t i v e

regarding Latin American national scvereignty. it said, and
too prone to intervene in their internal affairs:
Whatever may be the general
"l' things at
States, it is e v i d e n t th; a
, W a s h i n g t o n 's very hazy
present prevailing origin ^
south - A m e r i c a n
notion of the sovereign y
intervene or interfere in
nationality. The tendency_ to
h£V
the internal politics of Me
»
£ r e a t R e p u b l i c of
existed if, in the judgement of^hejr
^
the North, there Pr®^i le f or t h e integrity end
complete and unreseRational standing wn.ch
» » » states.
No one can dispute to.
ESSSS o°f S2&^ Huerta

of r taking a an°active

But as to tMJ g

«41^ >

not
part lA the struggle c. the

combatants. 61
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Instead of welcoming Wilson's actions relative to
Huerta and Mexico as manifestations of benevolence, the
Latin American press regarded it with, dark suspicion.

The

Literary Digest stated that the whole Latin American press
from the "great Prensa of Argentina to the smallest sheet
in Mexico raises its voice in Indignant and passionate
clamor,*62
10,

Violence at Tamplco and Vera Cruz. Mexico,

It

took two episodes of violence to bring about the final
downfall of Huerta,

The first episode was when a boat

crew from the USS Dolphin came ashore under cover of the
American flag at Tampico, Mexico, to secure supplies on
April 9, 1914.
troops.

The Americans were arrested by Huerta's

They were quickly released with apologies of a

superior officer.

The United States Admiral Kayo, without

consulting Washington demanded a formal apology from the
Port Commander, the punishment for the responsible officer,
and that the American flag be hoisted and given a twenty-one
gun salute.

On April 22, V/ilson requested and secured

permission from Congress to use force to secure redress of
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these grievances. In the meantime, episode two had
occurred:

the Vera Cruz, Mexico, incident had happened on

the night of April 20-21, In an effort to stop the
landing and subsequent falling into the hands of Huerta of
munitions from a German ship, an armed landing of American
forces was made on Mexican soil. The customs house was
occupied peaceably, but in the process of completing the
occupation of the city, skirmishes ensued end blood shed
was the consequence. Huerta broke off relations with the
United States by handing the American charge d'affaires
his passports.

By this action he had hoped to rally both

friend and foe to his support, but It did not work that
way.
Wilson gladly accepted the offered mediation of the
ABC powers, Huerta concurred with the suggestion of the
mediators that he resign in favor of a government with
which the United States could deal. Thus, finally Huerta
stepped down.
Ugarte gives an account of the anti-American feeling
that United States' intervention at Vera Cruz, Mexico, set
loose in Argentina:

The impression produced in Buenos Aires by these
events was n mixed one. The semi-official organs
maintained an impassive front. Public opinion, on the
other hand, broke out instinctively into a burst of
condemnation. Thus unanimous impulse gave birth on that

56
self same day to the Pro-Mexico Committee, supported by
the University Federation, and with a membership of
close on ten thousand.63
The Pro-Mexico Committee, converted into a
permanent Latin American Association, whose extensive
programme embraced the problem in its ultimate essence,
next undertook a work of patriotic propaganda of
rapprochement, of going back to our origins.64
11.

Nicaragua becomes a United States protectorate.

The next object of American intervention was Nicaragua. It
was reduced to a status of something like an American
protectorate by August, 1914.

President Taft had been

unable to get his Nicaraguan treaty policy ratified by the
United States Senate. However, Wilson followed through in
practically the way Taft had intended to go. Wilson and
Bryan did not manage to free themselves from the necessary
partnership of American government and American business in
the Caribbean.
"Perhaps," wrote Rippy In Caribbean Danger jtone,
"Wilson and Bryan were not dollar diplomats, since their
emphasis was so completely on strategy and the
promotion of democracy."bD
In an effort to displace or counteract dollar diplomacy in
Nicaragua, Bryan suggested to Wilson that the Federal

63 Ugarte, OP. cit., p. 243.
64 ibid., p. 245.
65 j. F. Rippy. Caribbean Danger Zone, p. 180.
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government make Micaragua a loan.

This was turned down

hut the idea reappeared in the proposal to pay $3,000,000
to Nicaragua for certain specific considerations: a canal
option, a long-term lease of Fonseca Bay, and Great and
Little Corn Islands.

Protectorate clauses similar to those

in the Piatt Amendment were included in this proposed
treaty.

65

down.

But the United States Senate turned this treaty

The other Central American states protested against

this treaty as one that reduced Nicaragua to the status of
an American protectorate.

They also said that the treaty

infringed on their own national rights.^
The Senate later ratified the treaty and sought to
mollify objection raised by Nicaragua's neighbors by
attaching a resolution stating that nothing in the said
convention "is intended to affect any existing right of any
of the said states;" however, this did not satisfy these
states.

They took the case to the Central American Court

of Justice, and there got a decision against Nicaragua.
Nicaragua refused to be a party with the action.

Neverthe

less, a decision was made, but the outcome was to repudiate
the Court.

66
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and Nicaragua refused to honor the decision.

Because of

the loss of prestige as a result of this decision, the
Court came to an end in March, 1918.^6

The United States

was at fault for not handling this matter with foresight.
If the American State Department had shown more regard for
the attitudes of other states during negotiations with
Nicaragua end consulted tactfully with them and the other
Central American states that were involved, the outcome
might have teen avoided.^

It is fair to say that

strategic considerations always have outweighed the economic
70
ones with regard to American policy towards Nicaragua.
The Legation Guard had managed to keep Nicaraguan domestic
politics reasonably stable as one conservative president
followed another.

Thus the application of the Roosevelt

Corollary, implemented by dollar diplomacy and the landing
of a few marines , had secured Nicaragua against any
violation of the Monroe Doctrine.

America thus came to stay

in Nicaragua. 71
As soon as Woodrov Wilson*s election to the Presidency
was substantiated, Ugarte wrote him a letter asking that the

68 Wllgus, oj). cit., p. 715.
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United States withdraw their controls from Cuba,
Nicaragua, Puerto Rico, Colombia, Panama, Mexico, and the
Philippine Islands, Ugarte affirmed:
We desire that the companies which commit abuses
shall not be supported in their unjust demands ; we
desire the republic of Santo Domingo not be suffocated
by unjust oppression and that the United States abstain
from intervening in the domestic politics of our
countries. , . we ask in short that the Star Spangled
Banner cease to be a symbol of oppression in the New
World,72
12, The American military intervention in Haiti,
The United States military intervention in Haiti began
July 28, 1915, The reason for such actions was that the
continued existence of a state of economic and political
confusion was a standing invitation for a European power
to intervene. Such precautionary measures were sometimes
called preventative intervention. It was considered that
drastic measures were necessary to forestall the potential
menace that such domestic and financial chaos generated.
There was grave danger that either Germany or France would
send naval units and take possession in order to guarantee
the interests of its nationals by collecting their debts

J. Fred Hippy, "Literary Yankeephobia:in Hispanic
nerica," Journal of international Relations, 12:365-36 .
72

60
directly. 73
At the time of the American occupation of Haiti, the
Haitian foreign debt had climbed to the staggering height
of almost $84,000,000. 74

For several years, all offers of

American bankers to apply to Haiti the pattern which was in
operation in the Dominican Republic were rejected by
Haiti.

Particularly important was the proposed collection

of revenue by America in this manner.

The Haitians resor

ted to questionable measures in attempts to avoid relying
on the United States.
money.

They tried to issue unsecured paper

Haitian officials tried to draw out some $8,000,000

that was pledged as security for the paper currency that
was already in use.

In order to prevent this raid on the

public treasury, the United States dispatched a man-of-war
to Haiti. 75
Violence of a particularly barbarous nature and to
a surprising extent broke out in the Haitian capital city
In July, 1915.

The Haitian Fresident ordered some of his

henchmen to execute one hundred sixty-seven political
prisoners who were from the aristocratic families of Haiti,
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while he took sanctuary in the French Legation.

When the

news broke of the bloody murder of these victims, a mob
composed of the relatives of the slain men, broke into a
hiding place and apprehended the president.

Thereupon he

was "murdered with a brutality rare even in Haitians."

7ft

His body was dismembered and the mob paraded through the
streets with parts of his body.77
Admiral Carpenter had been sent to Haiti as an
American observer.

He kept Americans informed of the

situation in Haiti.

In the midst of these grave disorders

the United States Marines landed and restored order in the
city.

After establishing themselves here, the Marines

gradually extended their control over the entire nation.
The American officials resorted again and again to strong
arm methods in order to impose the kind of order that they
thought was best.

Two legal instruments that were basic to

the new order were the new treaty with the United States
and the new constitution.

The treaty went further in

establishing American control than the Piatt Amendment had
gone with Cuba or the provisions of the treaty with Santo
Domingo had allowed.

It provided that Haiti should appoint

76 Ellis, op. cit., p. 299.
77 paul K. Douglas, "The American Occupation of Haiti,"
Political Science Quarterly. 42:228, June, 1927.
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to office men who were nominated by the President of the
United States.7®

The governmental debts were to be

classified and arranged, and increase of the Haitian debt
was not to be mads without the consent of the United States.
The collected revenue was to be properly distributed.
Haiti agreed to do nothing to alienate any of its
territory or impair its independence.

The United States

might take any essential measures to maintain Haitian
independence or to preserve

Ma

government adequate for the

protection of life, property, and individual liberty."79
The treaty was to be in force for ten years and might be
extended another ten years if desired by either party.60
American control in Haiti was

made even more effective by

two agreements made in 1918:
. . . that the American legation should be consulted
before any project of law was submitted to the
legislative body, and the other giving the financial
advisor a veto over all expenditures.61
It has been pointed out by American critics of the
United States policy in Haiti that no provisions were made
to introduce the Haitians to the democratic process but

78 Foreign Relations of the United States. 1915.
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63
rather the most reasonable outcome which we could expect of
them to learn from American policy there would be a
reasonably efficient dictatorship, for policy there was
dictated by the United States treaty officials, and the
navy and marine corps.82
A Uhited States Marine-controlled plebesclte was
used to ratify the constitution.

Only a few hundred votes

were cast against the ratification of the constitution, but
this may be explained by the procedure used at the voting
places. Orders were given at various places that all
citizens must vote. The election was in charge of the
marines. Two ballots were prepared, one white and the
other blue. The white ballot was for the constitution, and
the voters were given these ballots as they came to the
polls, but the voters could "go to the armed soldier and
ask for a blue ballot."^

However, this vote does not

represent completely the nature of the opposition to the
+V1P marines shot some two
United States occupation for h
nf nacifylAS the country,
thousand Haitians in the process of pa
There was no doubt that

+he United States occupation had

...li.
-hat there was much basis for
brought order and prosperity, nun
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64

the complaints of the professional revolutionists and
patriots.
13.
in Mexico.

United States military pursuit of Pancho Villa
Another factor contributing to the deterioration

In the United States-Latin American relations, was the
American military intervention in Mexico in pursuit of
Pancho Villa.

Peace and order had not come to Mexico when

Huerta stepped down, but the civil wars continued.

After

another year of waiting, the United States recognized
Carranza as the leader most likely to bring order and good
government to

Mexico.

t h i s appeared to be a mistake,

for Carranza was unable to restore order at home or to
live on friendly terms with the United States.

His actions

were strangely in harmony with the announced plans of
Germany for Mexico.

Also, Pancho Villa, Carranza's former

lieutenant, was the source of increasing trouble.

He

retaliated against American recognition of the Carranza
regime by killing Americans.

Villa seized and killed

seventeen or eighteen American miners in Santa Isabel,
Chihuahua, Mexico, in January, 1916.

64 Bailey,
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Villa raided American soil and at Columbus, New Mexico,
killed sixteen Americans and burned part of the town. It
was a part of Villa's considered policy or strategy to
provoke the United States to intervene militarily in
Mexico; then he

expected to play the role of leading a

United Mexican crusade against what was supposedly
American imperialism.
Wilson, with Carranza's reluctant consent, sent
General John J* Pershing, with American forces, in pursuit
of Villa into Mexican territory. However, after nine
months of futile pursuit in Mexican territory, Pershing
failed to find him.

Finally, Carranza blocked any American

farther penetration into the interior with the threat that
if American forces moved any farther east, west, or south,
Carranza*s Mexican troops would attack.

In fact, a

costly skirmish ensued at Carrizal between Carranza's and
American troops, American forces were withdrawn to the
border as «er «lth Germany became imminent in early 1917.<*
Wilson's policies eere, to some latin Americans,
evidences of American designs on the territorial integrity
of Mexico.

Yet Wilson's refusal to be stampeded into «ar

with Mexico was evidence to many other Latin Americans that

86 ibid., P« I80
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Wilson was true to Pan-Americanism.

The implication of

Wilson's leadership In the Mexican crisis has teen
summarized as follows:
President Wilson's refusal to become involved in war
with Mexico convinced the world of his sincerity and
gave him a hearing during the Great War such as no
political leader of any nation ever before commanded.
His acceptance of the mediation of the AEG powers and
his subsequent consulation with the leading represen
tatives of Latin America gave new life and meaning to
Pan-Americanism and tended to refute the charges of the
Pan-Hispanlsts• Mr. Fletcher, the ^i^df^!3success
Minister in Chile wrote:
. . the President s sue
in the Mexican difficulties—turning, as he did, a
situation f r a u g h t w i t h d i f f : i c u i t l e ' 6 7
American relations into a triumph of Pan-Americanism.
14.

United States military control of £anto fcomlngo.

Another step in American military intervention In
Caribbean nations was that initiated November
the Dominican Republic.

It came about as a kind of heroic

remedy fox a political and financial malady that had 1
menaced this Caribbean nation.

The assassinat
1q11 initiated a time ox
Dominican President in November,
that continued to ferment
political trouble in that coun y
nvinced that custom collectors^
until the Americans were convinced
^Tttical or financial
alone did not assure either political
.
roi4 the United States had
stability. By December, i-J- *
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decided to obtain greater internal control in order to
establish stability. Heavy expenses brought on by the
disorders had caused the government to operate continually
in the red. The United States had been able, by May* to
get confirmed a financial expert with authority to control
expenditures.

Other reforms were highly recommended, but

troubles continued to grow worse. For example, in five
years seven men served their turn as head of the state.68
In the final crisis the Dominican President refused to
cooperate with the American policy, affirming such policy
to be too dangerous to him politically, and suggested that
the electoral college fill vacancies in Congress when
terms expired, rather than depend upon accepted elective
processes.

America wanted some Dominican leaders to take

the initiative by asking for American aid, but neither
their President nor any prominent Dominican leaders would
ask for United States aid. Moreover, the electoral college
was controlled by a Dominican political leader who was
openly pro-German.

With American and German relations

strained to the verge of war, the United States policy
makers could not afford to let things merely drift
unsettled. Consequently, Wilscn reluctantly authorized the

88 Munro, op. cit.. pp. 541-545.
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American Naval Commander to take full control.89 The
American forces quietly took over the revolutionary centers
so that on November 29, 1916, complete military occupa
tion was declared, however, without the necessity of using
force.90
The American military government exercised both
legislative as well as executive authority. The department
heads were American, but all subordinates and all the
judiciary were Dominicans*

Order was maintained, and war

time demand for sugar brought prosperity.

However, the

Dominicans bitterly hated the occupation policy. Following
the close of the war, the United States tried to extricate
itself. In December, 1920, Wilson stated that occupation
would soon end•set about to recruit a native
political administration that would succeed the American
administrators,92 but the Marines were to continue until
they were recalJLed in 1924.
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15.

Military Intervention In Nicaragua In 1927.

Harding and Coolidge continued during their administrations
to advance the interests of the American economic and
political empire and control established by Theodore
Roosevelt, William Howard Taft, and Woodrow Wilson.

Both

showed eagerness to support the interest of American
investors in Latin America#

Aside from the commitment to

retire from Santo Domingo, Harding maintained consistently
the imperialist point of view.

In fact, he considered

expanding rather than limiting American controls.

It was

reported after his death at Harding was actually an
enthusiastic Imperialist with particular ambitious plans
for American expansion in Central America.

The report was.

. . . that he desired the chief
lnKing
of his Administration to be the bringing
of Central American countries under the Stars and
Stripes* that is* to have the sovereignty of tne
.
United States extended to them with the ultima e
of granting them rights of statehood.

accomplishment

Coolidge supported the policies of intervention,
United States economic and military preponderance in this
hemisphere, and the extension of the rights of government
to protect United States' citizen's property rights abroad.

New Yorjk Times. April 27, 1927.
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He said in 1927:
The person and property of a citizen are e part of
the general domain of the nation, even when abroad. ..
there is a distinct and "binding obligation on the part
of self-respecting Governments to afford protection to
the persons and property of their citizens, wherever
they may be.yft
The Latin American countries signed a treaty
February 7, 1923, solemnly agreeing not to recognize any
executive who secured his position by revolutionary mean3.
The United States had confirmed these principles, at least
indirectly, in June.

With brightening prospects of

stability In Central American affairs, the President with
drew American forces from Nicaragua.

The legation guard

was even withdrawn in 1925.95
Soon, however, following the American withdrawal, a
battle royal developed among the politicians of Nicaragua
to seize political control of the states.

A series of

COUPS de etats complicated and confused Nicaragua^ affairs.
The Nicaraguan situation was so confused by the closing
months of 1926 that the American withdrawal seemed a
mistake, or at least premature.

Soon a full-scale civ.l

was on, with one faction supported by Nexico holding the

94 New York Times. April 26, 192-.
95 Ellis, 0£. cit., P-

295»
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Eastern part of Nicaragua while the United States
recognized the other faction.

American forces were again

sent to Nicaragua. Under Coolidge's orders, Marines landed
in January, 1927, at Managua to neutralize certain areas
and to protect American and other foreign lives and
property.96

Coolidge likewise sent Henry L. Stimson to act

as his special representative to attempt to bring about a
settlement.97

By early 1927, American troops in Nicaragua
qo
numbered five thousand.
This renewed intervention in Nicaragua incited
wide-spread criticism of the administration both in the
United States and in Latin America. Coolidge 's critics
called the Nicaraguan hostilities his "private war" for
they were wholly without congressional sanction, but
Coolidge insisted that it was police action.99 Furthermore,
Coolidge justified the action in Nicaragua as the proper
function of government, protecting its citizens and their
property while they are abroad even though it be armed
intervention. The position held and practiced by all the

96 piatt, op. clt.. p. 318.
97 Ellis, op, clt.. pp« 295-296.
98 Bailey, op. clt., p. 712.
99 ^ew York Times. April 26, 1927.
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presidents of the United States during the first three
decades of the twentieth century, relative to American
right and duty towards Latin American nations , was more
clearly stated by Coolidge than by any other president.
To C o n g r e s s C o o l i d g e s a i d o n J a n u a r y 1 0 , 1 9 2 7 :
• . , The United States cannot fail to view with deep
concern any serious threat to stability and constitu
tional government in Nicaragua tending toward anarchy
and jeopardizing American interests, , , It has always
been and remains the policy of the United States . , ,
to take the step that may be necessary for the
preservation and protection of the lives, the property,
and the interests of its citizens and of this
Government itself. In this respect I propose to follow
the path of my predecessors. ^
16.

Coolidge »s attempt to intervene in Mexico.

Coolidge was on the verge of intervening in Mexico in the
crisis that grew up under his administration.

There were

bad feelings on both sides in the disputes over status of
American-owned property in Mexico,

Mexico's 1917 constitu

tion included provision for the nationalization of land end
subsoil rights.

It declared the ownership of land and

natural resources to be vested originally in the nation.
Recognition of Obregon was held up by Unitea States for
three years because Secretary of State Hughes insisted that
Mexico ratify a treaty that would agree to safeguard

100 Isaac Joslin Cox, Nicaragua and the United States,
1909-1927, p. 869.

property rights in oil ^d
1917.

lanfl aequlred

Otregon refused to buy recognition.

compromise was made.

^

before

However, a

Obregon's decision was (and this was

an executive agreement not binding on succeeding chief
executives) that in case of subsoil deposits—oil
particularly

owners of the surface were to be protected

against nationalization if, prior to May 1, 1917, they had
performed some positive act.101
In an effort to solve United States-Mexican problems,
two mixed claims commissions were established.

To these,

property owners could go for justice and compensation.
When things were at a stalemate between the political agents
a committee of bankers and capitalists went to Mexico and
quietly, quickly, and persuasively worked out a practical,
face-saving solution. 102
President Calles, Obregon's successor, favored a
retroactive interpretation of the constitution of 1917.

He

was determined to push the nationalization of Mexican
natural resources.

Kellogg, with little tact, warned Mexico

to go slow concerning making changes relative to property

101 Moore, 0£. clt.. p. 742.
102

Loc. cit.

74

rights.

A little later he was exchanging memorandum on

"bolshevik aims and policies in Mexico and Latin America"
with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
Regulations were clarified regarding foreign
property holdings in Mexico.

Owners of agricultural land

might continue to hold the land until death.

The heirs

would he allowed five or more years to dispose of the
land.

Owners of oil land prior to May 1, 1917, could have

a concession to exploit the land to a limit of fifty years,
but no longer.1°3
The United States objected and declared these
regulations were contrary to the 1923 agreements, that they
had injurious retroactive features, and that foreigners
should not be required to waive protection from their home
governments.104

Mexico was perfectly willing to submit the

question to the Hague Tribunal for arbitration.

The

President refused to accept the Mexican viewpoint and have
the dispute arbitrated by any court.

An open break seemed

imminent between the United States and Mexico in 1927.
The Nicaraguan problem complicated the United
States-Mexican relations.

103

Ibid.. p. 744.

104 ibid., p. 745.

Mexico had recognized and was
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supporting Sacasa as President of Nicaragua while the
United States had recognized and "was supporting Diaz.

A

first-class war scare emerged with the press seriously
discussing the prospects of hostilities.

The Hearst

newspapers at the end of 1927, published documents,
purporting to be authentic, which tended to show that
Calles was trying to substitute Mexican for United States
influence in Central America, that Mexico was spreading
communist propaganda, and that over a million dollars in
bribes had been extended to United States Senators to
support the Mexican cause.

Later all these documents were

proven to be forgeries, but for the time they were a
factor in stirring up distrust and keeping the countries
apart.-*-®^

The redeeming feature was that the people of

America in general and the United States Senate in
particular would not support Coolidge in his stiff policy
with Mexico.

The Senate unanimously supported a resolution

to arbitrate the whole dispute.
The outstanding steps in the deterioration of United
States-Latin American relations have been summarized in the
following passages, in part:

Moore, op .

clt.. pp. 745-746.
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10 s a xish American V.'ar, instead cf appealing to
T -t-P A P ^
Latin America as a demonstration of our Idealism
seemed to her the act of a bully attacking a weak,
exhausted neighbor for commercial advantages, and
gave rise to an influential school of advocates of Pan
Hlspanism. The Piatt Amendment and the occupation of
Porto Rico and the Philippines were to them clear
proof of this. The protection of Panama in its
revolution against Colombia and the securing of the
Canal Zone without recompense to Colombia; the inter
ference in the internal affairs of Central America,
with the permanent establishment of a guard of marines
in Nicaragua and the violation of rights of other
Central American nations by the Eryan-Chomorro treaty
with Nicaragua; the Lodge Amendment, prohibiting all
Latin American nations from exercising sovereignty in
disposing of their national domain; the forcible
establishment of a protectorate over Haiti, the
establishment of a military government in Santo
Domingo; the capture of Vera Cruz end the Fersning
Expedition into Mexico—these are the outstanding
explanations for the prejudice. . . .106

The prevailing anti-American hostilities, manifested
by Latin Americans in 1914 was almost a universal phenomena
in Latin America.

An American observer noted:

In 1214. after living in this atmosi here cf suspicion
in Mexico for ten years, I visited practically all the
other Latin American countries and found the same
suspicion as in Mexico. I came to the conclusion ha
this distrust was the greatest hindrance in the
development of North American spiritual, co-^rcial,
and intellectual influence in the Soutn ana tnet tnere
was no more important service than that of breaking
down this •middle wall of partition.
Some anti-American feelings have been stirred up by
radical socialist influence channeled from SUropean sources.

106 samuel Guy Inman, Pj,obiems in Pan Americanism,
p. 365.

107 Ibid., p. 366.
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Harding alludes to this factor in his book, South America
Looks at the United States:
Distrust of the political-financial aims of the
United States most frequently finds expression in
radical and socialist circles, and is very likely in
part a reflection of Communist hatred of the United
States in Europe. Owing to the prevalence of extrem
ist views among the laboring classes of south European
countries, and the close relations of these countries
with Latin America through immigration, communist
propaganda has met with considerable success,
especially in Argentina, Uruguay, and Chile, the
countries most exposed to European influence. Foreign
agitators have played an important role in the numerous
labor troubles of Argentina and other republics since
the end of the World V/ar, end South American labor
elements in Mexico. For every 'crisis' in the diplo
matic relations between the latter country and the
United States there are socialist meetings, protests
and broadsides in Buenos Aires, Montevideo, end
Santiago. This happened, for example, at the time of
the Kellogg manifesto to Mexico in June, 1925, and again
on the occasion of American military intervention in
Nicaragua in December, 1926. In each instance North
American policy was severely condemned, and formal
protest was made by various socialist groups against
allowing the government to seek further loans from
United States' Bankers. La Argentina Economic, in
reporting the meetings of 1925 expressed the fear that
Argentina is slowly permitting herself to be caught as
a debtor nation with every danger to her sovereignty
because of North' American policies towards such
nations. 108
J. Fred Rippy, an expert on Latin American affairs,
has a resum£ of the deteriorating trend in United StatesLatin American relations:
Roosevelt's procedure in Panama and his Big Stick
policy in the Caribbean, Taft's so-called Dollar

108

Haring, op. cit., p. 91.
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Diplomacy, ana Lodge•=
ay
a veritable epidemic of yfnS®"? ?
^solution caused
over latin America. 4l£ 8?? to spread all
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CHAPTER III
THE BIRTH OF THE GOOD NEIGHBOR FOLICY
We have noticed that Wilson contributed to the
deterioration of American relations with Latin America, but
that is not the entire story.

In a real sense Wilson also

laid the basis for a better understanding with Latin
America both by his words and the actions tnat were
inaugurated during his administration,

Wilson»s doctrine

of the New Pan-Americanism was a positive contribution to
improve feelings between the United States ani the republics
to the south.

Only a few months after his inauguration as

President of the United States, V/ilson stated the
principles that would guide his administration in Latin
American relations.

This so-called New Pan-American!si was

affirmed in a speech made by Wilson at Mobile, Alabama.
Among other things, he advocated a closer union of the
American nations for the purposes of promoting con_,titu
tional liberty and good will.

The Latin A~e*ica-< n<Tt*ons

were to be considered as our cooperating friends and
partner s•
Wilson stated sympathetically how Latin American
, *
„- a inst by the practices of
nations had been discriminated a^ams oy
op t h u s P ut human rights above property
foreign investors. He tnus puu
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rights and determined to identify America with the defense
of personal rights.

Wilson said in his Mobile, Alabama

speech:
. . . They have had harder bargains driven with them
in the matter of loans than any other people in the
world. ... I rejoice in nothing so much as in the
prospect that they will now be emancipated from these
conditions , and we ought to be the first to take part
in assisting in that emancipation.1
Friendship with Latin America must be based upon
genuine acceptance of equality among the nations of this
hemisphere and respect for personal worth, rather than
material advantage:
We must nrove ourselves their friends, and champions
upon terms of equality and honor.... We must show
ourselves friends by comprehending their interest
whether it squares with our interest or not. It is a
very perilous thing to determine the foreign policy of
a nation in the terms of material interest. It no"k
only is unfair to those with whom you are dealing, but
it is degrading as regards your own actions. • •
Wilson then stated a basic tenent of his political
creed and the indispensable core to his political policies,
that is, liberal democracy as based on constitutional
representative government:
. . . a r e a s o n a n d a compulsion lying behind^all this
I Sean the development of

1 Henry Steele Conmager, Dosasents. of American
History, II, p- 270.
2 Lac. cit.

el
constitutional liberty in the world.3
The issues as Wilson defined them, were human rights-,
national integrity, and opportunity.
these were "material interests."

Arrayed against

In this moral alignment

he declared America's place to be on the side of human
rights.

He announced that America forswore irrevocably

all policies of intervention and conquest:
I want to take this occasion to say that the United
States will never again seek one additional foot of
territory by conquest. She will devote herself to
showing that she knows how to make honorable and
fruitful use of the territory she has, and she must
regard it as one of the duties of friendship to soe
that from no quarter are material interests made
superior to human liberty and national orportunity. I
say this. . . merely to fix in our consciousness what
our real relationship with the rest of America is. It
is the relationship of a family of mankind devoted to
the development of true constitutional liberty.
The United States and the Latin American countries
are menaced by a common threat.

This threat should induce

their cooperative action against this common danger.

The

danger is "material interest":
What is the heart of all
Merest "
is that we have seen the hand of
ari
cl
u
some times about to °!® ^eriL. Interests threaten
possessions. We have seen
terian.
.
Thereconstitutional freedom in tne
^ose in
fore, we will now know ho// to symp

3 Commager, loc. cit.
4 Loc. cit.
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the rest of America who have to contend with such
powers, not only within their borders but iron outside
their borders also,5
Furthermore, to Wilson the things that unite us in
sympathy and spiritual interest with the peoples of Latin
America are only emphasizing the essential points of our
own life, Wa would prove untrue to our own interests and
vital traditions if we disregard these friends.
Haring's evaluation of the total effects of this
speech on Latin American public opinion was that Wilson had
made a lasting impression on the mind of Latin America,
especially on the larger nations of South America.^
By many of the important newspapers the President's
message was hailed as of the greatest political
importance, . • • It became the basis on an immense
admiration and respect for President Wilson, which was
vastly increased by his public statements during the
World War and his role at the Conference of Versailles,
an enthusiasm which persists to this day and is an
element of no little significance in cementing the
friendship between Latin and English America, . .
However, an extreme anti-American position was still
maintained by some Latin American diplomats. During this
early period of Wilson's administration, a Peruvian
diplomat and writer affirmed that his preference would be

5

Commager, loc. clt.

6 Clarence H. Haring, S22& AfiSliSS fit
United States, p. 13.
7

Ibid., pp. 13-14.
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Germany or Japan rather than the United. States*

It was in

1913 that F. Garcia Calderon wrote:
The tutelage of* the United States seems to us more
dangerous than the German invasion.
To save themselves from yankee imperialism the
American Democracies would almost accept a German
alliance, or the aid of Japanese Arms; every where the
Americans of the North are feared. In the Antilles and
in Central America hostility against the Anglo-Saxon
invader assumes the character of a Latin Crusade.0
Some Latin Americans criticized Wilson for not
bringing his performance up to his ideals and to the
promises that he held out for Latin Americans,

This failure

of American practice to keep pace with American ideals was
called "blah-blah Pan-Americanism."

Luis Quintanixla had

the following comment following one of Wilson's speeches
in which he affirmed these Ideals :
. . . as long a s the United States' marines occupied
Latin American territories, all this was blah-blah
Pan-Americanism.9
Gains were made in the modification of anti-American
feelings during Wilson's administration because cf the
specific, action inaugurated during his administration.

The

first action toward pacification was the Wilscnian liberal
tariff policy embodied in the Underwood Tariff Act of 1913.

8 Alejandro Alvarez, The Nonroe Doctrine, p. 359.
9 Luis Quintanllla, A Latin Mezicen fctffct. p. 142.
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This lowering of "the. trade barriers soon brought returns in
good will towards the United States.l°
The second action that helped improve relations with
Latin America was the legislation authorizing the
establishment of branches of United States Banks in Latin
America.

The American bankers acted on the authority given

them through this legislation so that by 1916 credit
exceeding $5,000,000 was extended to Latin America.

This

was to prove only the beginning for the great 'volume of
American capital, that found its way south.11
A third contribution to improving United States-Latin
American relations under Wilson was the action taken to
facilitate the flow of information.

Congress authorized the

establishment of agencies and information centers in the
larger American cities for the distribution of authentic
information on Latin America.12

Direct news services were

inaugurated between important centers of Latin America s^<d
New York.

The United Press first established such a service

in 1S16.!3

Soon a wider and freer flow of information began

10 Raring, op. cit<, p*

11 David R. Moore, & Hlstori of Lstln fearlcg, P- <*!•
12

Ibid*, p. S38*

13 Ibid., p. 342.
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to prevail with the growing practice of exchanging of
newspapers, magazines, teachers, students, and trained
specialists.1^
A fourth aid to the improvement of national rela
tions within the hemisphere, was the Improvement of
commercial relations by commercial specialists who were
appointed to serve as special commercial attaches to latin
American countries for the purpose of promoting better
commercial relations with Latin America.16
A fifth contribution to better relations was the
Bryan treaties.

By 1914, the Secretary of State, William

Jennings Bryan had negotiated special treaties with all
Latin American countries except Colombia.

These treaties

provided procedures for the settlement of disputes between
the America nations.

It provided that disputes were to be

brought to an international commission for settlement.16
Mr. Bryan considered these pacts to be his most notable
contribution to the nation.

1-^

Perhaps their place in the

Haring, op. cit., p*

16#

15 Moore, op. cit., p« 536.

machinery of international relations has boon under
estimated.17
Wilson 1 s obviously sincere efforts to rectify matters
with Colombia in the long-standing Fanema Controversy was
a sixth contribution to the improvement of relations with
Latin America.

Wilson failed in the immediate realization

of his project, but he did his best to secure ratification
by the Senate of the special treaty with Colombia.

He

would have made restitution for the results of the coercive
methods that the United States had used in the FanamaColombia civil strife. 18

The action, though temporarily

defeated, was passed in 1921 when the Republicans were in
power.

An American observed Latin American public response

to this action of the United States Senate and reported that
universal satisfaction was expressed in that at least some
action bad been taken. 19
A seventh means that proved Wilson's sincerity at
promoting good relations in the western hemisphere was his
acceptance of the offer of mediation that was extended by
Argentina, Brazil, and Chile—the ABC powers--to the United

17 Thomas H. Bailey, A Diplomatic fil stogy of the
American People« p. 594.
18 Ibid., pp. 545-546.
19 Samuel Guy Inman, Problems In Pan Americanism, p.
262.
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States and Mexico when a state of Hostility existed
between them. There was sufficient basis in the provoca
tions of the Americans by the Mexicans in the curTent
controversy between the nations to justify Wilson's
succumbing to certain American insistence on all-out war
with Mexico#

But Wilson proved that he meant business

about his promise of no more conquests by the United States
at Latin American expense.
"His evident determination to redeem the Mobile
pledge of nonaggrassion," Bailey wrote, "caused the
feeling in Latin America to rebound strongly, even
hysterically, in favor of the United States#"20
And especially was Wilson's desire for peace underwritten
when American forces evacuated Vera Cruz.
Wilson's eighth contribution toward bringing about
understanding in the western hemisphere was the President's
effort to form an agreement among the leading nations of the
western hemisphere of joint action to maintain the
territorial integrity and the republican form of government
in this hemisphere#
the Monroe Doctrine#

This was an attempt to internationalize
Colonel Kcuse had brought this to

20 Bailey, op. cit., p. 60S; also cited by Ray
Stannard Baker, Wppdrow Wilson; Life and Letters, IV, p. ^37,
see also Inman, on. cit., p. 217.
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Wilson's attention as early as December 16, 1914.21
Progress 'would have been made on the proposal towards this
realization if Chile had not treated the idea so coolly.
In fact, the administration continued to push the project
until trouble with Mexico by 1916, and later involvement
in World War I shelved lt.2~

Wilson had hoped that such a

pact would include the provisions for the pacific settle
ment of disputes, and thus serve as regional peace
machinery and "as a model for international organization in
Europe following the war.»."23 in time, Wilson turned to the
League of Nations as the more certain peace machinery.
But with the failure of the League of Nations we shall see
another Democratic President setting about the establishment
of this very kind of regional agreement as machinery to
keep the peace of the hemisphere. Wilscn should have credit
for beginning to move in this direction.

Perkins would

have us recognize this fact when we appraise the full
measurement of Wilson's contributions to inter-American
relations:
Charles Seymour, Intimate Papers o£ Colonel House
Arranged as a Narrative. I, pp. 209, 215.
21

22 Lansing Papers. II, pp. 471, 500.
Charles A. Thomson, "Toward a New Pan-Americanism,"
Foreign Policy Reports« XII, November 1, 1936, p. 210.
23
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Yet despite the unfavorable course of events it is
a fact of major importance that the Wilson administra
tion should have brought forward a plan which looked to
the translation of the fundamentals of the Doctrine in
to a general agreement of the American nations. Here
was at least the beginnings of an alteration in the
temper of American relations with the republics of
Latin America,24
A ninth contribution to bring better harmony in the
western haaisphere was America's part in World War I,
United States' action under Wilson's leadership in going to
war for the Ideals that the President expressed, made a
most favorable impression on most of Latin America,

The

Latin American chose to interpret American action in the
war as the expression of a heroic nation that was dedicated
wholeheartedly to unselfish humanitarian ideals.

When this

new perception or impression had sufficiently spread, it
brought about a complete change of attitude and feeling in
many parts of Latin America toward the United States,
Samuel Guy Inman, an American who lived close to the Latin
Americans, noted the change, and contrasted feeling
toward the United States in Latin America between 1914 and
1917:
In 1914,* after living in this atmosphere of suspi
cion in Mexico for ten years, I visited"practically all

24

Dexter Perkins, Hands Off, p, 325,

JJ®
^QfiCan count?ies and found the seme
?H?f H1 Stunat
Mexico. I came to tho conclusion that
this distrust was the greatest hindrance In the
development of North American spiritual, commercial and
intellectual influence in the South and that th«re was
no more important service than that of breaking down
this 'middle wall of partition. *26
Just as the United States entered the war the
writer began an extended trip through the southern
hemisphere. All throughout my tour^ beginning at
Mexico, I felt this change in sentiment. But not
until I arrived in Chile did it come over mo with full
force. On my visit three years before I felt li/e
leaving Chile on the first train, for I heard, on every
hand unpleasant references to the United States. Tho
students of the universities were particularly
hostile26, . . in 1917, I found a most encouraging
change in the situation. Our entrance into the World
War, with its unselfish implications, had convinced our
Southern neighbors that we were really idealistic.
'American Solidarity* was the expression most often
heard.27
The Democratic Vice-Presidential candidate, Franklin
D. Roosevelt, in the campaign of 1920 in an unguarded
statement, made Latin American relations a campaign issue.
He was endeavoring to refute a Republican contention tha«
in the League of Nations Great Britain could outvote the
United States with Britain's use of hex six voting Common
wealths to the American's one vote.

Vice Fresld-n„i

candidate, Roosevelt, contended that the edv^.-aGe
be with the United States, for by her peculiar relations... *

25

Inman, op. git., p. 366.
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Ibid., P- 247.

27 Ibid., p. 366.
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to eleven republics of the Caribbean and Central American
area their support could be assured to the United States:
• • • the United States has about twelve votes in
the Assembly. Until last week I had two of them my
self, and now Secretary Daniels has them. You know I
have had something to do with the running of a couple
of little republics ... I wrote Haiti's constitution
myself, and, if I do say it, I think it is a pretty
good constitution.2®
Harding's reply was so specific that it committed
him, if elected, to take some steps in liquidating the
interventionist policy at least as it applied to Santo
Domingo.

Harding's righteously Indignant retort was:

If I am elected, I will not empower any Assistant
Secretary of the Navy to draft a Constitution for
helpless neighbors. . • snd jam it down their throats
at the point of bayonets born by_ United States Marines.
/Neither would he/. .. misuse the power of the
executive to cover with a veil of secrecy ^peated
acts of unwarranted interference in domestic
of the little republics of the Western nemisphere
29
• • • •

The Navy had ruled the Dominican Rerubllc since 1916
with an iron hand.

There were several material advantages

that came of this.

Yet the Wilson administration had

initiated plans for the withdrawal of American armed forces
from the Dominican Republic to be effective In member.
1920.

However, difficulty with Dominicans over safeguards

28

New York Times, August 19, 1920.

29 New York Times, August 29, 1920.
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for vested rights delayed Wilson's plan. Harding's
negotiations were met with the same difficulties. Harding
had approved the appointment of a commission of the Senate
to investigate conditions in Haiti and the Dominican
Republic. The commission did not call for drastic changes.
Terms were finally agreed to for the Dominican leaders to
assume the responsibility for maintaining order.

Harding

initiated the withdrawal of the United States from the
Caribbean, but the military withdrawal from the Dominican
Republic was not completed until after Harding's death and
during the Coolidge administration.
The end of the military government v;as about the only
anti-imperialist action taken by Harding,
apparently was not an anti-imperialist.

At heart Harding

After his death

Harding was reported to have entertained ambitious plans for
American expansion in the Central American area. The New
York Times said of him:
That he desired the chief international accomplishment
of his administration be the bringing of Central
American countries under the Stars and Stripes; that is
to have the sovereignty of the United States extended
to them with the ultimate object of granting them
rights of statehood.00

^ New York Times. April 27, 1921.
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With the breakdown of the Central American Court of
Justice, an essential piece of machinery for peace
disappeared.

Central American nations were confronted with

a growing crisis with threats and counter-threats tossed
about them.

Three of these countries reaffirmed the treaty

of 1907 in 1921.

Finally, Harding and Hughes invited all

five of the nations that had signed the agreement of 1907
to Washington.

They met in December, 1922, and by

February, 1923, they had signed treaties involving the vital
concerns of their nations.

Of utmost Importance was the

general treaty of peace and amity.

It embodied the essen

tial features of the 1907 agreement.

It was especially

clear regarding the non-recognition of governments that
came to power by COUP d1 etat or revolution:
The governments of the contracting perties will not
recognize any other government which may co^.e into
power in any of the five republics through a
COUP d* 6tat or a revolution against a recognized ^
government so long as the freely elected representa
tives of the people thereof have not constitutionally
reorganized the country. -1Three important provisions were:
were not to be recognized unless the

first, governments

freely elected

representatives of the people had constitutionally

31
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reorganized the country"; second, a decisive person who
had been involved in a recent revolution was disqualified
thereby to hold the office of the presidency; third, a
president must qualify for recognition through being
elected according to the constitution of that

32

state,

The first step toward improving Latin American
relations with the United States during the Coolidge
administration was the consummation of the Harding
administration policy regarding Santo Domingo,
the United States military was withdrawn.

The last of

Public opinion

was pressing for action in the liquidation of United States
intervention in both Haiti and Nicaragua.

The Marines were

finally withdrawn from Nicaragua in 1925.

However, it was

to prove an untimely move for troubles in Nicaragua grew
from bad to worse, until the United States felt it had to
intervene in order to restore order.

Ey 1527 tne United

States was involved to the extent of five thousand American
Marines.

Coolidge defended his action there as Tollee

action," but Latin America considered it from a different

lient.

This action of intervention linked with Coolidge.s
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ideas on the proper r e l a t i o n of the American Federal
Government to American property holders abroad, revealed
Coolidge 1 s tendency t o adopt the drastic policies of
earlier days.
Coolidge held t o an exaggerated concept of dollar
diplomacy.

In April, 1927, Coolidge stated tnis doctrine

in a speech to the United Press:
The person and property of a citizen are a part of
the general domain of the nation, even when abroad. . .
There i s a d i s t i n c t and binding obligation on the part
of self-respecting governments to afford protection to
the persons and property of their citizens, wherever
they may be . .
Consistent with t h i s policy, the Coolidge adminis
tration moved with vigor to protect American investments
and national i n t e r e s t .

By 1924, the financial policies cf

about one half of the Latin American nations were in so^e
measure being directed by the United States.

American

Marines were used i n many republics t c maintain order.- 4
I n the c i v i l war i n Nicaragua, events so developed
that Mexico came t o support the liberal contender for the
presidency of Nicaragua, while the United States supported
the conservative candidate.

Trouble between

33 New York Times, April 26, 19^7.
54
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States and Mexico had been brewing for SCL:O tine.

The

principal basis for this trouble was the provision in the
newest Mexican Constitution.

These provisions favored

Mexican nationals against foreign owners of agricultural,,
mineral, and oil resources in the land.

As a result,

feelings soon began to run high, and war seemed threaten
ingly near.25

Hostilities on a large scale, both with

Nicaragua and Mexico, were a real threat.

Eoth President
/

Coolidge and Secretary of State Kellogg expressed an
attitude of hostility toward the "Bolshevist threat" of a
red wedge between the United States and the Fanama Cenal.
Stimson interpreted the development of events as moving to
an exceedingly unhappy crisis when he said, in pert, es
follows:
in Nicaragua then acquired a new and
en issue between the Americans and

There were forces in Ame
strongly for war with Mexico, c;
was not averse to such actions.

yet, such e volume of

35 Ibid., p. 712.
Henry L. Stimson
Service. p. 112.
25

end KcGeor.£e Bundy, Cn Active
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opinion opposed to wax was expressed both in Congress and
in the press of the nation that it marked a definite
turning point in the American-Latin American policy.
Coolidge began to reverse his course, and changed his
diplomatic strategy both in Mexico and in Nicaragua.
DeCond© summarizes Coolidge's eleventh hour conversion to
non-intervention in the following manner:
During the administration of the twentieth century,
from Theodore Roosevelt to Calvin Coolidge, the Latin
American relations of the United States had deteriora
ted badly,: owing primarily to a series of
interventions by the United States in the Caribbean
area.
In the closing days of his presidential term,
Coolidge suddenly realized through public pressure of
public opinion, the deplorable state of inter-American
relations. In hasty, last-minute efforts he tried to
improve them. This changed attitude toward LatinAmerican affairs had its beginning less than a year
before Hoover was elected President. . .
The two men who dramatized the new American policy
were Henry L. Stlmson and Dwight Morrow.

V.'e shall consider

briefly the specific nature of the problems that they were
called on to solve, and how they were solved.
The second step taken under Coolidge toward bettering
United States-Latin American relations was with Stimson.

37 Alexander DeConde, Herbert Hoover's Latin American
Policy, p. 154*

98

Henry L« Stimson went as Fresident Coolidge's personal
representative to Nicaragua. The civil war had dragged on
without decisive outcome.

The combatants were sick and

tired of the fighting. Stimson interviewed the principal
leaders of both factions and managed to get them to agree
to terms on which they would stop the war.

The conserva

tive Nicaraguan incumbent of the Presidency was to continue
as president until a general election could be held with
the United States supervising the election.

But basic to

this agreement was Stimson*s early achievement in gaining
the confidence of both sides.

Stimson reported that he was

reminded several times during the course of the attempts at
settlement of the dictum "trust begets tru-st."38
To Stimson himself the big lesson of his Nicaraguan
experience was a simple one: if a man was frank and
friendly, and if he treated them as the equals they
most certainly were, he could talk turkey with the
politicians and other leaders of Latin America as he
could with his own American colleagues and they would
not let him down.39
The results so pleased both sides that they prevailed
on Stimson to repeat his services four years later; for
within a month of his first landing Stimson had succeeded

38 Stimson and Bundy, op. cit., p. 114.
39 ibid.-, p. 116.
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in restoring general peace.

He had also pledge^ the

United States to stand good for a fair and free election.
In fact, the United States supervised at their request the
Nicaraguan elections of 1928, 1950, and 1932.
The third step in improving United States-Latin
American relations under Coolidge was under the leadership
of Morrow.

Dwight Morrow contributed largely to the

development of the new policy towards Latin America by his
work in Mexico.

Mexico represented a kind of test case for

all Latin America in the latter part of 1927,

Harold

Nicolson, Morrow's biographer, even states the importance
of this mission in terms of world significance:
. . . Morrow' s Mexican mission was bound t o create a
precedent affecting the policy of the Department of
State towards the whole southern continent. Dor was
this all. Owing to the Monroe Doctrine, the European
Powers would also tend to conform their attitude to
that of Washington. They also, sooner or later would
follow the Morrow precedent. This precedent, by analogy,
would moreover affect the policy of the Great Powers
dealing with other backward but suddenly nationalistic
countries. Great Britain, for instance, would in the
end find it difficult to adopt in Persia or China a
oolicv essentially different from that to which, in
Mexico, she had been committed by the Morrow precedent.
It was with this reason that his mission to Mexico City
was watched with anxious interest by all the world.

40 Harold Nicolson, Dwight Morrow, p. 295.
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Morrow went to Mexico with a determination to like
the Mexican people and make them like him.^
could to create good will.

He did all he

He especially cultivated the

friendship of the Mexican President, Calles.

There were

four main problems that were complicating United StatesMexican .relations.

They were oil, land, claims, and debts.

The most controversial and the most dangerous was oil.

For

ten years it had hem the subject of embittered wrangling.
Morrow, to Calle's surprise, assured the Mexican President
that it was a legal and not a diplomatic problem, and that
it could be settled in this manner.
compromise.

The conclusion was a

The United States agreed to abide by the

decision of the Mexican Supreme Court.

The Mexicans agreed

to recognize the right of American owners of oil land that
had been obtained before 1917 upon which some positive acts
of improvement had been made, while the American government
agreed to abandon "their objection to the issuance of
confirmatory concessions by the Mexican government."

Thus,

the "United States had maintained the principle of vested
property rights" and the- "Mexican government had maintained
the principle of the nationalization of the sub-soil."42

Ibid.. p. 300.
42 Ibid., pp. 331-332.
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Morrow pointed the way oat of the obnoxious American
practices of interfering with the internal affairs of the
Caribbean republics. The dilemma of the American policy
makers was that they could not afford to refuse protection
to American lives and property in situations where life and
property were being flagrantly endangered. Yet in giving
this protection intervention usually was entailed with the
consequent hostility of the Latin Americans and the
disapproval of the American electorate.43
The significance of Morrow's work was that he
proposed as the basis of a practical permanent policy ideas
that Wilson had propounded from time to time.

He declared

with complete charity that forcible intervention, however
noble were its sanctions, was a "power doctrine" and thus
was in conflict with the conscience of the United States.
To summarize:

Morrow was first to show that international

law may furnish a good basis for continuing controversy,
but it was no sure way of bringing about a settlement to a
dispute.

He insisted that private debts in foreign nations

ought not to be collected by governmental coercion; he was
the first to argue that cooperation between the United States

43 ibid., p.

299*
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and Latin America, however uncertain and disappointing it
night momentarily appear, would in the end prove the only
practicable policy, and he was the first to demonstrate
how much could be achieved by sympathy and confidence as
the only possible alternatives either to legal controversy
or to "menaces and marines.1,44
A fourth step under Coolidge in improving United
States-Latin American relations was the work of the UnderSecretary of State, Reuben Clark, in differentiating the
essentials of the Monroe Doctrine from its excrescences.

Of

the Roosevelt Corollary he wrote:
It is not believed that this corollary is justified
by the terms of the Monroe Doctrine, however much it
may be justified by application of self-preservation."40
In this memorandum, Clark divorced the Roosevelt Corollary
but did not disown it, but rather justified preventive
intervention in Cuba, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic.46
Hoover's first step towards the improvement of
United States-Latin American relations was his extended tour
of Latin America.

Herbert Hoover with his Secretary of

44 Ibid., pp. 297-298.
45 j. Reuben Clark, Memorandum on the Monroe
Doctrine, p* xxiii.
46 Laurence Duggan, The Americas: The Search fox
Hemisphere Security. p* 55.
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State, Henry L. Stimson, developed what perhaps could be
called the Good Will Policy,

Hoover's South American trip,

before he was inaugurated, greatly promoted cordial
relations between the United States and Latin American
nations.47

The Wilson administration had laid the

foundation for two aspects of the policy of conciliating
Latin American nations.

These were the renunciation of

imperialism and the disposition to cooperate with the
peaceful nations against aggression and violation of
treaties.4^
The second step to better hemisphere relations under
Hoover was partly due to the Latin American tour.

As a

result of his Latin American tour, Hoover was convinced of
the necessity of improving inter-American friendship.
Three principles that were the guiding stars for Latin
American relation were: the Monroe Doctrine, preventive
intervention against European powers and Latin American
weakness, and respect for the. independence
all the nations of the Americas.

and integrity for

Particularly important

did Stimson as Secretary of state consider this last
principle.

47
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The Hoover-Stimson good will policy that was thus
developed in the period 1929-1933 really marked the
beginning of an era of better relations between North, and
South America.49

During this period the "obnoxious

practices" and "untenable doctrines" that so long had been
an embarrassment to the United States were put away.
Herbert Hoover thus by:
. . « gradual action and successive declarations
brought about the replacement of all policies implying
tutelage, intervention or pressure on the part of the
United States, by an intercourse based on the principle
of Equality and on the respect for the sovereignty of
all the sister republics, large or small, strong or
weak.50
The third step under Hoover to improve the United
States-Latin American relations was the modification of the
recognition policy.

Stimson, while Secretary of State,

adopted practical remedies for. several causes that had
disturbed United States-Latin American relations.

Wilson's

practices of limiting official recognition of n8w govern
ments to those that were constitutionally elected was
discontinued for the more traditional policy of recognizing
new governments that demonstrated that they really were in

T. H. Reynolds, The Progress of jfen-Americanism:
A Historical Survey of Latin American Opinion, p. 129.
49

50 Ibid., p. 130.
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national control. The denial of the right of revolution
applied only to the Central American countries and not to
all of Hispanic America.
The fourth step to constructive and cooperative
living in the Americas was Hoover 's acceptance of and
publication of J. Reuben Clark's clarification in his
Memorandum on the Monroe Doctrine and the differentiation
between the essential and non-essential aspects of that
doctrine as propounded by

Monroe.

The fifth step to better inter-American relations
was the abandonment of or limitation of special protection
practices.

Coolidge's doctrine of the unlimited protection

of American citizens abroad was discarded.52

A

practice

was thus eliminated that could only be enforced in violation
of the sovereignty of other nations.

The duty of

protection was confined to the more reasonable limits
fixed by international law.
American investors

Moreover, Stimson notified

in Latin America to seek settlements for

alleged wrongs through the local courts in their respective
countries and that arbitration should be used whenever the

51 Perkins, on. cit., p. 344.
52 jbid., p. 131.
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particular government was willing.

Steps were taken to

relax the United States administrative control of those
states where she was administering the financial
policies.53

Parallel to these efforts to end the policy

of financial intervention went the steps to liquidate the
policy of military intervention and occupation in the
Caribbean Islands and the Centrel American region where
preparatory steps were taken to evacuate the American
troops from Haiti and

Nicaragua.54

The sixth step to inter-American accord under
Hoover was Stimson's refusal to intervene in Cuba.53
The seventh step was the efforts at withdrawal from
Haiti of the United States Marines.

A special commission

investigated and recommended the process of withdrawal,56
A new treaty with Haiti was negotiated.

When the

provisions of the treaty were met, the maintenance of order
would be in the hands of Haitians and the United States
Marines were to be pulled out of Haiti.57

Hoover failed

53 Reynolds, op. clt., p. 131.
54 foe, cit.
55 Stimson and Bundy, on. clt.. p. 183.
56 Ibid., p. 184.
57 Duggan, on. cit., p. 56.

107

t o g e t a t r e a t y r a t i f i e d t h a t would c l e a r up United
States-Haiti relations.

F r a n k l i n D. Roosevelt took a c t i o n

on t h i s matter i n h i s a d m i n i s t r a t i o n by executive
agreement.
The e i g h t h s t e p t o b e t t e r harmony among t h e i n t e r American n a t i o n s was t h e e f f o r t a t l i q u i d a t i n g i n t e r v e n t i o n
i n Nicaragua.

The f a c t t h a t American Marines were present

i n Nicaragua was d i s t o r t e d by c r i t i c s of t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n
e n t i r e l y out of p r o p o r t i o n t o r e a l i t y .

American withdrawal

from Nicaragua was d e l a y e d by demands f o r g r e a t e r e f f o r t s
a t p r o t e c t i o n of American p r o p e r t y .

Stirason argued:

Each i n t e r v e n t i o n by American t r o o p s undermined the
s l o w l y growing c a p a c i t y o f t h e Nlcaraguan Governragpt
t o maintain o r d e r w i t h i t s Marine-trained f o r c e s •*-'
After t h e f a i r and f r e e e l e c t i o n i n 1932 t h a t t h e United
S t a t e s was pledged t o h o l d , t h e American 2iarines were a l l
withdrawn. 8 9
I n s p i t e of s u c h advances towards harmony w i t h the
L a t i n American s t a t e s , numerous b a r r i e r s t o understanding
y e t remained,

p r e v e n t i v e i n t e r v e n t i o n , f o r i n s t a n c e , *as

not completely disowned, b u t r a t h e r j u s t i f i e d , i n c e r t a i n
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circumstances,, such as those which obtained Cuba, Haiti,
and the Dominican Republic.60

With all of these progressive

steps in the right direction during the Hoover administra
tion, we must record one step of retrogression that
contributed Immensely to the deterioration of the United
States-Latin American relations.

This was the passage of

the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act in 1930.

Even DeConde, who, in

the investigator's opinion, exaggerates Hoover's creative
role in formulating the Good Neighbor Policy, recognizes
the Smoot-Hawley Act was a mistake:
Probably the weakest link in Hoover's Latin American
policy was his administration's tariff policy, which to
many Latin Americans was anathema. In this regard, the
Roosevelt Administration made a significant change by
putting in effect a program of reciprocal trade agree
ments, championed by Secretary of State Cordell Hull.
High United States tariffs under the Smoot-Hawley
arrangement constituted a serious barrier to hemispheric
accord.

The United States was searching for a prosperous

economic and commercial policy.

It included both tariffs

on Latin American commercial goods and financial loans to
Latin American business men.

Many items of great importance

to Latin American economies were duty free, but on other

60 Duggan, loc. cit.
61

DeConde, 0£. cit., p. 125.
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items the duties were such that the entire American market
was lockee against them.

Such was the case with copper

from Chile, Mexico, and Peru in the Revenue Act of 1932,
Oil was excluded from Venezuela, Colombia, and Mexico by an
import tax on foreign petroleum.
was doubled between 1921 and 1930,

The import tax on sugar
As a consequence,

Cuba's share in the United States sugar market dropped from
55.4 per cent to 5.4 per cent.

Eeef and mutton from

Argentina had to hurdle tariffs of unreasonable heights,
until finally the device of a sanitary embargo shut off all
meat from there.^
We have a picture of the mind of Franklin D.
Roosevelt relative to United States-Latin American Relations
in an article written by him for Foreign Affairs in 1926.
In this article he was the spokesman for the Democratic
Party.

He summarizes the role that the United Stages has

played in Latin American affairs.

His principal thesis is

that America has erred in practicing unilateral intervention
in the Latin American states of the Caribbean region.
nations needed some assistance, but the process that we
settled on was wrong.

62 Duggan, on *
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satisfactory work for the material interest of the people
of Santo Domingo and Haiti, America excelled.
ought," he said, "to thank us."

"The world

But it does not. The

other nations of America do not thank us. Instead "they
disapprove our intervention almost unanimously. What is
the attitude

that they take:

. . . By what right, they say, other than the right
of main force, does the United States arrogate unto
itself the privilege of intervening alone in the
internal affairs of another Sovereign Republic?
The net results of these instances, and recently of
far less justified intervention in Nicaragua, is that
never before in our history have we had fewer friends
in the Western Hemisphere than we have today. . . in
the sixteen republics of Central and South America the
United States Government by its recent policies has
allowed a dislike and mistrust of long standing to grow
into something like positive hate and fear.63
Roosevelt moved from the task of examining the past
and its results to that of an advocate for changes that he
assumed would bring about better relations between the
nations of this hemisphere.

It is time not only to examine

the facts of our historic, policy, but also the "many new
principles of a high®1, lew, a newer and better standard in
international relations."

Americans who think so highly of

Franklin D. Roosevelt, "Our Foreign Policy: A
Democratic Fiew,» pvvreign Affairs: An American Quarterly
Review", 6:584, July, 1028.
63
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their own national sovereignty should respect the same
feeling in the peoples of the other nations of this
hemisphere toward their country end its positive role in
the affairs of this hemisphere:
. . . it is only right that we should respect a
similar feeling among other nations. The peoples of the
other Republics of this Western World are Just as
patriotic, just as proud of their sovereignty. Many of
these nations are large, wealthy and highly civilized.
The peace, the security, the integrity, the indeoendence of every one of the American Republics is of
interest to all the others, not to the United States
alone.64
Single handed intervention by us in the internal
affairs of other nations must end; with the cooperation
of others we shall have more order in this hemisphere
and less dislike.65
Sumner Welles had a basic part in the creation and
administration 66 of the policy that was so appropriately
called by Franklin D. Roosevelt the "Good Neighbor Policy."
Laurence Duggan, an expert on Latin American affairs in the
United States Department of State, and a close associate of
Welles , gives Welles the principal credit for creating the
essential blueprints of this policy;
. . . Cn inter-American matters, Roosevelt was
fortunate in having beside him Sumner Welles, a man who
64

Roosevelt, loc. cit.

65 Ibid., p. 565.
66 William L. Langert ana S. Everett Gleason, The
Challenge to Isolationism. 1937-1940, p. 8.

understood clearly the mistakes of cur past polic • and
had definite ideas for building a new cue. delles had
fought courageously for decent treatment of L:tin"
Americans at a time when neither the Gov-rm.eut nor ch
people of this country were interested in the i rotlem.
The Latin Americans recognized in hi*,; a PLndr«-d spirit
with whom they could talk as friend to friend, he had
infinite patience and tact end an unrivaled insight
into their political problems, iloreover, he beli .vcd
in the vision for which Gimon Bolivar had fcuwhfc: a
community of American nations, equal before the law an
co-operatin_ with one another in v:ar and jcacc.®7
For more than thirty years dm:nor '.."olios fcu^ht for
a satisfactory policy with Latin America,

he considered

that the achievement of the Gcod neighbor I'clicy v.as seccr.
only to the "establishment of a successful international
organization" so far as the security of the United dtates
was involved.®®
According to Sumner h'elles, tiiexe are four basic
principles of Pan-Americanism in our Good Leichtor rclicy

upon which rest the structure of the Inter-Anoxican system
First, that each American nation recognizes the
equality of all the other twenty-one.

2CV'-r-^an

Seconu, that no

nation in the Americas will intervene in the internal or

foreign affairs of any of the ether

-ri~o-»

Third, that the solution of controversies among the Ar.erice

67
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nations will "be made solely by pacific methods.

Finally,

that a threat that Jeopardizes the security of any of the
American nations will elicit Joint action of all in the
hemisphere as they may determine through consultation.69
Another authority, by subdividing these principles,
presents a list of eight:

non-intervention, condemnation

of aggression, non-recognition of territories seized by
force, "no forcible collection of pecuniary obligations,"
equality of states, respect for treaty obligation, continential solidarity, and pacific settlement of disputes.^
Still another authority finds seven aspects of the Good
Neighbor Policy.71
Me shall see, in time, the unique contribution that
Cordell Hull made to the solution of some of the grave
economic problems that complicated the relations of the
inter-American nations.

American bankers had loaned some

two and one half billion dollars to Latin America in the
years 1919 to 1930. These debts could be paid only from the
proceeds of goods shipped to the American market.

The

69 Sumner Welles, The Time for Decision, p. 369.
70 Edward C. Guerrant, Roosevelt's Good Neighbor
Folicv, pp. 68-73, 83.
71 Howard J. Trueblood, "Progress of Fan-American
Cooperation," Foreign Policy Reports, 15:393, February 15,
1940.
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American tariff policy made this increasingly difficult.
The Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930 was the final barrier
in stopping the flow of Latin American trade.

Hull

described the results of this on Latin American opinion as
he understood it:
Piled high on political antagonism was economic
resentment. The high tariffs of oreceding administrations coupled with the panic of 1929, had brought
to the Latin American countries grave economic distress
. ... In 1932 certain Latin American countries,
stung by our high tariffs, actually conferred with one
another to form a customs union for defensive action
against us.72
Since Cordell Hull played, a very Important role in
implementing the "Good Neighbor Policy," it is of some
importance to know his attitudes toward the factors involved.
For some time before he became Secretary of State, Hull was
convinced of the wisdom of a policy that would reduce
friction between the United States and the other nations of
this hemisphere.

He held strong convictions of the

principles involved in the Good Neighbor Policy;
Long before March 4 I had resolved that one of our
principles in dealing with Latin America would be
religious adherence to the principle of nonintervention.
I felt we could never be reel friends with the Latin
Americans so long as we maintained the right to inter
vene in their internal affairs. I had helped write the
planks in the Democratic Platform of 1932 which stated,

Cordell Hull, Memoirs, p. 308.
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•No interference in the internal affairs of other
nations' and also 'Cooperation -with nations of the
V/estern Hemisphere to maintain the spirit of the
Monroe Doctrine.' president Roosevelt was in thorough
agreement with me on these points, and for some years
we had already been thinking on the same line,73
This seems to express Hull's early congenial attitude to
the political principles involved in the Good Neighbor
Policy.
In view of the fact that Hull was to play the role
of applying principles instead of formulating them .alto
gether it is important to observe Hull's concept of the
total project of improving United States-Latin American
relations. Hull felt that it was of the highest importance
that the policy with regards to Latin America be formulated
with great care ana implemented with greet tact.

Hull, who

faced a vital role in accomplishing political and
commercial peace and understanding with Latin America,
felt that such a program should follcw these lines:.
Our program toward latin .America, I know, had. to
embrace a broad and basic set of mutually beneficial
policies and principles, political, economic, ana ^rsl.
But policies and principles were not enough, ine latin
American nations had heard them enunciated by previous
administrations, and alleged breaches of such
principles had brought doubt and misgivings in
corner south of the Rio Grande. He woula have to ei^e
them acts as uell as words. They were judging us now by

^ Ibid.» PP- 309-310.
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their Interpretation, cf our previous acts.
continue to judge identically.

Thev would

But action, even though right, v;as not enough. It
also had to be highly delicate and tactful. We had to
take the initiative and leadership to effect contacts
and conference calculated to remove the grievances held
against us. Ey deeds dene carefully in the right way v;e
had to pave the way for gradual restoration of confidence
and friendliness and steadily increasing cooperation on
the part of all the Latin American nations--not only
with us, but also among themselves. Actually, our task
was to create a 'whole new spirit.74
In his inaugural address, on March 4th, 1935, Mr.
Roosevelt had affirmed that the nature cf his proposed
foreign policy would be in the need or spirit cf a ^,ccd
neighbor.

He had used the phrase as the symbol of the spirit

that was to characterize all of the American foreign
relations.

Roosevelt said:

In the field of world jolicp, I would dedicate this
Nation to the policy of the good neighbor--the
neighbor who resolutely respects himself and because he
does so, respects his obligations and respects the
sanctity of his agreements in and with a world of
neighbors.75
The administration's decision to cooperate with the
other nations in the settlement cf troubles in tnis
hemisphere was an important forward step.

74
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75 samuel Rosenman, compiler, j£he Public F?pers gnd
Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Vol. 11»- I-to: mg real
of Crisis, p. 14.

117
the border dispute between Colombia and Peru—the Leticia
border dispute--constituted a challenging enterprise.

The

League of Nations had invited the United States to join with
its Advisory Commission in this highly significant matter:
Our acceptance signified our willingness to
cooperate with other nations in the settlement of Latin
American questions. Unilateral action on our part was
now in the discard. We began to apply a principle to
which we adhered in the years to follow. This was to
refrain from acting until after having consulted?6
with all the other interested nations. Only in this
way could we work from under the deep-seated resentment
engendered in Latin America by previous one-sided
actions of our country.'7?
Again in the perplexing Cuban situation when inter
vention seemed to .some to be the best answer, Hull stood
firmly for non-intervention.

The State Department began

the practice of consulting with Latin American states in
times of crisis.

Hull was convinced that it worked:

I held frequent conversations on Cuba with the
Ambassadors of important Latin American countries. This
was in line with the decision I had reached that
whatever diplomatic actions were called for on our
part in Latin America would be taken only after

Consultation had been defined as an obligation
under the Hellogg Peace Pact by Stimson, Hull*s immediate
predecessor: "whenever a breach of the treaty is threatened
by approaching hostilities, it implies a duty of consulta
tion among the other parties in order that public opinion
may be mobilized against the impending disaster of war."
Russell M. Cocoer, American Consultation in World Affairs
p. 61.
"
.
'
76

77

Hull, on. cit., p. 311.
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consultation with the Interested countries to the South
of us. We vjould no longer make single-handed neves.
Acting in conjunction or consultation with other
Latin American countries gave us two advantages. It
strengthened the move we had in mind. And it ire vented
or lessened the resentment that so often rose in Latin
America when the United States acted tv herself in the
Western Hemisphere.7C
Hull says that Roosevelt's Pan-American Day Creech
v;as produced largely by the State Department.

Perhaps the

Secretary of State had something to do with the wording of
the definition of the role of the good neighbor in the
American hemisphere.
The essential qualities of a true Fan-Americanism
* . • must be the same as those which constitute a Good
neighbor, namely, mutual understanding ana, tnrou^i
such understanding, a sympathetic appreciation of the
other's point of view. It is only in tins manner tiiat
we can hope to build up a system of wrier ncniiaence,
friendship end good will P.IS the cornerstones, arch
one of us must grovi by the advance:.cnt of civ-llsa-icn
and social well-being, end not by she acquisition of
territory at the expense of any nei^n-or. -

73 Hull, on. cit., p. 214•
75

Ibid., p. 311.

CHARTER IV

IMPLEMENTING THE GCCD NEIGHBOR. POLICY AT MONTEVIDEO
The Seventh International Conference of American
States had been postponed once for an entire year.

There

were many who wished to delay its meeting again.1

The

outstanding Latin American states were reluctant to
proceed with it.2

The time was far from auspicious.

Two

world conferences had recently ended in dismal failure:
The London Economic Conference for the stabilization of
national currencies and the Geneva Conference to achieve
military disarmament.

All twenty-one American Republics

•were entangled in the throes of economic depression.

The

Chaco war was on in South America, end Cuba was torn by
revolution.

The condition of Uruguay was such that to go

there would be "like walking into a burning house."
ever, Uruguay urged that the Conference be held. 3

How

All the

Latin American nations finally accepted the invitation to
attend the Conference without reservation.^

1 New York Times, November 2, 1933.
Z Ibid. , October 9, 1933.
3

cordell Hull, Memoirs, p. 317.

4 New York Times, September 30, 1933.
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Hull's friends advised him against; participating in
the Conference for fear that another conference failure
would spell ruin to his career.5
going and doing his "best.

However, he insisted on

The prospects, however, seemed

dark for an opportunity to get his own commercial
principles considered.

All nations seemed to "be moving in

the direction of extreme nationalism.

The United States

was obsessed with its domestic economic recovery program.
The National Recovery Act, the Agricultural Adjustment Act,
and such other domestic undertakings if followed
permanently meant economic nationalism as a long-term
policy.

Nevertheless, the final decision was to hold the

Conference with Hull heading the American delegation.6 to.
Roosevelt, however, gave Hull little encouragement for the
furtherance of Hull's trade principles.

In fact, when Hull

asked the President to make a statement that would squelch
superficial optimism as to the possible outcome of the
Conference, Roosevelt responded with such a good Job at
"squelching" that Hull was alarmed least he have closed the
door to any real achievement.^

They were to discuss neither

5 Loc. cit.
6

Hull, op. cit., pp. 317-318.

7 Ibid., p. 319.
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currency stabilization nor custom duties.6
Nonintervention sentiment among students of
international affairs in America was growing and was
represented to our State Department through several
recommendations.

Concerning the Montevideo Conference one

of these recommendations was, in part:
That the American States conclude at Montevideo an
agreement following the general principles advanced by
Fxesident Roosevelt on May 16 to the effect that no
state, acting on its private authority, should send its
armed forces across the frontiers of other States,
except in accordance with treaties and for the purpose
of evacuating foreigners from the parts of disturbed
areas.9
Some extremely serious questions confronted this
proposed Conference:

Such as, the war over the Chaco between

Paraguay and Bolivia; the need of strengthened peace
machinery; a continentalized Monroe Doctrine; radical re
organization of the Pan-American Union with Canada included,
and with the Union headquarters not confined to Washington
but decentralized with the Director a Latin American, and
tariff and trade adjustment.10

An agreement to

continentalize the Monroe Doctrine would mean that the

6

New York Times. November 10 and November 11, 1933.

Ernest Gruening, "A New Deal for Latin America,"
Current History, 39:270-275, December, 1S33.
9

10 Herbert Herring, "Will Montevideo Make History?"
The Christian Century, 50:571-573, December 13, 1933.
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American states assume as a common task the policing of the.
nations of this hemisphere "rather than the arbitrary act
of a single power deriving its right solely from might."11
Despite the difficulties of the task, there were some
hopeful signs on the horizon:
. . .There is a fair prospect of such a New Deal in
our relations with our southern neighbors. President
Roosevelt took a step in this direction by his proposal
on May 16. . . . There is also the President's
declared purpose to play the part of the 'good neigh
bor.' There is Secretary Hull's evident desire to
establish a new era of equal dealings in this
hemisphere. . • a declaration of a new nonintervention
policy, except where we are specifically obligated by
existing treaties (as in Cuba and Panama) would be a
step forward. It would be in the fullest sense a
victory, not for Latin America but for us. Our Jingoes
will never understand that the best defence for the
Fanama Canal is to make friends of the neighboring
peoples, and from a purely material standpoint, trade
is fostered by good will.J-2
Hull was given a free hand in the selection of the
members of the delegation he was to lead in the Conference.
Work began when they took ship for the Conference and
continued in a long seminar-like study on United Statas-Latin
American relations throughout the voyage to Montevideo.

!1 Gruening, 00. cit., pp. 274-275.
12 Editorial, "What May Be Done at Montevideo,"
The Nation. 137:640-645, December 6, 1S33.
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Hull felt that great care must be exercised to implement
the President's Good Neighbor Policy in a broad and
practical way, therefore, the American delegation spent
the trip doing intensive study and consultation along
specific lines for t h i s

purpose.

Hull proposed not only right actions toward the Latin
Americans, but also delicately tactful actions toward them.
Grievances must be removed, and the way must be paved for
the restoration of confidence and friendliness and
cooperation.

Moreover, the United States had to take the

initiative to effect contacts and conferences to accomplish
these ends.

Hull began this practice aboard ship on the way

to the Conference.

He made it a point to see and confer,

as cordially as possible, with delegations aboard ship.
Particularly was the Haitian delegation thus cultivated.! 4
The thought grew in Hull's mind as his ship ploughed
southward until it became a settle conviction that this
Conference could provide the situation for the establishment
of a landmark in the development of tariff and trade reform.
He wrote of this:

»I early determined to introduce a

comprehensive economic resolution for lower tariffs and the

13 Hull, op. cit., p. 320, also New York Times,
November 13, 1933.
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abolition of trade restrictions."15

Hull spent a

considerable time polishing up this resolution which he
expected to be in such a form that it could be applied
world-wide—to the Old as well as the New world.
Specifically, this plan
. . . provided first for a tariff truce. Next, the
signatories agreed to initiate bilaterial or
plurilateral negotiations for the removal of
restrictions on commerce and for the reduction of
tariff rates. The Governments were to direct their
greatest efforts toward eliminating restrictions and
reducing duties which most clearly lacked economic
justification. Lastly, the Governments agreed to
incorporate in their trade agreements the most-favorednation principle in its unconditional and unrestricted
form, this to be applied to all forms and methods of
control of imports and not only to import duties.15
The next thing was to secure authority from Washington
to go ahead to some extent on Hull's proposed statement of
tariff reform programs.

Franklin D. Roosevelt consented

only after making such reservations which would limit
tariff reform action to the statement of broad objectives
that were more in the nature of unattainable ideals and pious
hopes than specific steps in a practical program.

Roosevelt

particularly feared lest commitments be made that would
interfere with his domestic policy that was aimed at
economic recovery*

With adequate exceptions and reservations

15

rbia., P* 320.

16

Hull, ££• pit., p. 320.
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as safeguards lor Roosevelt's New Deal, he gladly approved
Hull's efforts to keep alive the idea of liberalizing
tariff barriers by simultaneous cooperative action of many
national states.Hull proceeded to make the most of this
qualified authority from Washington.

He presented his

proposals for tariff reform to the Conference.18
Hull and the American delegation arrived in Montevideo
four days early.

These four days were to prove most

valuable days for Hull and the ultimate success of the
Conference. He made it a point to call on each of the
various delegations as soon as they filtered in.19

He thus

followed through on his basic assumption that it was an
American responsibility to take the initiative in making
good will and understanding.

The technique that he used

was not to make a formal appointment, but simply to have his
secretary telephone, after Hull left his hotel, the parti
cular delegation upon whom he proposed calling.

Hull's

secretary simply informed that delegation that Hull was cn
his way to call on them.

Thus, without ceremony, Hull

contacted the delegations one by one from Panama to Erazil.

17

Ibid.. p. 322, also New York Times, December 14,

1933.
18 New York Times, December 13, 1933.
19

Loc. cit.
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He made no exceptions, but called on them all, and made

himself available to them to discuss the matters that were

their distinctive interests.20
Hull's inside picture of these contacts and how the

Latin Americans reacted to his approaches follows:
Invariably one of the first sentences the other
chiefs of delegations uttered was: 'I was just intending
to call upon you at your hotel.' To which I invariably
replied, 'It is as much my duty to call upon you as
your duty to call upon me, and my people feel that way
toward you and your people.'
Generally a thirty to: forty-minute conference
followed preparing the way to better understanding, more
uniform objectives, and a full measure of cooperation
to attain, them. I assured each delegation: 'There is
nothing my Government wants or is seeking down here
except to carry forward the doctrine of the Good
neighbor. We simply want to cooperate fully with all
Latin American countries in promoting the political
and economic ideals in which we are all alike equally
and mutually interested.'
I sought to discuss with the delegates pleasant
rather than disagreeable subjects and to convince them
of iny absolute good faith in relation to the meeting.
Having ascertained in advance what each delegation was
most interested in, I made that an important part of
our conversations..
Most delegations had difficulty concealing their
surprise at the fact and manner of my call; but they
appeared pleased,- and soon I was receiving return calls
from the other delegations in an increasingly cordial
atmosphere.

20

Hull, op. Cit., pp. 322-324.

21

Ibid., p. 326.
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One of the more important, if not the most
important, steps to the success of the Conference would be
to win the support of Argentina.

The key to this delegation

was, of course, their chief or head, Dr. Saavedra Lamas.
The outcome of the entire Conference could be decided by
the nature of the encounter between Hull and Saavedra Lamas.
Argentina's Ambassador to the United States had told Hull
before he left for the Conference that the United States
could have Dr. Saavedra Lamas' support at the Conference
simply by adhering to the famous Argentinean's anti-war
pact.

American adherence, even though the United States

felt that they had to do so with reservations, would be
acceptable to Saavedra Lamas.
Apparently, the argentine delegation had been hastily
thrown together at the last minute, for she had not
intended to support the Conference.

Late developments,

however, had caused her to change this policy.
was considerable confusion.

The re salt

The delegation arrived on the

morning of the day before the Conference was scheduled to
open.

Almost as soon as the Argentine delegation had reached

their hotel, which was some fourteen miles out of Montevideo,
Hull was on his way to see Saavedra Lamas.

22 ibid., p. 322.

Hull followed his
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standard routine, for after he left his secretary reached
the Argentine delegation by telephone and informed them
that Hull was on his way to see them.

On arrival, Hull

was able to see the head of the Argentine delegation at
once..

Hull was aware of the importance of the meeting and

described it as follows:
I approached him somewhat in circles. I first
assured him that my government wanted nothing for
itself except to put into practice the doctrine of the
Good Neighbor. This included the fundamentals of all
those relationships between the nations of this
hemisphere which should be asserted and scrupulously
maintained. It embraced the doctrine of territorial
and political integrity of each nation, the freedom of
their citizens and their absolute sovereignty. It also
included the promotion of peace and economic welfare.^ 3
With the acknowledgment of Saavedra Lama's pre
eminence as a Latin American statesman, Hull pointed out
that at least two broadly comprehensive resolutions should
be introduced to the coming Conference and passed.

One

proposal should cover a constructive economic program for
business recovery.

The other proposal should cover peace.

As a good basis for peace in the American hemisphere, all
the American governments should be pledged to sign the
five lately unsigned treaties, that according to Hull were

23

Ibid., pp. 327-528
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"floating around" in the western hemisphere.24

Saavedra

Lamas noticeably became alert when Hull said, "The United
States is ready to sign your Anti-War Pact."25 Further
more, Hull gave as his opinion that Saavedra Lamas was
pre-eminently qualified as the person best to introduce
the peace resolution with a ringing speech. However, in
case Saavedra Lamas should not see his way to do this, the
second choice would be the Brazilian Foreign Minister.
Saavedra Lamas asked for twenty-four hours' time to consider
it, but considerably short of that time he had returned
with the speech prepared and the resolution ready.26

He

announced his hearty support of the peace proposal and
added, ". . .I'll support your economic resolution, although
my government is not very favorable to certain portions of
it."27

This was of utmost importance, for Hull's resolution

24 These treaties were: The Gondra Treaty of 1923;
The Keilogg-Briand Fact (the treaty for the renunciation of
war); The 1929 General Convention of Inter-American Concilia
tion; The 1920 General Treaty of Inter-American Arbitration
and the Protocol of Progressive Arbitration; the Treaty of
Non-Ag0ression and Conciliation of the Argentine Anti-War
Pact. Also, Hull, op. cit., p. 322, and l.anly 0. Hudson,
"The Inter-American Treaties of Settlement," Foreign Aflairs.
15:165-177, October, 1936.

25 ibid., p. 328.
26

New York Times. December 3, 1933.

27

Hull, OP. cit., p* 329.
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on economic reform must pass through, the important key
committee of which Saavedra Lamas was the chairman.
Saavedra Lamas had smiled broadly while he said with
enthusiasm, "We shall be the two wings of the dove cf peace,
you the economic and I the political."2®
Throughout the Conference that followed, a cordial
and understanding cooperation prevailed between Hull and
Saavedra Lamas on all important questions.

Later, Hull

pressed the Argentinian's candidacy for the Nobel Peace
Prize, although Hull's own candidacy had been proposed.
Saavedra Lamas in time received this award,2*'
Hull's economic proposals of reciprocity went through
more easily than he expected.

True to their woxxing

agreement, Hull represented the "economic wing of the dove
of peace" and Saavedra Lamas represented the political.
They supported each other's resolutions.

Hull made a speech

before the Committee on Economic Matters as he presented
the American economic proposalsC®

The resolution ..a.. in a

28 inc. cit.
29

IMd., pp. 328-329.

^ j_ •> _
;=>
a s of the dnited State s o x
30 Report of tge
_JL_c o n f e r e n c e of American
America to the^Seventh
2-26, 1933^ The Departp
s-hs-has Montevideo, tlrugua., ,
c*
n
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short time passed,31

The resolution thus passed became an

important basis for the application of the United States
Trade Agreements Act that was enacted some six months
later,52

Mexico wanted the debt situation tied into the

economic consideration, but this was laid on the table and
reserved for consideration at a commercial conference that
Argentina was requested to call.33
Meantime, during the Conference, Hull had managed to
keep himself in the background.

Deliberately avoiding

assignment, he was free to slip in and cut of meetings and
to spark plug things generally and keep them rolling.

This

technique had been used by him at the Democratic Convention
in 1932 that had first nominated Franklin D. Roosevelt fox
the Presidency.

It seemed to work with striking success in

both cases.
It was a high point in the Conference wr.en Hull, for
the United States, declared his approval of the resolution
on the Rights and Duties of States.
had to be made with reservations.

51

The American declaration

Nevertheless, the United

Ibid., pp. 196-198.

32 Hull, 0£. cit., p. 322.

33 Resort on Seventh Internetlonal Conference of
American States, p. 58.
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States had taken a strong stand for non-intervention. 3 ^
Hull thus stated clearly that the United States was opposed
to interventionist policies.

He took a firm stand cn the

matter both in committee and before the plenary session.
Hull persisted unmoved in this attitude end position even
when subjected to a heavy barrage of Latin American oratory.
In the consideration over United States* reservations on
the non-interventionist resolution, the temptation was too
great for many Latin American delegates to resist,
Politicians, who had cut their first political teeth in
tirades against the interventions of the United States,
were slow to become accustomed to America's new role of
the good neighbor.
storm out, 35

Hull quietly and deliberately sat the

When the time came for signing, Hull signed

for the United States, and thus erected the capstan of the
Good Neighbor Policy. 35
Hull insisted that the Policy of the Good heighfcor
was now in practice by the United States, but it would ta^e

A Nicaraguan delegate asked Hull to put his fair
speeches in writing, New York Times, December cO t 1.33.
34

35 Report on the s e v e n t h I n t e r n a t i o n a l Conference of
American States. pp. 18-20, 165-172.
36 samuel Flagg Bemis, The Latin American Policy of
the United States, p. 258.
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a little time for the old practices to be liquidated in
relations with. Cuba, Panama, and Haiti. The Conference was
proceeding with considerable harmony when a sour note was
sounded by the Cuban chief delegate, Angel Glraudy, who
declared, in part, as follows:
I declare with deliberation that the United States is
intervening in Cuba, strongly intervening.* No United
States Marines have landed but the United States has
been engaged in intrigue against our President and his
Government through Ambassador Sumner Welles. If that
is not intervention, what is .'37
This outburst cane about in a committee hearing on
the economic measures that were proposed by Hull. The
committee chairman, Saavedra Lamas, stopped the Cuban
orator, declared his remarks irrelevant to the issue under
consideration and hence pronounced him out of order.38
Hull's stands for the lowering of trade barriers and the
opening of the United States to Latin American raw material
convinced Latin American delegates that the United States
was moving

39 Hull's cordial manner brought great

forward.,

respect from the Latin Americans.40

37

lime Magazine, 22:12, December 25, 1933.

38 New York Times, December 14, 1933.
39 New York Times, December 16, 1933.
40

New York Times, December 17, 1933.
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Despite such untoward Incidents, the Conference
closed with unprecedented harmony aril good feeling between
the nations of the western hemisphere.41

Hull erri the

Conference were both, acclaimed as great successes.

Cn the

return trip to the United States, Hull visited the capitols
of other Latin American states that he had been unable to
visit on his trip to the Conference.
tained with highest honor end esteem.

Here he was enter
During a dinner given

in his honor at Lima, Feru, he gave his evaluation of the
Montevideo Conference:
We have just had a great demonstration at Montevideo,
a demonstration that common sense and sincerity can
surmount all obstacles when men of good will approach
problems in a spirit of mutual helpfulness. That
conference was a convocation of good neighbors. It was
no place for demagogues end trouble makers , for back
biters end detractors, for petty suspicions, for the
harangues of mere place-hunting politicians. The
republics of this continent sent to the conference men
in majority of instances of high attainment. . . •
Largely because of this, it was possible in the
beginning for the conference to assert on behalf of the
Reoublics represented there a spiritual partnership
that became the underlying force of all our efforts..
Sumner V.'elles declared that the United States did the
best thing possible in signing the non-intervention
agreements:

"It was the first great step forwarding the

Charles A. Thomson, "The Seventh American Conference
Montevideo," 10:96, June
1934.
41

42 Hull, op». cit., P. 340.
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construction of the new inter-American relationship.m43
Furthermore, Hull attempted to list the accomplish
ments of the Conference to the Press Club when he landed
in the United States.

In part, his speech ran as follows:

A new spirit inspired by the policy of the good
neighbor was born at Montevideo. It was the spirit of
the Golden Rule, . . . The United States delegation
proclaimed everywhere the policy of the good neighbor
as so well defined by President Roosevelt. .. . This
doctrine bids every nation of the world take notice
that each is secure in its frontiers, its rights, end
its honor, and that nothing will be asked of it which
cannot be justified under the law of nations or
approved by the conscience of mankind. . . .The
representatives of the United States solemnly reiterated
this program of enlightened liberalism, of fair pley,
fair dealing, and mutual respect for the independence,
the sovereignty, and the rights of nations. The socalled right of conquest was denounced, condemned, and
outlawed. . . the Montevideo Conference courageously
attacked the destructive commercial policies which in
part have spread business havoc everywhere, and
demanded that the sky-scraping trade barriers be
lowered to a moderate level. The Conference was not
content with a mere expression of disapproval, but it
proceeded unanimously to propose a definitive, concrete
and comprehensive program for economic rehabitation which
would combine a policy of mutually profitable inter
national trade with such domestic economic policies and
programs as each nation may desire to maintain.44
Professor Mathews of the University of Illinois
assessed Roosevelt's Latin American policy up to 1935 and
Cordell Hull's role in it, as follows:

43 Sumner V/alles, The Time for Decision, p. 20C.
44 Cordell Hull, Some of the Results of the Monte video Conference, Department of state, Conference c-eries,
No. 18, pp. 5, 10.
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This change in the position of our goal, together
with the friendly, sincere, and unassuming attitude of
Secretary Hull, the head of our delegation, created a
very favorable impression upon the delegates from the
other states. It was largely due to Secretary Hull's
efforts that no hostile bloc of Latin-American nations
confronted the United States at the Conference. Some
persons have taken the position that international
conferences are a delusion and a snare and that the
United States should keep out of them. It is true that
some conferences, such as the world economic and
disarmament conference, have seemed to be failures *
Even the most pessimistic observerhowever, must admit
that the Montevideo Conference was a success.
Enough has now been said to show that, under the
Roosevelt Administration, the attitude of the United
States toward Latin America has undergone a. fundamental
change. This change is traceable to various causes,
among the most important were: (1) the lack of darker
of European intervention in Latin America; (2) the
gradually increasing stability in Latin-American
countries and their increasing ability on the whole to
keep their own house in order; (3) the effects of the
economic depression in the United States and the need
for this country to cultivate the good will of Latin
America as a stimulant to international trade; linally,
and most important, (4) greater realization on the
part of the United States of the right of Latin .-wnerica
to be allowed to work out its own destiny, without
unnecessary interference by the United atates.
The next forward steps in implementing the Good
Neighbor Policy after the close of the Conference at
Montevideo were the attempts to square all United StatesLatin American relations to the policy of non-intervention.
The months following the Conference were critically decisive.

%5S5fa

45 Tnhn m Mathews, "Roosevelt !s Latin American
olicy," ge"
science Esvlew, 29:019, October,
S35.
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Cuba was a special trial and embarrassment.

In the

revolutionary movement against the despotism of Cuban
dictator, Machado, the American administration under Hoover
had followed a strictly hands-off policy towards Cuba.
Roosevelt tried to formulate and execute a more positive
course of action.
Sumner Welles was sent to Cuba to implement a more
positive policy, but became greatly involved in a complica
ted situation.

The American nonrecognition policy and the

presence of United States naval craft off the Cuban shore
constituted nothing short of types of American intervention.
But no American forces were landed.

Within, a month after

the Montevideo Conference, the United States had recognized
the new regime and four months later a new treaty with Cuba
was formed that abrogated the Piatt Amendment ,4^

Economic

aspects so complicated the Cuban problem that only economic
solutions could meet them.

Hence the United. States

formulated policies appropriate to these needs.47

Financial

assistance was made available for Cuba to stabilize her

Edward 0. Guarrant, Roosevelt's Good Neighbor
Policy, p. 5,
46

David H. Popper," Latin American Policy of the _
Roosevelt Administration,» Foreign Policy Reports, 10:-75276, December 19, 1934.
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economy through t h e Export-Import Bonk.

The P r e s i d e n t ' s

25 per cent r e d u c t i o n o f t h e American t a r i f f on Cuban
sugar was a g r e a t s t i m u l u s t o t h e one-crop Cuban economy#
Some months l a t e r , Cuba became t h e f i r s t n a t i o n t o sign an
agreement w i t h t h e United. S t a t e s under t h e new. American
Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act. 4 ®
As a r e s u l t o f s e v e r a l months n e g o t i a t i o n s , t h e 1S03
t r e a t y with Panama was s o changed t h a t the o l d advantages
f o r United S t a t e s i n t e r v e n t i o n were e l i m i n a t e d . 4 ^
By mutual agreements with H a i t i American Marines were
a l l withdrawn i n August®® and t h e American bankers sold t o
t h e H a i t i a n Government t h e N a t i o n a l Bank of H a i t i .

This

Bank took o v e r t h e s u p e r v i s i o n of f i n a n c e s t h a t had been
conducted by A m e r i c a n s T h e United S t a t e s demonstrated
s i n c e r i t y i n cooperating w i t h h e r hemispheric neighbors i n
mediations i n the m a t t e r of the Chaco v;ai u n t i l t h e wax was
a t l a s t s u c c e s s f u l l y stopped.® 2

4®

H u l l , o_D. c i t . , p p . 344-345.

49 Loc. c i t .
popper, l o c . c i t .
51 H u l l , o p . c i t . , PP. 345-346.
^ I b i d . , pp. 3 4 6 - 3 4 7 .
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The claims of American citizens against the Mexican
government because of personal injury to Americans or
property damage during revolution or counter-revolution
came up for treatment. This amounted to several hundred
millions of dollars.
$500,000 a year,

Mexico agreed to make payments of

Tnis agreement cleared up some of the

hinderances to good United States-Mexican relations.53
Thus, Hull was able to emerge strikingly successful
in implementing the Good Neighbor Folicy both during the
Montevideo Conference and following it.

Through his

tactfulness, sincerity, modesty, cordiality, end consis
tency Hull won the respect and confidence of the Latin
Americans. In the Conference, Hull committed his country
to the non-interventionist policy and following the
Conference intervention policies were liquidated with Haiti,
Cuba, and Panama.
. . . At a time when we considered that at least some
of the other American republics were excessively
immature and irresponsible, we did net scruple ourselves
to exercise certain powers of government over them,
With the advent of the Good Neighbor Policy we abandoned
the use of such powers on the theory that all the
members of our community were of age and had achieved a
capacity for responsible conduct that allowed us to
risk the anarchy which, in default of any superior

53 Ibid., PP. 348-349
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authority, must reign among sovereign equals. . .54
Financial cooperation with Haiti and Mexico was demon
strated.
reform.

Also, Hull had emphasized the ideal of trade
In the midst of the Conference the New York Times

had the following evaluation of the accomplishments of the
Conference:
A working agreement with Argentina, Roosevelt's
consent to Hull's declaration of the intention to reduce
tariff and trade barriers and agreement to sign the
treaty to give equal rights to women.55
Raymond Leslie Euell, a Latin-American expert,
emphasized the significance of the tariff and trade
statement.

"The Montevideo tariff declaration is a direct

attack on economic nationalism and in favor of international
economic cooperation.1100
Hull's work was estimated in the following assessment
as being a constructive policy:
Mr. Hull, as Secretary of State, began to guide our
nolicy into definite channels of cooperation on a basis
of equality. The platt Amendment, which gave us the
right of interference in Cuban affairs was abrogated and
in general the policy of intervention was abandoned, and
our influence was directed toward strengthening the
inter-American efforts to out a basis for peace in this
hemisphere.

54 y, "On a Certain Impatience with Latin America,
Foreign Affairs. 28:572-573, July, 1950.
55 jjew York Times, December 16, 1933.
56

New York Times, December 24, 1933.
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At Montevideo tarrifs were discussed—a definite
reversal of the United States thesis that tariffs are
solely a matter of domestic concern. But more than any
specific issue, the most significant thing was the
marked change in the attitude toward cooperation.5'

Josephine Schain, 14A Peace Audit of The Americas,"
The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social
Science, p. 134.
57

CHAPTER V
AMERICAN RECIPROCAL TRADE AND ECONOMIC POLICY
As early as 1916, Hull had been convinced or the
value of the liberal tariff principles that are involved in
the Reciprocal Trade Agreement Program.

He had embraced

this point of view as the only valid basis for continuing
peace.•*-

As a Senator, he had taken his stand for

Reciprocal Trade Agreement legislation.

These views

continued after Hull had left the Senate and stepped into
the administration as Secretary of state.

Thus, even before

he left as head of the American delegation to the London
Economic Conference, in 1933, Reciprocal Trade legislation
was in the making. 2 However, the President seemed to
relegate it to a secondary matter, for, in his inaugural
address, he had affirmed his position on the relative value
of world trade:
. . .Our international trade relations, though vastly
important, are in point of time and necessity secondary
to the establishment of a sound national economy. I
favor the putting of first things first as a practical
policy. I shall spare no effort to restore world trade

Cordell Hull, Memoirs, p. 81,
2

IMd.. p. 248.
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by international economc readjustments, but the
emergency at home cannot wait on that accomplishment.3
The President, In other words* was In a difficult
spot, since his New Deal counselors, such as Raymond Moley,
were pressing him to proceed along the line of a narrow
nationalistic economic policy.

Roosevelt paid lip service

to Hull's principles, but he went no further.^

Roosevelt

felt that it was necessary to the success of his policy
towards domestic recovery that he carry on in a narrower
national economic policy.

This was the prevailing policy of

the first fourteen months of the administration.

It was

in effect during the London Economic Conference.
Trade reduction measures was a major objective of
the administration from the outset.

It was clearly stated

in the Democratic platform that they stood for "reciprocal
tariff agreements with other nations."5

Furthermore, Hull

had the basis from the President of his assurance that the
way was open for immediate legislative action before the
London Economic Conference.

Hull, under this impression,

3 Samuel I. .Rosenman, compiler, "It33;. The Year of
Crisis j i% The Public pg~oeTS g.no. Ado.resses. of Franklin D•
Roosevelt, II, p. 14.
4 Hull, Op. Cit., p. 249.

5 Henry Steele Commager, Documents of American

Hi story* II, p. 416.
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drafted a b i l l and understood that Franklin D. Roosevelt
would press shortly the Congress t o enact i t . 6

One of the

four major world problems that was on the agenda for the
London Economic Conference was "the cut-ting down of trade
barriers."

However, the advocates of economic nationalism

who were closer t o the President than was Hull, influenced
Mr. Roosevelt to delay action, both i n Congress end in the
Conference.

The United States delegation was instructed to

t r y to get "a t a r i f f truce for the duration of the
Conference.
Just to be on the safe side, Hull l e f t a copy of his
proposed Reciprocal Trade Agreements E i l l on Fresident
Roosevelt * s desk, and anothe r copy he took along with him
t o the Conference.

He hoped t h a t the Fresident would rush

for congressional action before or durin^ t.ie Conference in
London.

However, Roosevelt refused t o pre_~ for act^c... and

even instructed Hull t o take some steps In the wcnf
that would be diametrically opposed to
Hull's proposed bihL.

provision.

He had suggested to Hull that while

the Secretary «as i n L o n d o n ne negotiate general reciprocal
commercial treaties , and on Hull's return the President vculc

6

Hull, loc. c i t

7 Ibid., p . 246.
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get them ratified, even if he had to call a special
session of Congress to get it done.

Hull was disappointed

in the President's suggestion, for it meant that the old
system that had failed so dismally in the past, would be
retained.

Hull's plan was for Congress to give the

Executive authority to negotiate such treaties with the
right of congressional veto, but with ratification
unnecessary.

Hull felt that the time was especially

propitious for the United States to launch a constructive
program that would have some promise to break the log Jam
of world trade.

Hull was due for much disappointment and

frustration.
Hull acted, however, as consistently with his
principles as he could under the circumstances that hedged
him in at the London Conference.

He used every opportunity

that he could to sow the seeds that would produce a more
satisfactory system of international trade and cooperation.6
Hull's opening speech at the Conference bore down heavily on
the necessity for the removal of trade barriers on the
ground that "international commerce was indispensable to
national life."9

6

On his return to Washington, from the

Ibid. , p. 266.

Maxwell S. Stewart, "The Work of the London Econ
omic Conference," Foreign Policy Reports, 9:129, November b.s
1933.
9
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London Economic Conference, Hull applied himself
vigorously to the task of pushing for his liberal trade
plans:
. . . I k e p t earnestly a t work o n officials and the
public in support of this undertaking. I delivered
speeches and gave out statements., I maintained contact
with appropriate members of the State, Commerce,
Treasury and Tariff Commission, and with officials of
economic associations, leading economists, and ethers
who showed a disposition to help.10
V/e have observed how Hull's mind, while he journeyed
to the Montevideo Conference, had begun to be haunted with
the idea that here at last hah cone the appropriate time to
take some essential position in implementing the trade
relations principles.

He had kept in close consultation

with the President by wire.

He finally had succeeded in

obtaining Roosevelt's consent to limited action restricted
to the affirmation of long-range objectives.
ence was a decided Hull triumph.

The Confer

Hull returned with a

fixed purpose to get specific action on tariff reform.
The Montevideo Conference resolution on liberal trade
became the basis for the .Reciprocal Trade Agreement program.
The opposition seemed to be formidable, but Hull said.:

"It

was a case of 'It can't be done, therefore, we will proceed

Hull, or. cit., p. 353.
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to do it.t"11
Gne of the major problems confronting Hull was to
convince Roosevelt that it was time to push the tariff
reform program.

Roosevelt had assured Hull that his

policies of economic nationalism were temporary, and that he
would support Hull's proposals in time.

Hull continued to

push vigorously for immediate action on his advocated
program until the President made room for it. Following
the Montevideo Conference, the favor that Hull's liberal
trade program had begotten among Latin Americans and the
press in the United States, impressed Roosevelt towards
being more receptive to Hull's ideas.

The President

favored a trade agreements program, but he had appointed,
in Hull's absence, George Peek, a high tariff man, to
function in the State Department as head of committees to
coordinate foreign trade. Hull considered Peek to be
inimical to the sound trade agreements policy that he had
in mind.l^
The battle then was to get liberal tariff principles
enacted into congressional legislation. Latin American
states saw in Hull's earnest efforts toward the adoption of

11

Ibid., P. 219.

12

Ibid., PP. 353-354.
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liberal trade principles a demonstration of United States
progress towards hemispheric cooperation..

Such principles

were an asset in our foreign policy in promoting good
United States-Latin American relations.13 Hull wanted
legislation that would authorize the President to modify
the tariff rates established by the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act
of 1930.

Settlements could be made by Executive agreement

with such nations as should cnoose to enter into such
mutual agreements.

Hull explained the essentials cf the

Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act as follows:
. . . Basically it contained three main points:
Agreements could be negotiated without their having to
be submitted to the Senate. Tariffs could be reduced
by as much as one-half, but only if we gained corres
ponding concessions from other countries. Reductions
applied to all countries that did not discriminate
against us.l 4
Progress in the formulation of an American foreign
trade policy seems to have been largely shelved for the
three months that Hull was away from -Washington on the trip
to Montevideo.

Meanwhile, memoranda and data continued to

accumulate on the President's d=sk from the advocates of the
various proposed policies, but Mr. Rccsevelt declined
consideration until Hull had studied this material.1^

13 New York Times, December 16, 1933.
14

Hull, ££• £it., p. 359.

15 New York Times. February 25, 1934.
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In fact, when Hull returned, it took him a month to go
through the mass of data and contradictory proposals.16

In

preparation for the White House Conferences on the foreign
trade policy, Hull prepared a digest of these ideas and
proposals of tine various Presidential advisors.

In the

discussion which followed, each man in turn had an opportun
ity to defend his point of view.1''' He drew up another
Trade agreement Bill that was considered by the White House
Conference.

In this Conference, the President and

congressional leaders favorably passed on the bill and the
principles that it represented.

The President agreed to

send it to congress with an accompanying, message from him
asking for its passage.18
Of the several possible alternatives in American
foreign trade policies, the policy that seemed most adequate
was the reciprocal trade agreement policy containing the
most

favored— nation

clause.1^

Indications were that there would be a bitter fight
over the

enactment

of Hull's ideas into congressional

16 New York Times, loc. cit.
17 poc. clt«
18

Hull, £E- £it., p. 357

19 Cordell Hull, The Foreign Commercial gfijUSE gf,

the umtea states. Departcent of State, General Publication
No. 733, May 2, 1935.
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legislation.

P a r t i s a n s had d i v i d e d on the i s s u e of

r e c i p r o c a l t r a d e agreements, while t h e Montevideo Conference
was y e t i n s e s s i o n .

S e n a t o r Couzens, Republican of Michigan,

represented t h e g e n e r a l p o s i t i o n o f t h e Republican
opposition when he s a i d t h a t c o n s i d e r a t i o n of t r a d e agree
ment proposals should be d e l a y e d u n t i l t h e United S t a t e s
was c e r t a i n o f r e c o v e r y .

The Republicans opposed i t

p r i n c i p a l l y b e c a u s e they saw i t i n i m i c a l t o t h e American
p r o t e c t i v e t a r i f f system.

Congressman Doughton, Democratic

Chairman of House Ways and Means Committee, represented the
general a t t i t u d e of t h e m a j o r i t y of t h e Democrats when he
d e c l a r e d i n f a v o r of t h e i d e a t h a t t a r i i f a u t h o r i t y be
placed i n t h e hands of t h e P r e s i d e n t ,

He promised t h a t t h e

House would c o o p e r a t e w i t h t h e Executive on t a r i f f
measures.20

Thus, a s soon as t h e y recognized the s i g n i f i c a n c e of
t h e s t a n d f o r r e c i p r o c a l t r a d e agreements taken by n u l l a t
t h e Montevideo Conference, Republican spokesman voiced
t h e i r o p p o s i t i o n t o such a measure,

should any

l e g i s l a t i o n be considered a t e l l , i t must be a f t e r recovery
tad

succeeded.

Su=h a p r o g r t a would d e s t r o y t h e p r o t e c t i v e

t a r i f f system, t h e y contended, t h a t was so e s s e n t i a l

20

New

y o r k Times. December 2 7 , 1933.
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United States economic balance.

The Democrats favored the

proposed tariff changes.2i
When President Roosevelt asked for congressional
action on modification of the Smoot-Hawley tariff by
authorizing the Executive to enter into executive commercial
agreements with foreign nations,22 the Republicans already
had formed a strong line against it and promised to give
strong opposition.2^
against it.24

Senator Vandenber took a strong stand

Soon opposition had grown so strong to the

proposed legislation that predictions were it must be
limited to a period of three years, if it were to be enacted.
Soon hearings were being held by the House Ways and
Means Committee.

It marked an Important step in the process

of congressional action on the trade agreement legislation
when Hull appearer" before the Committee.

He was a confirmed

advocate of this program, and consequently 6eve a strong
statement for the enactment of the proposed bill.2^

There

were those of the opposition who gave equally as firm

21 New York Times. March 1, 1934.
22

New York Times , March 3, 1934.

23 jfew York Times , March 2, 1934.
24

New York Times, March 5, 1934.

25 Department of State, Press Releases. March 10, 1934,
pp. 130-135, also New York Times. March 9, 1934.

I
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testimony against the bill In the hearings, both in the
House Ways and Keens Committee and later before the Senate
Finance Committee, Prominent among those of the opposition
were:

Samuel Crowther, economist and writer; James A,

Farrell, Chamber of Commerce of the United States; James A,
Emery, National Association of Manufacturers; John E,
Dowing, United States Potters' Association; William H.
Cliff, Home Market Club of Eoston; and Eenjamin C. Marsh,
People's Lobby.

Hull appeared before the Senate Finance

Committee in its hearings in the latter part of

26

March,

Democrats rallied to support the measure in committee so
that e. favorable

majority report was brought back in its

report on the bill to the House,

Republican dissent was

oppressed in the minority report.87
The Democratic Senators held a conference to find
means to speed up action in the hearings in the oanate Fin
ance Committee so that the bill could be brought back from
Committee as soon as possible.
senatorial debate to be over.88

They were eager for the
At this point Henry L.

Stimson in a radio speech, threw his influence to support

26

New York Times, March 27, 1934.

27

New York Times, March 20, 1934,

88

New York Times. April 25, 1934.
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passage of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Bill,, while the
Bill was yet before the Senate for consideration.2®

This

speech and Stimson's position, were given full publicity by
the American press.

Both Hull and Roosevelt were delighted

with Stimson's support.

Stimson reported Roosevelt's praise

being a bit exaggerated when he said to Stimson:

"That he

thought I was the chief influence in securing the probable
passage of the bill.."SO
Again the Democrats in Congress held a conference on
how to get the bill passed.

The result was aim. st a solid

31
Democratic front for the bill.
Debate began on the Trade Agreement Eill in the House
on March S3, 1634, with Congressman Doughton responsible for
piloting it through the House.

Congressman Tread way led the

opposition, which was chiefly composed of Republicans.-2
Doughton introduced debate en the bill in vhe Kou^e by
pointing out that it was a necessary emergency recovery
measure that would aid in economic restoration.

Since the

Smcot-Kawley Tariff Eill went into effect American foreign

29

New York Times, April 30, 1534.

30 Henry L. ^imson

and McGeorge

Eundy, Cn AcUve

Service in" Peace and War, p. 3C0.
31 New York Tiroes, Kay 1* 1934.
32 aaeresgional Bass*.
Vol. 78, p» 5255.
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trade had continued to decline.33

in the process of the

House debates on this measure, one of the most comprehensive
treatments on the constructive side of the debate was made
by Congressman Lozier of Missouri. The title of his speech
was "The Genesis and Evolution of the Doctrine of
Reciprocity."34

After the Congressman had traced the

historical development of the "doctrine" he summed up his
arguments for the proposals as follows: (a) the proposed
legislation is constitutional, (b) the proposed legislation
evidences a wise public policy and is a forward step in the
rehabilitation and recovery of a distressed world, and (c)
the objections urged in opposition are unfounded in point
of fact, have no basis in law, and are made only as part of
a concerted plan to discredit Franklin D. Roosevelt's efforts
to relieve the economic distress, and (d) we may trust the
President to administer this Bill wisely and well."
The Republican opposition, as they promised, put up
a continuing fight.

Representative Treadway closed the

opposition arguments in the House.
stressed were:

The main points that he

The Democrats insisted on undue haste in

33 ibid., pp. 5256-5262.
34 Ibid., pp. 5546-5554.
35 Ibid., p. 5554.
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rushing discussion on the Bill to a close.

This measure

would sacrifice the American domestic market for the foreign
market.

It casts Democrats in the unfamiliar role of

supporting principles to which most of them have
demonstrated staunch opposition.

In the process of extended

debate, the opposition made much of this point that
Democrats were inconsistent.

Democrats had opposed flexible

tariff legislation when sponsored by Republicans, but now
they were all out for it.

This legislation would place too

much power in the hands of the President.

The prosperity

of the United States is not dependent upon the prosperity
of the rest of the world.

If we set out to break down

world tariff barriers, instead of bringing the outside world
up to our standard of living, we will find that our standard
will be brought down to their level.

This, then, means the

36
administration against the American people.
In effect., the issue presented by this bill is a case
of the administration vs. the American people. The
people are the supreme court of last resort, and they
will eventually decide the question by their ballots.
The Republican Farty invites and awaits with expectancy
the opportunity to meet this issue before the people in
November.37

36 ibid., pp. 5770-5774.
37 Ibid., p. 5774.
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Representative Vinson of Kentucky closed the House
debates for the Democrats.
these:

Among other things, he stressed

The Democrats end Franklin D. Roosevelt were worthy

to be trusted.

Reciprocal trade was not free trade, but i t

was just the moderating technique that the "too much
tariff" of the SmOot-Hawley Act required.
could be compared to s a l t and food.

Tariff and trade

Because a l i t t l e salt

was good i n food did not mean the more s a l t the better the
result.

The "too much t a r i f f " of the Smoot-Hawley Act had

been the most important factor in bringing on the panic.
There i s a difference between a reasonable t a r i f f upon the
articles which would benefit our people and the tariff that
has practically destroyed industry, deprived labor, of i t s
opportunity t o have a living wage, and bankrupted the
farmers of America.38

There are many historical precedents

for this legislation.

Our continuing loss of export trade

demands that we do something to put a stop to i t .

Tnis
39
measure would be an aid to industry and agriculture.Today in t h i s chamber we are called upon for action.
I f you are satisfied with the old idea of ' l e t well
enough alone,• 'make no effort t o cure the i l l s which
Visit u s t ' 'make no effort to secure world markets for
American commodities and American products, then you

38 i b i d . , pp. 5774-5780.
35 Loc. c i t .
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ought in good conscience vote against this bill. On
the contrary, if you believe in action, if you have
confidence that you claim you have in the President
of the United states, if you have faith in the
President., this legislation. . . .The American farmer
and industry will receive benefits. American families
will have happier homes, and we will have discharged
another obligation placed upon us by the people of the
United States in carrying out the platform pledges of
our party and the purpose of Franklin D. Roosevelt, our
President.40
In the Senate, Harrison and Robinson led in the
debate for the measure, while the leading opponents were
McNary, Vandenberg, Borah, Walsh, Davis, end others.

At

the outset, the opposition in the Senate debate, led by
RcNary, endeavored to get the proponents of the Bill to
specify how the proposed tariff measures would affect a
given commodity.

Harrison refused to fall into this trap.

He said that this would destroy the entire principle merely
upon impractical suppositions and fear.

This would raise as

an alarming question to what extent would protection be
removed from such commodities as wool, without the counter
balancing benefits that would accrue to American from
concessions that would be granted to us.
Borah made an extended speech in which he pointed
out his objection to the legislation on constitutional

40

Ibid., P. 5761.
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grounds and endeavored to prove his case against the
legislation.4^
Davis voiced the Republican position in his list of
eleven reasons wr^y he was opposed to the proposed Reciprocal
Trade Agreements Bill.

First, the proposal demands a

delegation of the congressional taxing power and the
Senate's treaty-making power, which is without authority.
Second, it clothes the president with dictatorial powers to
ruin industrial and agricultural commodities that he thinks
can be sacrificed.

Third, those affected most cannot be

heard soon enough to really influence the outcome.

Fourtn,

the traditional tariff yardstick (the difference between the
cost of production at home and production abroad) will be
thrown away, and the president's judgment substituted for
it.

Fifth, this will mean three years of anxiety and

uncertainty with each business man fearing that he will be
the next to be unfairly treated.

Sixth, tariff bargaining

is not calculated actually to produce the expected net
advantage for the bargains may mean only a shifting so that
always some workers will be without jobs anyway.

Seventh,

it overlooks the importance of our domestic market to our
domestic producer.

41

Eighth, this bill denies the beneficial

Ibid., PP« 9006-9012.
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use of the free duties.

Ninth,, it is hostile to the

administration's theory and recovery programs embodied in
NRA and AAA.

Tenth, it invites international complications

that for one hundred and forty years we have tried to avoid.
Eleventh, the proposal is opposed by much of the voice of
organized industry, commerce, labor, and agriculture.42
Finally debate was closed, the bill was brought to
vote, and it carried in both houses by a substantial
margin.

Arthur Krock, in an editorial of the New York

Times of June 6, 1934, pointed out the important role that
Cordell Hull played behind the scenes in pushing the Trade
Agreements Bill to enactment.
remained for Hull to tackle.

But the major task yet
That job was actually to

negotiate treaties under the provision of this act.
Hull set himself with extraordinary single-minded
devotion to the laborious task of negotiating treaties with
foreign governments under provisions of the Reciprocal Trade
Agreements Act.

The first agreement was signed with Cuba

and became effective September 3, 1934.

Within two years

fourteen nations had drawn up agreements with the United
States.43 By the time Hull wrote his Memoirs, trade

42 Ibid. , PP. 9061-9082.
43 David H. Popper, "The Hull Trade Frogram," Foreign
Policy Reports. 12:190, October 15, 1934.
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agreements were In operation with thirty-seven nations.44
By 1949 it Involved some forty-six countries.

The Trade

Agreement Program realized two signal successes when
France signed up in May, 1936145 and Britain in November,
1S38*

It was the judgment of some that it was the. crowning

success of Hull's career when Eritain signed and Canada
renewed her agreement with the United States.4^

Hull had

puzzled over the fact that it had been such an uphill task
to bring Eritain to an agreement:
It seemed ironic to me that we should have so much
difficulty getting Eritain into our trade agreements
system, because I had drawn heavily on the former policy
of Britain herself in formulating our program. I had
gone back to the British procedure before the Civil
War which was bilateral coupled with the unconditional
most favored nation policy.4'''
As to the results of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements
Program on world tradeCuba was the nation with the longest
record under the new program.^

Table I is a graphic

portrayal of the trends in Cuba's import and export trade

E. Ethan Ellis, A Short History of American
Diplomacy, p. 444.
44

45

Popper, oj>. cit., p. 196.

46 J. H. Latane and D. H. V/ainhouse, A History of
American Foreign Policy, p. 833.
47

Hull, op* cit., p. 520*

David H. Popper, "Progress of American Tariff
Bargaining," Foreign Policy Reports, 11:61-62,. May 22, 1935.
48
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TAELE I
THE VOLUME OF TRADE EST'TEEM CUBA AND THE UNITED STATES
EEFCRE AND AFTER RECIPROCAL TRADE
AGREEMENTS BECAME EFFECTIVE

Trade from Cuba, to
United States

Year

Trade from United
States to Cuba

1926

$160,051,621s-

$242,881,819a

1930

91,872,214a

116,050,839a

1933

22,670,000^

57,112,0C0b

1934

41,225,012^

81,093,676b

1935

55,686,078°

101,534,180°

1936

66,984,245°

121,898,787°

1937

88,846,617°

150,157,821°

1938

75,152,388^

108,362,605d

1939

78,380,602^

111,lQ2,lfild

1940

81,042,000e

104,905,OCCe

a Pan American Union Foreign Trade Series Bulletin
No. ICO, pp. 1, 3.
b Ibid.. No. 140,. pp. 1, 6.
c Ibid., No.. 169, pp, 5, 13.
d Ibid.. No. 185, pp. 4, 12.
e Ibid.. No. 193, p. 14.
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with t h e United S t a t e s .

Cuba's import t r a d e from the

United S t a t e s had plunged from $160,051,621 i n 1926 t o
$91,672,214 i n 1930, but i t continued t o plummet downward
u n t i l i t reached $22,670,000 i n 1933.

Then under t r a d e

agreements i t began a remarkable climb out of t h e abyss
showing steady g a i n year a f t e r y e a r .

The same can be s a i d

of t r a d e from Cuba t o t h e United S t a t e s .
i n 1926 i t dropped t o $57,112,000 i n 1933.

From $242,681,619
Under t h e new.

t r a d e program i t showed a growing gain from year t o year
u n t i l t h e " r e c e s s i o n " of 1938.
Reports show t h a t between 1934-1935 end 1936-1939
our exports i n c r e a s e d by 63 per cent, t o t r a d e agreement
countries.

Shipment t o non-trade agreement c o u n t r i e s

i n c r e a s e d only 3 2 per c e n t .

At t h e same tim e, imports from

t r a d e agreement c o u n t r i e s increased 22 per c e n t , while
imports from n o n - t r a d e agreement c o u n t r i e s i n c r e a s e d only
1 2 per cent
P r e s i d e n t Roosevelt s a i d of t h e t r a d e agreement
program:
We know without any doubt, t h a t t r a d e agreements t ^ i l d
t r a d e and t h a t they w i l l do s o a f t e r the war a s they d i a
b e f o r e . A l l s e c t i o n s of our population—labor, farmers,

Samuel I . Rosenman, compiler, " 1 9 4 4 - 1 9 4 5 : Victory
and t h e Threshold of Peace," The Public Papers and Addresses
of F r a n k l i n D. Roosevelt, X I I I , pp. 5 9 6 - 5 9 7 .
45
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"businessmen have shared and will she re in the benefits
which increased trade brings.^0
The Reciprocal Trade Agreement Tro^ram rronotec peace
from a psychological and diplomatic point of view.

Hull's

trade reform program, that is as he represented literal
trade at Montevideo, was a stron^ factor in convincing Latin.
American nations that the United States was thoroughly
sincere' in practicing good neighborliness.

It aid much

towards reconciliation of the nations of the ne;ais] here
north and south and producing solidarity.0^

It aided in

bringing about economic and psychological disarmament.
There had existed an active movement a:;.on-, Latin American
states towards the formation of Latin .4merican solidarity
RP
against the United States.0^
F. Cyril James, a critic of the Hull program, has
said:
A cynic mifcht sue est that most
ir,
hp«=n directea to
ta~x ci

Rosenman, l££*
51 Ke« York Times, December 16, I-"52
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therefore, depends not on technical discussions of
tariff schedules but on a careful study by all
countries of the extent to which they are eager to
import the products of other parts of the world. It is
the desire for other people's goods that is the funda
mental basis of trade, and if that desire is not
present in all our discussion, a game oi chess would
probably be as useful in international affairs as any
tariff conference.53
Hubert Herring, an expert in Latin American affairs,
made the following evaluation of the effectiveness of the
trade agreements program in 1839:
Cordell Hull's trade-agreement policy has been a
realistic effort to drop the barriers which block
exchange of goods. Kr. Hull has patiently typed out the
shopping lists of individual countries, contriving
formulae under which the United States and other nations
one by one might concede reciprocal concessions.
Agreements with twenty countries have been signed, ten
in Latin America. The results are ponderable. We
signed an agreement with. Brazil in February, 1935. Cur
sales to Brazil in 1936. amounted to almost sixty million
dollars, 53 per cent above the 1934 figure. 'We signed
an agreement with Colombia in September, 1935. Cur
exports to Colombia in 1935 were 66 per cent above those
in 1934. Cuba and Guatemala signed with us: 1936
exports to those countries were 68 per cent and 69 per
cent respectively, greater than in 1934, In contrast to
these figures, total United States exports for 1936
showed an increase of 46 per cant over 1934.54
The condition of the Trade Agreements Act was that it
had to be renewed every three years.

Hull made a speech in

F. Cyril James, "The Foundation of Prosperity
After the War," Annals of the Academy of American Political
end Social Science, 234:113-114, July, 19*±<±.
53

54 Hubert Herring, "Making Friends with Latin America

Ha.rrers Magszine, 179:375, September, 19o9.
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Chicago in December, 1939, advocating in his campaign to
have the act extended for an additional three years. He
called for its renewal in order to be able to cope with post
war conditionsAt the next cabinet meeting, Franklin D.
Roosevelt commended Hull highly for the speech and
encouraged the other cabinet members to stand firm for the
renewal of the trade agreement program.
expressed his impression later:

Of this Hull

"For the first time since

1933 I had the feeling that the President was really behind
me on trade agreements."

The president followed Hull's

suggestion and included an important part of his message to
Congress on January 3, 1940, on trade agreements.
Carl Kreider, estimating the results of the trade
agreements program with the hazards of extended hearing., had
the following to say:
The changes made in the United States are manifestly
of profound significance to the future of American
commercial policy. The American trade sgreements
program was launched in 1934 as en emergency measure
after it had become abundantly clear that congressional
tariff making had failed. The Trade Agreements Act was
a delegation of legislative authority to the executive.
This paper has demonstrated that tne history of trade
agreement hearings since 1934 has been a story of grad
ual weakening of the executive's freedom of action—even
though such freedom was of late sound from the blow that

55 Hull, QP« Cit.. pp. 746-757.
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would have befallen had Congress, In continuing the
Trade Agreements Act until 1943, adopted proposed
amendments t h a t would have required the ratification of
new agreements by the Senate or even by both houses.57
Sumner Welles, Hull's former colleague in the state
Department, evaluated the trade agreement program as the
most constructive international contribution of the early
Roosevelt administration.

Hull's place in this enterprise

Welles recognized as : second to none:
The greatest achievement of the f i r s t Roosevelt
Administration in the realm of international coopera
tion lay i n the trade agreements policy for which
Secretary of State Hull i s wholly responsible, and which
he. has furthered with a single-minded and indefatigable
devotion. I t has been the one program of an economic
character which, during the last years before the second,
world war struck a note of constructive sanity in
international trade relations; i t lowered commercial
barriers a t the very moment when a l l nations seemed
most bent upon increasing them. I t greatly assisted in
establishing the Good. Neighbor Policy i n the Western
Hemisphere. I t helped materially to lessen the strangle
hold which Hitler was endeavoring to exercise over the_
small countries of Europe. I t arrested a runaway trend
on the part of many peoples toward the belief that
autarchic trade systems were inevitable.58
Percy W. Bidwell criticized the Hull program on the
basis of i t s r e s u l t s through 1238.

Economists support the

t a r i f f bargaining policy as a means to reduce Smoot-Hawley
t a r i f f excesses and thus stimulate imports with some
57 c a r l Kreider, "Democratic Frocesses in the Trade
Agreements Program," American Political ocience Review,
34:332, April, 1940.
58 sumner Welles, The Time fox Decision, p. 55.
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assurance of securing a balance of trade.
These objectives have been attained only to a
limited degree, , . imports have increased' somewhat
since 1934, but exports have gained even more rapidly.
With Europe forced to buy more than it sells, there is a
surplus of almost one billion dollars of exports over
imports.
Under these circumstances, the Hull program contri- .
butes little to stem the flow of gold from Europe,
where it is bitterly needed, to the United States, where
we can do nothing with it except to bury it at Fort
Knox, The real threat to the Hull program comes not from
the dictatorship but from our own timidity in applying
it.59
One of Hull's earliest constructive contributions to
the cause of international order was perhaps his reciprocal
trade agreement program that aimed at economic disarmament.
It was an important aspect of the Good Neighbor Policy so
far as making that policy practical end workable.
its influence in the world at large.

It has

However, the world

crisis had developed to .such an extent that there was small
possibility that these economic changes could bring the
world to its senses and restore peace, but it was a strong
factor in bringing success to the United Nations.

Easil

Raueh appraises the world effects of Hull's economic
internationalism as follows:

59 percv v.\ Eidwell, "Latin America, Germany and the
Hull Programs," Foreign Affairs, 17:390, January, 1939.
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. . . Eoth Hull and Roosevelt never lost sight of
the truth that economic internationalism is a necessary
and solid foundation for political internationalism,
and, therefore, world peace.
The new American economic policy led the peaceful
nations of the world to liquidate economic rivalries
among themselves and form ties of Oreot political and
military as well as economic significance in opposition
to the Axis nations. In perspective, the Roosevelt
Administration's internationalist economic policy may
be called the tap root of the political and military
united front which the peaceful nations organized too
late to prevent the Second World War but in time to \Jin
it and make their Victory a victory for collective
security and the United Nations.6°
Raymond B. Stevens, Chairman of the United States
Tariff Commission, Washington, D.C. has the following
evaluation of the Reciprocal Trade Agreement Program:
The tariff has always been a controversial subject,
and conflicting claims have been made with regard to the
effect of the trade agreements on our foreign trade.
There are so many factors other than tariff rates which
may affect foreign trade at any particular moment that
it is possible by the selection of commodities end the
period of time to £,et evidence that will su;;rort almost
any claims. I am certain, however, that a careful
examination of all the facts proves that the trade
agreements have materially increased both our efforts
at export and our imports, and that the benefits we have
secured abroad have not been raid for by injuries
inflicted on our industries b}' imports.
I would not claim that no mistakes have teen irade,
but I can state with confidence that the program has teen
carried cut with such care and caution that surprisingly
few cases may be cited of any serious grounds for
complaint. That this is true is partly the result of a
procedure designed to insure consideration by several

60 Basil Eauch, Roosevelt from I-unlcn t_o
p. 7.
- • - • - -

hector,
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?^vin-?
I n 2??v,' r e - f e r t s E n d governmental o f f i c i a l s
T P S T ? n? ? L
f o r e i g n t r a d e . I t I s a l s o partly the
r e s u i t of th e accumulation c f information made a v a i l 
able by t h e T a r i f f Commission both tio-ou^h written
m a t e r i a lb and
through t h e advice of i t s technical
experts , - L

Raymond B. Stevens, "Lowering Our T a r i f f '..'all by
rade Agreements," Annals of the Academy of American l o l i t cal and Social S c i e n c e . S l l : b 4 .

CHAPTER VI
THE SPECIAL INTZR-AFIFJCAN CONFERENCE CN PEACE
On J a n u a r y 3 0 , 1 9 3 6 , P r e s i d e n t F r a n k l i n D, Roosevelt
p r o p o s e d t o t h e o t h e r American s t a t e s a s p e c i a l . Conference
t o meet a t Buenos A i r e s , A r g e n t i n a , f o r t h e c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f
the organization of peace.

T h e r e were s e v e r a l r e a s o n s why

a c o n f e r e n c e a t t h i s t i m e f o r a c t i o n was a p p r o p r i a t e .
Some o f trie r e a s o n s why a n i n t e r - A m e r i c a n Peace
C o n f e r e n c e was a p p r o p r i a t e were a s f o l l o w s :

The League of

N a t i o n s h a d d e m o n s t r a t e d i t s i n a b i l i t y t o d e f e n d weak n a t i o n s
when i t f a i l e d t o s t o p I t a l y i n E t h i o p i a .

There were s e r i o u s

t h r e a t s t h a t h o s t i l i t i e s would become more g e n e r a l , which
i n d e e d f o l l o w e d when r e v o l u t i o n b r o k e o u t i n S p a i n .

The

t e m p o r a r y c e s s a t i o n o f h o s t i l i t i e s between E o l i v i a and Peru
o v e r t h e Chaco p r e s e n t e d a f a v o r a b l e s i t u a t i o n i n t h i s
h e m i s p h e r e t h a t c o u l d be e x p l o i t e d t o make f u r t h e r p r o g r e s s
i n t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f permanent p e a c e h e r e .

Even though

war came i n t h e o t h e r h a l f o f t h e w o r l d , i t was u r g e n t t h a t
a g r e a t e f f o r t be made t o m a i n t a i n p e a c e i n t h e American
hemisphere.

K u t u a l p r o t e c t i o n a g a i n s t l a n d - h u n g r y and

power-hungry

European o r A s i a t i c d i c t a t o r s was i n o r d e r .

The p r i n c i p l e s o f n e u t r a l r i g h t s s h o u l d be c l a r i f i e d s o
t h a t a common a t t i t u d e c o u l d be t a k e n .

Autual understanding
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with, the other Americas would strengthen the interests of
the United States^ politically and economically against
European and Asiatic exploiters, who were working for a
dominant position in Latin America.

It might be well to

capitalize on the good will already won through the Good
Neighbor Policy and consolidate the gains already made."
An important step in arranging for the Conference
was taken by Franklin D. Roosevelt in the preparatory
correspondence to heads of the. various. American Republics.
The avowed purposes were:
. . . t o determine how the maintenance of peace among
the American Republics may best be safeguarded. Whether
perhaps, through the prompt ratification of all the
inter-American peace instruments already negotiated;
whether through the amendment of existing peace instru
ments in such a manner as experience has demonstrated to
be most necessary; or perhaps through the creation by
common accord of new instruments of peace additional to
those already formulated.3
The special Inter-American Conference for the
Maintenance of Peace originated, according to Ee-mis, in the
"senseless rivalry of Argentina and the United States for
Fan-American leadership."

Furthermore, in spite of pledges

1 David R. Moore, A History of Latin America, p. 871.
2 Loc. clt.
3 Renort of the Delegation of the United States to the
Conference for the Maintenance of Peace.
Buenos' AiresArgentina, December 1-23, 1S36, Department of
State Gcriference Eeries,' Somber 33, p. 49.
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solemnly made at Montevideo to ratify the existing
inter-American peace treaties, some American nations had
delayed signing.

President Roosevelt proposed the

Conference with this in mind:
The full ratification, coordination and enforcement
of existing peace macninery;4 inter-American economic
amelioration; the furtherance of cultural rapprochment
as an aid to political solidarity; fending off from
this side of the ocean the disastrous effects of
strife in the old world.5
Unanimous approval of Roosevelt '3 proposal was
followed by the steps at the formulation of a program for
the Conference.

A committee of twenty-one, composed of

representatives from each of the American states , received
suggestions, formulated a proposed program, ar.d submitted it
to the government board of the Fan-American Union, which
approved the agenda and recommended to the Conference tnat
that preference be given to the consideration to the ques
tions relating to the organisation of peace.

Uuatever else

that appeared appropriate for their consideration v.as left
UP to the Conference to decide when it met.

4 Samuel I. Eosenman, compiler, t,l£-±4-l-'4^: ^ctory
and the Threshold of Peace," The Public Papers and ^odresses.
of Franklin D. Roosevelt, V, pp. 615-616.
5 Samuel Flagg Bemis, The Latin American Policy of
the United States: An Historical Interpretation, p.
6 Charles G. Fenwick, "The Buenos Aires Conference:
1936%n Foreign Policy Reports, July .1, 1537, p. -0.
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Hull's part was limited at this time to that of
developing the general ideas and purposes of the coming
Conference.

Sumner Welles,. the Assistant Secretary of

State in charge of Latin American affairs and members of the
Latin American Division, formulated the detailed plans of the
Conference.

Few international conferences have been so

thoroughly planned as was this one.

Months before the

delegation sailed south, the carefully drafted plans were
circulated among the Republics.7
Two principal issues at this Conference were;

first,

whether the Republics would agree to create some workable
machinery that would function whenever inter-continental
disputes threatened to break the peace, or when the security
of the hemisphere was threatened from aoroad.

The second

issue was whether they would unite to recognize jointly
that a threat to one of the Republics involved the security
of the other Republics.

These two issues had to be settled

properly or no predictable system of security would obtain.c
Argentina used all its powers to thwart such plans.
Action, however, was taken in spite of Argentina.

Much of

Argentina's disposition to hinder unanimous action sprang

7

Cordell Hull, Memoirs, p. 494.

6 Sumner Welles, The Time for Decision, p. 2C6.
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from the attitude of the head of their delegation, Ssavedra
Lamas.

At Montevideo he

had been prevailed upon by the

American Secretary of State to cooperate, but new something
had happened to cause him to resist most steadfastly a l l
American proposals.
Lamas 1 jealousy.^

Perhaps one explanation was Saavedra

The fact i s that t h i s head of the League

of Nations and distinguished receiver of the Nobel Peace
Prize had to play second or third fiddle for a while,

'with

the opening of this Conference President Roosevelt took the
spotlight..

Prospects were that Brazil would be the

preferred power above Argentina i n tie proposed new western
hemispheric association for keeping the peace.

The vanity

of the Argentine Foreign Minister was described by an
American correspondent:
"Dr. Saavedra Lamas* self-admiration has been
mentioned before i n these notes. I t i s one of the mar
vels of the world," he observed sourly, "like the Taj
Mahal by moonlight."-'-®
However that may be, Saavedra Lamas consistently opposed a l l
American proposals to develop a strong consultative
organization aiaong the American stetes.

Hull presented to

° "Washington Notes," The New Republic, 69:296-295,
January 6, 1937.
10

Loc. c i t .
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the Conference the essence of the American position in his
famous "Eight Pillars of Enduring Fence1' speech.H
The Argentinean stood for the League of Nations
playing a strong role in the affairs of this hemisphere.
This arrangement would serve to enhance his own prestige,
but if the American proposal carried, he would be cut down
to march in the ranks,

Hull attempted, by various efforts,

to advance some proposal that would elicit some favorable
response from Saavedra Lamas, but all his attemj ts met with
failure.

So bitterly did Saavedra Lamas appose the idea of

F. consultative body of foreign ministers and the adoption of

a comm.on neutrality policy that would embrace the arms
embargo, that his personal relations with Hull were affec
ted

Hull explained this as follows:
He thought that the consultative body of American
foreign ministers mijat cut into the League, He refusec
to accept the idea of a common neutrality policy
embracing en arms embargo, . . .iiy reservation in favor
of the Republics that were League members was as broaa
as a barn door but he could not see it,
I had several conferences alone with Saavedra Lamas
These discussions became increasingly animated,

II George A, Finch, "Editorial Comments," American
Journal of international Lew, 51:666-693, 1937.
12

Hull, or. cit., p. 499,
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CUT last conference was heated, soma sharp words were

exchanged at least on my side, and vje parted with no
signs of complete agreement. I saw no more of Saaveara
Lamas before leaving Euenos Aires. He did not extend
the usual courtesy of seeing me off.13
In spite of some of these limitations on the
accomplishments of the Conference, there were some agree
ments that were basic.

There was an agreement on the use

of the technique of consultation as en appropriate
procedure.

Subsequently, the entire inter-American system

was erected upon these principles and in time it was to
cement the unity of the hemisphere at the outbreak of tire
Secton World V/ar.^

Consultation could be the alternative

to war for the settlement of differences, a method of
action that could be easily and efficiently put into
operation,and a method of cooperative effort in the
hemisphere in the direction of peaceful settlement of

discords.16

Again, there is the assumption that safety for

all the American nations lies in the loyal acceptance of

13

Hull, loc. clt.

14 Welles, loc. cit.
15 Charles G. Fenwick, "The Euenos Aires Conference:
1936," Foreign Policy Reports, 13:28-93, July i, 1-9 •
16

Hull, op,, cit., p. 502.

17T
the rule of law with the integrity of a l l nations
assured.17
Charles G. Fenwick points out Hull's role. in the
Montevideo and Buenos Aires Conferences:
. . . I t was he who had a t Montevideo laid the
foundations oi more friendly cooperation, and who had,
during the succeeding years, given practical proofs
that the policy of the 'good neighbor,' announced by
President Roosevelt i n 1933, meant what the words said.
Mr. Hull stood as a symbol of the good faith and
integrity of the United States. His word was his
bond. . . . Americans who were privileged to be t resent
a t the Conference and t o catch the spirit of i t s
friendly deliberations might well be proud to soe that
the name of their country stood for a new order of
peace and justice, an order of equality of rights
between great and small., an order of helpful
cooperation. . . , l e
Stephen Duggan's evaluation of the outcome of trds
Conference was as follows:
. . .But the chief results of the Buenos .^ires
Conference (end t h i s was true also cf the Li...a Confer
ence i n 1S3S) were t o be found in tne in: cna-rabies--in
the conviction on the part of the Latin American
representative that the United States vas sincere end
earnest in i t s desire to have i t s t o.iltical relations
with the ether republics of this hernia: here based on
the principle of mutual trust aril ^ccd will, and that
the Americans were not giving mere l i p service to the
Good Neighbor Folicy.

17 Hull, l o c . c l t .
16 Charles G. Fenwick, "The Inter-American Conference
for t h e Maintenance cf Peace," The American journal of
International Law, 31:225.,
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The most valuable idea that came out of that
Conference. . . was the principle of Continental
Solidarity. . . .I 9
The Good Neighbor Folicy is evaluated by an anonymous
writer in Foreign Affairs as evidence that the United
States has accepted the fact that the Latin American states
have reached maturity.

The United States tendency to be

more impatient with Latin American failure in democracy is
a demonstration of the fact that we have accepted them as
adults and our equals.

In part he wrote;

We measure them /Latin American states/ accordingly,
by a new and more vigorous standard of political
behavior.
The turning point in our attitude came between 1928
and 1936, with our abandonment of intervention and our
adoption of the Good Neighbor Policy, It may, in fact,
be said that at the Montevideo end Euenos Aires
Conference of 1933 and 1936 we joined with the Latin
Americans in formally declaring them of age. The
evaluation that reached this conclusion was .more in
themselves than in us. They had arrived at the stage,
with respect to us, that v;e had arrived at with respect
to England in the 1770' s. Unlike the England of
George III, however, we had sense enough to join them in
their declaration of independence, which we had resisted
at Havana in 1936. More than that, having taken the
new direction from them, we proceeded to put ourselves
in the lead. It was an act of statesmanship .such as
has rarely been displayed by any world power. The era
of good feeling that followed was its reward.

IS Stephen Duggan, "The New Orientation of the
V/estern Hemisphere," Annals of the Academy of American
Politlca3 end Social Science. 210:130-131.

17

V/e should remind ourselves constantly of this,
because our initiative in proclaiming the Good Neighbor
Policy was an expression of cur test s.nd truest
instinct, upon which cur country was founded and by
which, i t has grown great, . . .
The acceptance of equal status is the essence of
our Good Neighbor P o l i c y . ^0

PC)

Y, "On a Certain Impatience with Latin America,"
Foreign Affairs. '38:571, July, 1950.

CHAPTER VII
THE LIMA CONFERENCE

The background f o r the s e t t i n g of t h i s Conference was
as follows:

The continuing success of H i t l e r i n Europe ,

t h e t o t a l i t a r i a n s 1 p e n e t r a t i o n of Latin America p o l i t i c a l l y
and economically, and t h e Mexican expropriation of
petroxeum and l a n d s ware major events immediately preceding
t h e meeting of t h e Eighth I n t e r n a t i o n a l Conference of
American S t a t e s i n -Lima, Peru, December 9-27, 1S3S.

The

c h i e f purpose of the Conference was t o answer the problems
o f how t o organize inter-American s o l i d a r i t y against the
European t h r e a t .

Notwithstanding t h e opposition l e d by

Argentina and stimulated by various F a s c i s t agents, t h e
American cause prevailed."'"
The Lima Conference was attuned to the changes i n the
world e v e n t s .

Events had t r a n s p i r e d t h a t d r a s t i c a l l y

e f f e c t e d n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y i n t h e period between the Buenos
Aires Conference i n December 1936 ana the Lima Conference i n
193S.

I n t h e f a c e of t h e spreading epidemic of Axis

aggressions i n Spain, i n China, i n Ethiopia, and i n Austria,

1 John D. Hicks, The American Nation, pp. 695-6S.6.
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Roosevelt had called for a concerted quarantine action by
the peace-loving nations against the spreading contagions
of' aggressions.^

The Axis proceeded to confirm their

policy of expansion "by the announcement of their AntiComintern Fact in November 1S37.

Germany, Italy, and Japan

thus strengthened themselves in their common policy against
the peace-loving world powers.

They had formulated a kind

of collective security at the very time that the western
powers were flaunting collective action policy as a means
of national security, and were practicing "going it alone.
Britain and the United. States tried to go it alone
in their own characteristic manner.

America tried to

insulate their policy of isolation by the establishment of
the

most rigid neutrality.

Britain tried to deal with

Germany in a direct fashion by granting some outstanding
concessions, a policy of appeasement which found its climax
in the Munich Agreement.

Chamberlain, the British Prime

Minister, was induced to go beyond Germany's original claim
on the Sudeten lands of Czechoslovakia, where a concentration
of a majority of Germans were, in giving to the Nazis such
strategic military sections that the Czechs were no longer

3

Hicks, loc. cit.

3 Ibid., pp. 696-698.

162
able to defend their country.4
Thus from the outset, the danger of a comprehensive
Axis penetration of Latin America was an actual ^rowing
reality that cast a shadow over the inter-American Confer
ence.

Argentina constituted the worst problem and

hindrance to decisive action.

The role that Argentina

played was so obstructive that in confronting it Hull said
that the ten days of the Conference were "the most difficult
of my career.
The Nazis redoubled their efforts to discredit the
United States in Latin America and to subject the delegates
of the countries of South America to such pressure that they
would have been prevailed upon to consider the wisdom of
going along with the Axis. These efforts stirred Hull to do
his best against these forces.6
was:

The question in null's mind

Would the other American nations regard with the same

understanding the actions of the Axis?

He was afraid that

there would be trouble with Argentina.

Argentina had done

its best to get the Conference postponed, but they had not
succeeded.

A wireless message to Hull from the State

4 Ibid., pp. 696-629.
5 Coraell Hull, Hemoirs, p. 605.
6 Ibid.. pp. 601-602.

Ifc3
Department brought the. t e x t of a reported d e c l a r a t i o n t h a t
Argentina would give t o t h e Conference.

Hull c a r e f u l l y

studied i t , but found i t t o be too weak and vague f o r him
to support.
L a t e r , e message reached h i s s h i p from E r a z i l t h a t
Argentina planned t o s t a t e a t the opening a d d r e s s of t n e
Conference her r e j e c t i o n of the i d e a of a C o l l e c t i v e Secur
ity Pact.

She i n s i s t e d t h a t the United S t a t e s could not

be r e l i e d upon f o r her p r o t e c t i o n .

Consequently, she

I n s i s t e d on her r i g h t t o u n i l a t e r a l a c t i o n i n t h e i n t e r e s t
of her n a t i o n a l d e f e n s e , and t h u s , under t h i s assumption,
r e s i s t e d breaking t h e t i e s with Europe. 7
Meanwhile, Hull and h i s colleagues were working cn a
d e c l a r a t i o n t o be presented a t Lima.

They wanted, i t t o be

a c l e a r a f f i r m a t i o n cn American s o l i d a r i t y .

H u l l describe'.

th e American approach a s f o l l o w s :
g'e spent some time, . . i n t e n t a t i v e l y r e v i s i n g
C ^ n t i l o ' s r e s o l u t i o n t o make i t i n c l u d e t h e rueas we naa
i n mind. I was q u i t e w i l l i n g f o r the Argentina
d e l e g a t i o n t o introduce a r e s o l u t i o n and ^ e i n elo. creoiu
f o r i t , provided i t contained approximately t h e sua
s t a n c e I f e l t we needed. . . . '..'hat I wanted was
unanimous agreement. . . . s

7

I b i d . , p . 603.

6

I b i d . , p.. 604.
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Cantilo vjas the Argentine Foreign. Secretary, though
not the Chairman of their delegation to this Conference.

He

planned on delivering the opening address of the Conference,
and then going into the back country in the lake region on
vacation.

These things spoke volumes as indications of

Argentina's estimation of the relative importance of the
Conference.^
Hull was highly dissatisfied with the outcome cf his
initial interview with Cantilo.

Cantilo took the position

that there was really no need for any further formal agree
ments to sustain American solidarity.

He contended that the

natural-impulse-ties that bind the American states together
was quite sufficient to effect united and coordinated
action.^

Furthermore, Cantilo maintained that the United

States was trying to ^et Latin America to support policies
that were peculiarly the Anerican policy as she faced her
world responsibilities.

The United States brings her

position, he said "in here to use in Latin America, and says,
'Let us adopt this as a Fan-American policy. 1 "H

9 Hull, loc. cit.
10 Ibid., p. 6C5.»
H Samuel Guy Inmen, "Lima Conference and the
Totalitarian Issue," The Annals of the American Academy of
Folitical and Social Science, Vol. S04, p. 10.
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On the other hand, Hull held that a strong affirma
tion of American solidarity would serve two Important
purposes.

First, i t would reassure each American Republic

that i t could depend upon a l l the others for help to
maintain the safety and security of the western hemisphere.
Second, i t would say to the Old World, particularly to the
Axis nations, that there would be no easy Job of picking off
the American countries one by one, but i t would say to the
Axis that any attempted penetration will be confronted by
the resistance of all.-*- 2
At the beginning of the Conference, Cantilo l e f t for
his vacation with the instruction to his delegation to agree
to nothing without f i r s t referring i t to him.
to be a certain way to h i l l the Conference.

This seemed
For a we eh the

Conference continued i t s work only to be frustrated by
Argentina's resistance.

Finally, Hull called for a show

down with Argentina in a private informal meeting with a l l
the principal delegates present..

Argentina favored a

statement so general that i t could not possibly be used
against the Axis threat or any European nation.

I t was

really more the concern of Argentina to secure a statement

12

Hull, op. o l t . , p. 605,
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that could most certainly be used against the United
S t a t e s . B u t Hull insisted that there be a positive
statement referring to non-American governments,
meeting lasted until after midnight.

The

Hull carried the

struggle beyond the Conference situation.

Ke contacted tin

American Embassy in Argentina, instructed him to call on
the President of Argentina (a personal friend of Cornell
Hull), and urged him to authorize the Argentina delegation
to submit a stronger declaration.

As a result, new

instructions came through to that delegation, and eventually
a more specific draft of & declaration that contained, in
effect, a l l that Hull wanted except trie provisions for
regular meetings of the Foreign Minister's Conierences.
These Conferences were to be held a t the call of one of the
American

Republics.

^4

The essentials of tne famous Lima

Declarations are as follows:
Third, end in case the peace, security or t e r r i t o r i a l
integrity of any American Republic i s thus threatened
by acts of any nature that may impair them, they
proclaim their common concern and their determination to
make effective their solidarity, coordinating their
respective sovereign wills by means of the procedure or
consultation, established by conventions in xorce and Dy
declarations of Inter-American Conferences, using the
measures that in each case circumstances may maae

13

Ibid., p. 606.

14 Ibid., p. 607.
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a d v i s a b l e . I t i s understood t h a t the governments c f t h e
American Republics w i l l a c t independently I n t h e i r
i n d i v i d u a l c a p a c i t i e s , recognizing f u l l y t h e i r j u r i d i c a l
e q u a l i t y as sovereign s t a t e s .
Fourth, t h a t i n order t o f a c i l i t a t e t h e c o n s u l t a 
t i o n s e s t a b l i s h e d i n t h i s and o t h e r American peace
i n s t r u m e n t s , t h e m i n i s t e r s of Foreign A f f a i r s of t h e
American Republics,, when deemed d e s i r a b l e and a t the
I n i t i a t i o n of any one of them, w i l l meet i n t h e i r
s e v e r a l c a p i t o l s by r o t a t i o n and without protocolary
character. . . .15
T h i s d e c l a r a t i o n was unanimously agreed t o .

I t was

a. c l e a r v i c t o r y f o r t h e United S t a t e s and when proper
r e c o g n i t i o n of t h e process of i t s attainment i s considered.,
Cordell H u l l deserves a g r e a t d e a l of c r e d i t f o r t h i s
success.

The Axis s u f f e r e d a. d e f i n i t e s e t b a c k .

They were

t o discover t h i s , i n t h e long r u n , when t h e s e c u r i t y
machinery t h a t was provided f o r i n t h i s Conference began t o
work.
Perkins summarizes t h e s i t u a t i o n , i n p a r t , as f o l l o w s :
By t h i s time t h e Pan-American Conference convened i n
Lima, and t h e r e had been an ominous development of
^
German power, and i t was c l e a r t h a t t h e world had escapee
war o n l y by t h e appeasement p o l i c y of Caamberlain ana
D a l a d i e r . At Lima", t h e n , t h e s o l i d a r i t y of the American
n a t i o n s was more f o r t h r i g h t l y expressed. I n t h e ^ w e l l known Declaration of December o f t h a t year t h e s ^ a t ^ s o l
the New Uorld. . . declared 'their continental solidarity
and their purpose to collaborate i n the maintenance ol^
t h e p r i n c i p l e s upon which t h e s a i d s o l i d a r i t y ^ i s t , £ -sea
and s t a t e d t h e i r d e c i s i o n t o 'm aintain and d e f e n d ' oiiese

1 5 New York Times, December £ 5 , 1S36.
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principles 'against a l l foreign intervention ox
activity that may threaten then. . , . ' In order to
implement this pledge, provision was made for a sracial
machinery of consultation, instead of leaving the*matter
largely to chance, as had been dene at Euenos Aires.
I t was stipulated that the Minister of Foreign Affairs
of the American Republics 'when deemed desirable and
a t the initiative of any one of them,» would 'meet in
their several capitols, bv rotation, and without
protocolary character.'"lo
Not the least result of the" Lima Conference was
the example that i t set for the function and ar.j lication of
democratic methods to international relations.

In contrast

to Munich, i t stood not for coercion, tut for voluntary
agreements.

These methods were slower but the long-run

value of such processes was obvious by the development of
r e a l i s t i c understanding and voluntary cooperation.17
Hull's evaluation of this Conference was as follows:
The Declaration of Lima was a great advance over
previous Fan-American agreements. I t affirmed the
intention of the American Republics to help one another
i n case of a foreign attach:, either direct or indirect
on any one cf them. I t provided, for Joint action net
only against a. military assault tut else against the
underground infiltration methods pursued-by the ^ Axis •
while names cf specific countries were not mentioned,
there could be no doubt whatever what names were meant.
From now on, the responsibility of the United States to
defend the hemisphere became the responsibility of a l l
the hemisphere republics
16 Dexter Ferkins, "Eringing The Monroe Doctrine Upto-Date," Foreign Affairs, 20:262, January, 1942.
17 Charles A. Thomson, "F:esults of the Lima Conference,"
Foreign Policy Fie ports. 15:6, March 15, 1639.
18 Hull, 0£, c i t . , p, 606.
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Supporting this view is Ricardo J. ALfaro.

He wrote

that the practical accomplishments were as follows:
The traditional tenets of peace, independence,
equality, law, nonintervention, and cooperation are all
maintained. The I-ionroe Doctrine is continentalized.
Solidarity is reaffirmed, as opposing any action
threatening the basic principles of the American common
wealth of nations.
Joint action is promoted through the procedure of
consultation which, even though not properly regulated
as yet, is a system conducive to close political
cooperation.
The meaning of Hull's success in the Lima Conference
can be judged better by considering what the condition would
have been if this struggle had been delayed until after
Pearl Harbor.

With this action collective security witnin

the western hemisphere was a real thing.

Thus, by skillful

action was the inter-American system secured against the
military, economic, or political assaults from without.
And, best of all, the American nations did not have to use
methods other than those consistent with democratic principles
to secure these provisions for mutual defense.
Samuel Guy Inman cites a Chilean writer 's summery of
the attitude that Latin Americans have towards the Good
Neighbor Folicy.

15 Ricnardo J. Alfaro, "Tne Future of Inter-American
Relations,* The Annals of the American Academy of Political
and Social science, a04:145.
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The views of Latin Americans who remain skeptical
about the Good Neighbor policy, may be summarized as
follows: 1) The Indo-Amexic&n people are enemies of
Hitler because they have been educated to love liberty
and because they have suffered under the same kind of
totalitarianism in their own countries; 2) they believe
in democracy because this was the tradition of their
independence movement, and they desire to enjoy the
liberty and equality of opportunity enjoyed by the
common people of the United States; 3) they do not
believe entirely, however, in the cause of the democra
cies because the United States and Eritain, in their
relations with Latin America, have usually dealt with
those v/ho deny liberty and equality rather than those
who favor democracy; and 4) there are Latin Americans
who want a Hitler victory because they would like to see
a new experiment, because they are tired of oligarchic
regimes that pretend to be democracies, because the
democracies offer no concrete program for the future,
and because imperialism in Latin America has been
predominantly of Anglo-American,, not European, origin.
To achieve a common inter-American front, these
spokesmen believe the United States must demonstrate
that it is concerned 'with, the welfare of the common man
In Latin America. One wonders why so many sons of the
rich and of government officials in Latin America have
been chosen for scholarSUITS. One wonders why so few
North Americans v;ho really know Latin America" end speak
its languages have been used in the program of cultural
relations. . . .50

® Sam.uel Guy Inman, "Some Latin American Views on
Fost-Nar Reconstruction." Foreign Policy Reports. 20:4.
Harch 15, 1944.

CHAPTER VIII
THE THREE CONSULTATIVE i.SUTINGS CF xi:E ^-.ERICAS
Hitler's conduct during the six months after Munich,
had thoroughly convinced Chamberlain that he could neither
be trusted nor appeased.

By March 1939, all cf

Czechoslovakia had been brought under German domination.
In April of that year r Chamberlain suddenly and radically
reversed British policy.

He made a strong alliance with

France and Poland that irovlded for mutual guarantee of
independence and announced a readiness to extend the same
provisions to Rumania, Greece, and Turkev.-*In the meantime, Roosevelt's attempt to move the
United States from its rigid shackles cf neutrality met with
failure.

A rebellious Congress, in spite of the solemn

'warnings of Cordell Hull and the President, went on simmer
adjournment without taking proper action.

T:.ey complacently

maintained that Hull's warning of the threat of immediate
war in Europe was exaggerated.' 0

During the late summer, on

August 23, 1939, the signing of the Russo-German

1 Carlton J. K. Hayes, Marshall Vhithed Baldwin, ana
Charles Woolsey Cole, History of Eur ore., pp. 9 54-965.
2 Basil Rauch, Roosevelt from Munich to Fearl Harbor,,
pp. 124-126.
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non-aggression, pact served to isolate Poland and temporarily
deflect Nazi aggres.sion from Russia toward the vies tern
democracies.^.3

It was a final blow at collective security,

but England and France, ten days after the Soviet-Nazi deal,
took a stand that was ultimately to redeem collective
security. They converted Hitler's invasion of Poland into
a world war precisely because they had finally,
Determined that their own safety could be secured
only by action on the requirement of Collective Security
that every nation must defend every victim of
aggression.4
Germany attacked Poland without warning on September
1, 1939, and by the 27th all effective Polish resistance was
at an end.

Russia had, in accordance with her previous

agreement with Germany, moved into Eastern Poland.5

These

events cast their shadows over the affairs of the western
hemisphere.

It was during the Panama Conference that the

Nazi conquest of Poland was completed.

The war in Europe

posed serious problems that had to be settled, concerning the
American policy towards the war.

Panama called a meeting

of the Consultative Conference of Foreign Ministers of the

Ivar Spector, An Introduction to Russian History
and Culture, p." 340.
5

4

Rauch, op. cit., p. 137.

5

Hayes, Baldwin,and Cole, OP. CIT,, pp. 967—968,
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American S t a t e s t o be held i n Panama September 23 t o
October 3 , 1 9 3 9 .

Two of t h e p r i n c i p a l o b j e c t s of the

Conference were t o maintain the peace end e s t a b l i s h economic
p r o t e c t i o n a g a i n s t t h e i n e v i t a b l e upset t h a t t h e war would
b r i n g .®
The governing board of t h e Pan-American Union, with
H u l l a s chairman, approved the agenda f o r the Conference.
H u l l did n o t a t t e n d t h e Conference, but kept i n close
c o n t a c t with i t .

Under-Secretary of S t a t e Sumner Welles

headed t h e American d e l e g a t i o n .

Welles went prepared t o

p r e s e n t s i x p r o p o s a l s t o t h e Panama Conference.

They were:

F i r s t , a N e u t r a l i t y Zone should be created around the
American r e p u b l i c s from which a c t i v i t i e s of t h e b e l l i g e r e n t s
a r e excluded.

Second, submarines of the b e l l i g e r e n t s

should be excluded from American p o r t s .
of t h e Republics should be d e c l a r e d .

Third, neutrality

Fourth, an Advisory

Committee on lionet a r y and Cormiercial Problems should be s e t
up.

F i f t h , l i b e r a l t r a d e p o l i c i e s should be preserved.

S i x t h , u n n e u t r a l and subversive a c t i v i t i e s by b e l l i g e r e n t s
w i t h i n t h e American r e p u b l i c s should be prevented.7

6 Department of S t a t e , Fostwar Foreign p o l i c y
P r e p a r a t i o n 1S39-1945, p . 1 7 .
7 C o r d e l l H u l l , Memoirs, p . 689.
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kept Hull f u l l y Informed "by cable of t h e developments of t h e
Conference.

H u l l , I n t u r n , made some p r a c t i c a l suggestions

t h a t e v e n t u a l l y contributed t o t h e nature of t h e outcome of
t h e Conference,

Hull s a i d of h i s p a r t :

" I mad- a s e r i e s

of suggestions t h a t were incorporated i n l a t e r d r a f t s of
agreements
The Conference supported t h e proposal t o e s t a b l i s h a
N e u t r a l i t y o r Safety Zone a s an e f f o r t t o l i m i t che v;ar t o
t h e a r e a s o u t s i d e t h e western hemisphere, and t h u s i s o l a t e
t h e American c o n t i n e n t s .

The Safety Zone i d e a supported end

enforced by p a t r o l s of t he e n t i r e American c o a s t l i n e s , ..as
a n i n n o v a t i o n t h a t d i d not stand up so w e l l under t h e t e s t .
Eut i t s e r v e d some purpose i n promoting c o n t i n e n t a l
s o l i d a r i t y and s e c u r i t y .

The r e g u l a t i o n s e s t a b l i s h e d a

f i x e d zone around t h e c o n t i n e n t i n which a l l b e l l i g e r e n t s
were p r o h i b i t e d . -

H u l l favored a more f l e x i b l e system.

" I maintained t h a t we had t h e r i g h t t o p a t r o l c u t t o s e a
whatever d i s t a n c e n i g h t be necessary t o p r o t e c t our shore
l i n e and t e r r i t o r i a l waters."*^ 0

These r e g u l a t i o n s never

S Hull, loc. cit.
S T . I I . R e y n o l d s , e d i t o r , The Fro ; r e s s of _ganAmericanism, p . 1 6 3 .
1 0 H u l l , op. c i t . , p . 690.
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ware agreed to by Britain, Germany, end the other
belligerents.

A naval engagement involving the British

I'avy and the Nasi ship, the Graf Von Epee, upset the
enforcement of these regulations.
Far mere important than these Safety Zone ideas,
vjere the financial and economic policies begun at this
Conference, An Inter-American Financial and Economic
Advisory Committee, made up of an economic expert from each
of the twenty-one republics, started a. series of confer
ences in Washington.

Adjustments were thus facilitated in

the displacements brought about by the war, particularly
in trade and business•

Economic assistance of the United

States was made available to the Latin Anerican Republics
as a contribution to the general welfare.H 'Welles
maintains that the most practical work of the Conference
was to be done under one of the two committees fox which it
provided.

Welles made available to the Latin American

Republics aid from the United States.

This aid was not

merely camouflaged exploitation that in the long run would
benefit only American finance capitalism.

Welles declared

that the United States would expand shipping services to

11 Sumner Welles, The Time for uecision. pp. £12-213.

Latin America and provide credits for financing new
industries to replace the displacement of lest markets.

It

would encourage industrialization, and thus offer promise
of economic as well as political independence.12
Welles' plan was carried out and it resulted in the
construction of the first steel mills in Latin America.
The best evidence of the meaning of this program was
that it was advocated by the seme Latin Americans who
led the struggle against imperialism. This expansion
and deepening of the meaning of the Good Neighbor
Policy, revealed the creativity of Roosveltian
internationalism. . . .
At Panama the policy of collective security for the
western hemisphere, which was the ultimate goal for
America of Roosevelt's Good Neighbor Policy, first was
manifested not merely in promises and on political
levelsy but in economic and military as well as
political actions.13
Hull was an influence behind the scenes of this
Conference at Panama.

Properly speaking, credit belongs to

Welles for much of the financial adjustment that followed
as a result of this Conference, but Hull's steady hand also
was on the whole enterprise.

Aid was made available to the

Latin American nations that were threatened with economic
disaster.

In some cases strides were made to reorient

entire national economies.

12

Ibid., p. 213.

13

Rauch, OJD. cit., p. 156.
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In the western war theater very little action took
place for six months following the conquest of Poland.
During this time, Russia strengthened herself in the Balkan
countries by exacting concessions from them, but when it
came to Finland, Russia found a resisting people.

The

outcome was the Soviet-Finnish Nar that became quite a
drain on and a disgrace to Russia. This dragged on through
the winter months of 1939-1940.14

However, with the coming

of spring the Nasi Blitzkrieg war machine was turned loose
with terrifying effects on 'Western and Northern Europe.
April 1940, Denmark and Norway were overrun.15

In

At this

point Churchill took Chamberlain's place as Britain's Prime
Minister.16

In May, the Low Countries were forced to

accept the Nazis as their master.

In June, the Nazis had.

broken the Haginot Line and drove on to defeat the French
Armies,17 while the British forces stationed in northern
France were saved only by the "miracle of Dunxirk."1®

14

Hayes, Baldwin, and Cole, on. cit., pp. 956-970,.

15

Ibid., p. 970.

16 v/alter P. Hall and Robert G. Albion, ^ History
England and the British air-ire, pp. 958-960.
17 H-yes, Baldwin, and Cole, on. cit., pp. 970-571.
IS Hall and Albion, or. cit., p. 961.

198
On June 17, 1940, three days after the fall of
France, the United States Senate passed e; No-transfer
Resolution.

In this they expressed opposition to the

transfer of any territory in the American hemisphere from
one non-American to another non-American power.June 20th
Roosevelt took another step towards strengthening the unity
of the United States by appointing to his cabinet two
prominent Republicans, Stimson and Knox.
A few hours

after France signed the Armistice, Hull

called for a Consultative Meeting of Representatives of
the American Republics at Havana, Cuba.20

Only England

stood between the Axis and the American World,

Nothing

except the British Navy kept off the Axis from the hemis
phere.

Economically, the Nazis had "built much strength in

Latin America.German businessmen, working closely with the Nazi
Party, were scattered all over South America. Tbev were
developing their businesses and digging in socially,
economically, commercially and politically. They were
using every method possible in the line of subversive
activities. They were invading the universities.- They
were insinuating themselves into every kind of official
and individual activity that wouM give them influence
or control in their respective orbits.21

2-9 Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the
American People. pp. 765-766.
20

Ibid., pp. 766-767.

21 Hull, O P . cat., p. 613.
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Thus, the threat to the American hemisphere was
acute.

The Nazis in Latin America were cocksure about their

coming military victory snd their business success in Latin
America. Their plans to take over Latin America were in
part as follov/s:
First, use the British, French, Scandinavian, and
other merchant fleets to carry on commerce with Latin
America at rates that would put American lines out of
business. Second, blanket Latin America with German avia
tion lines carrying freight and passengers at rates with
which American lines could not compete. Third, export
German and European merchandise to Latin America at whatever
prices that are necessary to undersell American products.
Fourth, overthrow any Latin American Government not favor
able to Germany and substitute one that would cooperate.
Fifth, then take over the Latin American countries as
virtual dependencies.22
With these conditions in prospect, the Second
Consultative Meeting of the American Foreign Ministers met
in Havana July 21-30, 1940, Hull considered that the
Conference was confronted with three principal problems:
The transfer of American territory from one non-American to

22 Ibid., p. 814,
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another non-American power, the threat of subversive
activities, and last, the economic difficulties resulting
from war.25

The result was that at Havana both an

emergency and an enduring long-range policy was set up
with regard to the control over territories in America who
are menaced by Axis control. The Declaration of the Act
of Havana provided that in case of danger of a territorial
transfer that might convert European territorial possessions
in the western hemisphere into strategic centers of
aggression, the American nations—"taking into account the
imperative need of continental security and the desires of
the inhabitants of the said islands or region,"24 might step
in and set up a regime of provisional administration. In
case of grave and sudden emergency, any American state might
act in the capacity of a provisional administrator for its
own defense and the defense of the hemisphere.25

A

Convention was signed at the same time, the Convention of
Havana, to go into effect when ratified by two thirds of the
signatories. This set up the basic principles and machinery

23 Cordell Hull, "Pan American Relations," Vital
Speeches of the Day, 6:646, August 15, 1940.
24 second Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs
of the American RepublicsHavana, July 21-30. 1940, Department~of State Conference series No. 48, pp. 84-90.
25 Ibid., pp. 75-77.
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of the provisional administration.

Administration was to

be by a committee of the contracting parties.^6

This was

better known as the inter-American Commission for Territorial
Administration.27

a Bill of Rights was included in the

Convention. In this the common human rights were
vigorously maintained.
This Act of Havana was not only a proposal for
defensive measures of the highest importance, but it was an
outstanding milestone on the road to inter-American
cooperation. It was a most significant step taken toward
making the Monroe Doctrine multilateral.

The Latin

American neighbors shared with the United States under these
conditions, in the application of the no-transfer principle
involved.28
Perkins indicates the spirit behind the movement as
follows:
. . . only the cynic will depreciate the impulse which
lay behind the accord of 1936. Beyond all doubt that
accord demonstrated the strength of the democratic ideal
in the New v/orld and set up the justified hop that it
would be defended against aggression. Nor was the
Declaration of Lima a mere form. Acting under its terms
the New World states met at Panama from September 23 to

26 Samuel Flagg Bemis, The Latin American Policy of the
United States: An Historical Interpretation, pp.. 370-371.
clt.

27 Second Meeting of American Foreign Ministers nn
pp. 64-90.
* -*
28 Bailey, pp. cit.. p. 767.
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October 3, 1939, and adopted, certain common resolution
with regard to the subject of neutrality; and '.vhat is
more important. « .they met in Havana from July 21 to
30, 1940 and drew up certain protocol very intimately
related to the Monroe Doctrine.29
The European Wax had gravely displaced the economies
of the American countries.

The Havana Conference tried to

meet this economic emergency by strengthening and expanding
the activities of the Inter-American Financial and Economic
Advisory Committee.

Provisions were madt; for the Co;:jnlttee

to set up sub-committees to deal with special problems.
Some of these problems for solution were:
. . .(1) to aid the American nations in studies
designed to increase the domestic consumption of normally
exportable surpluses; (2) to study the possibility of
increasing inter-American trade; (3) to create
*Instruments of Inter-American cooperation lor the
temporary storing, financing and hanalir^ of such
commodities; (4) to develop commodity arren0e ® £oth^
a view to assuring eouitable ter^s of ^ra^e 1
.»
producers Sd JoSfumers; (5) to 'recommend methods Tor
improving the standard of living of ohe People- of the
Americas, including public nealtn and nutritive
measures.*31

As at the Lima Conference, Hull found Argentina to be
confirmed in her opposition of the United states.

2 9 Dexter F e r K i n s , " ^ *n 5 Q u a r t e r l y ° R eview. ?
to Date," Foreign Affairs: An American ju
20:262, January, 1942.
rr
.itcpypl t 's Gcod .»e1 ghooj
30 Edward 0. Guerrant, Hoo^—
Policy, p. 153.
•vi
,, „
of American Foreign Ministers, op.
31 second Meeting cu_ ag
—
cit., pp. 60-63.
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Particularly did she oppose Hull's proposals for providing
for collective trusteeship over territories that were about
to fall into the hands of the Axis.

As at Lima, Hull

appealed over the heads of the Argentine delegation to the
Argentine President, Ortiz.

Eventually, Hull's efforts were

crowned with success, for the Argentine delegation received
authorized changes in their instructions so that they
supported the proposals sponsored by the United States.32
In the summer of 1940, Franklin D. Roosevelt was
nominated for the third time to the Presidency of the
United States.

On September 3, Roosevelt announced the

United States-British deal by which fifty American
destroyers were traded to Britain for ninety-nine year
leases on certain strategic points which guarded the
eastern approaches to the United States and entrances to
the Caribbean Sea.
South were:

These points, extending from North to

Newfoundland, Bermuda, Jamaica, Antigue, St.

Lucia, TriniU^» end British

Guiana.

33 In the face of what

was going on in the rest of the world, American national
defense increasingly became the first concern of the United
States.

Americans, in growing numbers, were convinced that

32 Hull* Memoirs, p. 826.
33 Bail e y» 0£. cit., pp. 769-770.
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the "best way to defend America was to give aid to those who
opposed Axis aggressions.

"Defend America by aiding the

Allies" was the apt slogan for this concept.

To accomplish

this purpose the Lend-Lease legislation was pushed through
Congress.

This was particularly aimed at sustaining Britain

who stood alone against the Axis during the year between the
fall of France and the Nazi's attack on Russia on June £2,
1941.34
The seizure of Axis ships in American ports was
authorized on March 30, 1941.

Two months later, legisla

tion was passed that authorized the seizure and use of
foreign ships that were immobilized in American ports.

On

April 13, 1941, the Russo-Japanese five year Neutrality
Pact became effective.

This deflected Japanese aggression

from Northern Asia to Southern Asia and the South Pacific
areas.

It meant that Japan would have a free hand to deal

with Western European powers in this region, and also any
other Pacific power.^
Attention in the United States was duly focused for
the most part on the developments in Europe and the Atlantic
areas.

The Robin Moor, an American vessel, was sunk in the

34

Ibid., pp. 772-774.

35 Ivar Spector, An Introduction to Russian History
and Culture, p. 340.
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South Atlantic on May 21, 1941.

Roosevelt proclaimed an

unlimited national emergency and continued to expand our
defense efforts. 36

Following the Nazi attack on Russia,

the defense of Iceland was declared to be essential to the
security of the United States.
American military forces.

Iceland was occupied by

On July 14th, Roosevelt ordered

American naval vessels on convoy duty.

The Nazi submarine

menace to Atlantic shipping was such that the President
issued September 11, his famous order to shoot on sight any
Nazi craft. 37

Lend-Lease aid was made available to Russia

on November 6, 1941.

Congressional action on November 13,

only three weeks before Pearl Harbor, relieved the
administration of the last restrictions of the neutrality
legislation.

The Pearl Harbor surprise attack 36 catapulted

the United States into the status of a full belligerent.
The United States called for a meeting for consultation
with the other American nations.

This Third Consultative

Meeting of the American Foreign Ministers was called to
meet in Rio de Janeiro, Argentina, January 15-26, 1942.
The world situation was exceedingly grave and the United

36

Bailey, on. cit., pp. 779-781.

37

Ibid., pp. 784-786.

38

Ibid., p. 796.
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States was at last a shooting combatant against the Axis
attempt to conquer the world.

Under these conditions the

United States approached this Conference with some fixed
purposes:
First, seek to persuade all the other American
Governments that it was essential to sever diplomatic
relations and all commercial and financial intercourse
with Axis nations, in order to end Axis espionage and
subversive activities in the hemisphere.
Second, try to find the basis for agreement upon
such co-operative steps of a military and naval
character as might be necessary for the security of the
American republics, as to enable the Americas to
withstand the economic strain resulting from war
conditions. 39
Hull made arrangements for the meetings, but UnderSecretary of State, Sumner Welles, headed the American
delegation.

After Welles arrived at Rio de Janeiro, he

discovered that Argentina was trying to create a bloc
among the Latin American Nations to obstruct a joint
declaration to break off all diplomatic relations with the
Axis.

Hull advised that on this issue no compromise with

Argentina should be sought.

It was war now, and it was

more important in such circumstances to take a firm stand
vjithout unanimity among the American nations, rather than

Welles, op. cit., p. 225.
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have a vague and watered down pronouncement as a result of
compromise,. This was contrary to the method so often
practiced by Hull of giving concessions, but Hull defends
his position thus:
But now the issue had become crucial. It was time
for the Argentine Government to choose. This was a life
and-death struggle, the result of which could only mean
freedom and advancement for Latin America or domination
and probably occupation by the Axis, During the course
of that struggle, the presence of Axis diplomats and
agents in any headquarters of the American Republic,
which they would inevitably use as a headquarters for
their subversive activities in other Republics, could
not but be a danger to the whole hemisphere. Enjoying
the full use of diplomatic codes and communications,
they could make that Republic their message center, and
from it they could communicate quickly and secretly
information concerning ship movements, raw-materials
purchases,, defense activities, flights of planes, and
the like. Argentina, or any other Republic, therefore,
had to decide whether to cut off this danger or let it
flourish,40
On the other hand, Welles considered it to be of
greatest importance that dissension be kept to a minimum
among the nations of this hemisphere.

Thus, a unanimous

declaration, to him, was of the utmost importance,
stand with Argentina would only agitate dissension.

A firm
He

felt that Chile would join Argentina at the least provoca
tion, No one could tell where it would stop if the Latin

Hull,: on. cit,p. 1145.

American nations once began to break away.41 It was tine
to close up the ranks in unity against the European menace.
It was time to declare unity at Its minimum or lowest
common denominator where it had been produced without
coercion.

It was better to work having the conciliatory

spirit in excess rather than throw away the attitude of
conciliation entirely, and have no alternative except the
instruments of coercion,42
Hull objected that Welles' stand in the Conference
was contrary to their settled agreement before Welles left:
"that rather than a compromise formula a breach in unanimity
would be

."43 The whole Issue in the Welles-Hull

preferable

controversy was on this statement that Welles signed for
the United States regarding the manner cf severing rela
tions with the Axis countries.

The declaration undoubtedly

shows signs of concessions to Argentina.

It ran as

follows:

-

. . . The American Republics, in accordance with the
procedures established by their own laws and in
conformity with the position and circumstances obtaining in each country in the existing continental

41 Welles, OD. cit.. pp. 234-235.
42 Loc. cit.
43 Hull, pp. cit., p. 1144.
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conflict, recommend the breaking of their diplomatic
relations with Japan, Germany t and Italy, since the
first-mentioned State attacked and the other two
declared war on an American country.44
Hull put in a telephone call to Y/ellas when the news
broke on the radio that agreement at the Conference had
been achieved at the price of the United States surrendering
her essential position.

The President was also in on the

conversation which took place.

Hull apparently was quite

upset and did not cover it up:
. . .1 then spoke to him more sharply than I had
ever spoken to any one in the Department. I said I
considered this a change in our policy, made without
consulting me, and the equivalent of a surrender to
Argentina^ I added that it contained an escape clause
that would permit the Argentines to return home with a
straight face and thereafter war e gradually over to
ward the camp of our Axis enemies and render^ the enemy
aid and comfort, to our damage and even to the loss of
life as the war progressed.4°
perhaps a factor in the Hull-V/elies controversy was
Hull's failing health.

Hull attributed his failing health

nartly to the pressure of overwork incidental to the.
Japanese phase of the war crisis, and partly to his great

44 ibid., p. 1149, and The Pan American Union, Report
on the Third Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs oi
the American Republics. p. 32.
45 Hull, op^ cit. , p . 1150.

210
disappointment over the outcome of the Rio de Janeiro
Conference.4®
This marked the climax of tension between Hull and
Welles.

Welles, however, continued on in the State

Department for another eighteen months before he finally
resigned.

Six months after the Rio de Janeiro Conference,

Hull called Welles to his office, reprimanded him for
usurping the powers of policy making, for by-passing the
head of the State Department without first consulting Hull.
For a while after this matters between them seemed to be
mending.

Hull confessed, however, that he held Welles in

suspiciion.

"I could not repose the same confidence in him

that I did in my other associates."47
Apparently, Hull's protestations to Roosevelt,
concerning Welles were taking effect.

Of this Hull wrote:

The President himself had begun to appreciate the
extent of Under-Secretary Welles*s disloyalty to me. . .
Xn earlv summer, 1943, the President himself realized
that the situation in the State Department could not
continue. He decided on his own that in the light ol
all existing circumstances the efficiency of ^ the
^
Department would be improved by Welles's retirement. . .

46 LOG , cit.
47

Tbid•, p. 1229.
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"When the President proposed to Welles that he
resign, Welles immediately found Hull and charged hir; with
the responsibility for this*

Hull pointed out that it was

a deliberate act of the President whatever may have been the
contributing factors that brought it about.

He suggested

that Welles go to the Conference at Moscow that was coming
up.

Welles refused.

Their relations ended there.

Hull

wrote of this: "He soon got up, came over to my desk,
shook hands , and then departed. I have not talked with him
since."4®
The matter of the severance of diplomatic relations
with the Axis nations, although of first rate importance,
was not the only important action taken at the Rio Confer
ence. For agreements of utmost importance to the
50
successful prosecution of the war were reached here.
Particularly was this so in regards to economic and financial
matters.
It seemed to be easier to break the financial and
economic ties with the Axis than to break the political,
ties.

Welles lea the Conference to harmonious action

49 ibid., p. 1231.
50 David K. Popper, "The Rio cU Janeiro Conference of
1942," Foreign Policy Reports, 18:33-34, April lb, 1.42.

regarding the following phases of policy:

the production

of strategic materials, 51 the development of better
commercial relations within the hemisphere, the obstruc
tion of Axis' commerce with it, 5 ^ the development of
transportation facilities within the hemisphere,53 the
curbing of subversive activities, 5 ^ the creation of an
inter-American Defense Board, 55 and the proposed study and
consideration of important war problems. 55

Without doubt

Welles played a very important part in getting through
these actions *
Hull pressed for decisive action in the matter of
breaking off relations with the Axis nations.

Hull wanted

to put all the pressure possible on Argentina, even if it
meant the breaking up of the unity of the American nations
Welles acted otherwise, for believing it best to maintain
unity even at the price of compromise, he agreed to a

51 pan American Union, Resort on the Tnird meeting
the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics
Hio de Janeiro, January 15-28, 1S42, p. 33.
52 ibid., pp. 33-34.
53 Ibid., pp. 38-4.0.
54

Ibid.., pp. 44-48.

55

Ruth D. Masters, Handbook of international
Organization
the Americas, pp. 123-126,
56 pan American Union, op. c i t . , p p . 5 2 - 5 3 .
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watered down version.

Hull was deeply disappointed.

It was

codded pressure in a relationship that already was pressed to
the breaking point.

Eventually Welles resigned.

Tension grew between Mexico end the United states
concerning Mexico 's expropriation in 1938 of the oil
properties of certain oil companies in which the Investors
were predominantly American.

Hull's strident and scalding

tone in the diplomatic notes to Mexico over tins matter
perhaps added to the tension.

Yet it was. legitimate diplo

matic pressure and policy short of intervention.

In the

diplomatic contest that followed over expropriation, the
administration was confronted with a complicated problem.
Moderation had to be practiced in order that the
administration avoid becoming the victim of one of the
extremes of the special interests that were involved in tie
confict.

The administration felt that in fairness to the

American investments made there that Mexico should stand
good for reasonable compensation to the owners or investors
according to the amount of investment Involved in the
property taken over.

United States oil interests and

American church interests did their utmost to get the
administration to intervene in Mexico, but there was no
intervention.

Stebbins points out that the administration,

on the whole, was to be commended for handling a matter so
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potentially explosive as well as they did.
The position of the United States was most commend
able. It practiced what it preached--the Good Neighbor
Policy. ... It will probably never be known
accurately the pressure exerted by President Roosevelt,
the State Department, and Congress to forsake that
policy and return to the policy of 'the big stick.1
True enough, Secretary Hull scolded and threatened, but
he never once failed to recognize that Mexico was using
the prerogative of a sovereign nation when she
expropriated the oil properties.57

57 Karie F. Stebblns, "The History of the Expropria
tion of the American Oil Companies in Mexico," (unpublished
Master's thesis, College of the Pacific, Stockton, 1948).

AFTERMATH:
THE PLACE OF THE GOOD NEIGHBOR. POLiCY IN THE VVOFXD ORDER
This study has been in the nature of a survey of
important trends In United States-Latin American relations.
Specifically, it has been an Inquiry into the role played, by
Cordell Hull in Implementing this policy.

Our Latin

American relations under the Good Neighbor Policy was
manifestly an outstanding demonstration that nations could
act together for. their own common interests without
surrendering any of their essential sovereignty.
demonstrated an answer to the question:

It

How to obtain co

operation and how to formulate hemispheric solidarity.
Fadilla summarizes the movement in the foraulation
of a satisfactory hemispheric solidarity program, in part,
as follows:
The principle of inter-American solidarity Inthe o t
face of outside threat to the territoria
g
political independence of an American state has
which go back to Bolivar.
It was given formal expression for tne first time,
however, at the Buenos Ai res
£»«of the
Convention signed there provided that
their
peace of the American republics ^
jtme . their
governments should consult among
el
cc ^jron
purpose of coordinating their efforts for the common
defense. . . .
The Eighth Inter-Americain Conference ^peated and
added to the previous declarations, emphasi^ ng.
Declaration of Lima, the common interests oi the
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republics of the hemisphere and their determination to
make their solidarity effective in the face of external
threat....
Nevertheless, there still remained two serious
lacunnae in the American system of reciprocal aid.
First, the agreement applied solely to threats from
states outside the hemisphere. . . . Secondly, there
was no mention of specific means to be employed to
carry out the agreements.
The Act of Chapultipec satisfactorily filled those
two gaps. • . . The Conference extended the provisions
of Declaration XV of Havana to all international
attempts at aggression, whether by a non-American or an
American state.
With respect to the second weakness in the earlier
agreement, the republic of tne hemisphere which took
part in the Mexico City Conference (The Argentine
Republic also, when it subsequently adhered to the
Final Act) undertook, during the war now Just ended, to
adopt such measures as they deemed necessary in support
of the principles embodied in the Act of Chapultipec.
Those enforcement measures were specified on an
ascending scale, as the withdrawal of the cniefs of
missions and rupture of diplomatic, relations, the
imposition of economic sanctions, and the use of mili
tary force. Considering a provisional agreement
insufficient, moreover, the Conference recommended that
the governments of the American republics later
conclude a treaty making the 'wartime obligations
assumed in the Final Act permanent.
Here was promise that light could be thrown even on the
perplexing problem of how to formulate vital coordination
among other nations of the world in order to obtain the
common good.

In fact, Hull frequently in his discussions

1 Ezequiel Padilla, "The American System and the
World Organization," Foreign Affairs.: An American Quarterly
Review, 24:102-103, October, 1$45.
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with diplomats from countries outside of this hemisphere,
used the American success in regional relations as an
example of what could and should he done on a world level
The Good Neighbor Policy, as announced by the President,
was the general mood in which foreign policy generally was
to be cast.

It applied to the entire foreign policy of the

United States.

The pattern for consultative agreements had

stood the test of regional relations in the western
hemisphere.

It had established a pattern for world

relations.s

It was a policy worthy of

imitation by the

nations in building up a world order for peace and security.
The problems confronting the makers of United States
foreign policy 1933 to 1941 were complicated by the popular
mood of isolationism.4

Americans were so thoroughly

convinced that American participation in world affairs would
bring only evil complications that the isolationist stay-athome commitments had become almost a religion.

It became a

severe barrier to the realistic handling of America's role
in world affairs.

While the situation abroad became

S United States Department of state, Peace and Wap:
United States. Foreign policy 1931-1941. pp. 366, 36S, 372.
3 Ibid., p. 272.
4

Cordell Hull, Memoirs, p. 176.
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Increasingly menacing, many political leaders advised
non-participation.

This mood of isolationism was so

prevalent in American politics that the administration had
to bear it constantly in mind in the formulation and
implementation of our foreign policy.5

in other words, the

administration had to find a means of participation in
world affairs in our national interest in a manner that
would least antagonize the isolationists.

America had to

wort with the nations who opposed aggression, but the exact
pattern of United States* participation with these powers
had to be such that it would be consistent with our long
range national interest, and would not completely antagonize
the American mood of isolationism.6

The neutrality

legislation was the legal barricade that America, under
isolationist influence, tried to use as a guarantee for
continuous insulation against world involvement.
Hull had a healthy appreciation of what the mood of
isolationism could do to the administration if it were
fullv aroused.

He never forgot Wilson's defeat.

His tac

tics were those of using patience and persistence in doing

5 Ibid., pp. 176-177.
6 Loc. cit.
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his "best to develop informed public opinion that would
support full participation in world affairs.

Such devices

of diplomacy as conferences, consultation, parallel
actions, and the like were practiced as means of joining a
world organization or making national commitments that
would tie the United States to an entangling situation or
program.
The success in establishing harmonious relations
among the nations of this hemisphere was used advantageously
"by Hull, particularly since the other attempts in the
world to arrive at a better order by consultation had
failed. Hull was careful to point out to diplomats from
Europe and Asia the principles involved in the success of
the Good Neighbor Policy in the inter-American relations.7
It became a kind'of exhibit A for the cause of consultation
as a reliable approach to understanding, cooperation, and
peace between nations.

From the cutset, this ultimate

role of our Latin American policy was in the mind, of those
who formulated American policy.

The hope was that it would

possibly prove to be the alternative to the attitude of
dark despair that was settling upon the minds of men who
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were struggling with the problems of human relations on the
international level.
Mexico's Pad ilia outlined the relation that the
Good Neighbor Policy sustains to the permanent hemispheric
system:
. . . It is therefore proper that the form of the
Pan-American union be modified and Improved in order to
bring it into harmony with the basic maxims of the
Good Neighbor Policy. Such a re-organization is
particularly needed in view of the development of
inter-American Jurisprudence. This movement, initiated
at Montevideo and strengthened at Euenos Aires, Lima,
and the three subsequent consultative gatherings,
reached its culmination at Charultipec and tool: share
in the solidly-rooted principle of absolute Juridical
equality. From this principle flow the other important
principles of non-intervention, continental solidarity,
and cooperation for economic and social rro 0 ress. fa
Only a few months before completing his twelfth year
as Secretary of State, Hull reviewed United otates and
Inter-American Policy, in a speech before the governing
board of the Pan-American Union.

He pointed out the

contributions that the pattern worked out in our regional
affairs might make toward the establishment of a wo^ld
order.

In the years between the world wars, he _aid, tru_t

an3 confidence among American nations grew wrule else.....re
. , .
-pp„T and animosity,
conqu e s t h a d b r o u g h t d i v i s i o n , l e a x ,

8 Padilla, o£. cit., P-

100 •
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International organizations, whether inter-American or of
world comprehensiveness, must have two main supports.

An

international organization's greatest strength must be
derived from the Tightness and justness of the underlying
principles of the. organization and the binding unity will
be the mutual trust of its members.

Finally, Hull pointed

out the American example, in part, as follows x
It is the common pride of the American republics and
the good fortune of all mankind that the torch of
international co-operation has burned at its brightest
in the affairs of this hemisphere precisely at a time
when it was being blacked out elsewhere,-'
Consequently, the history of such a long association
"should provide encouraging guidance for the future."
The movement towards cooperation and maintaining
mutual security is assessed as follows:
The United States in the 1930's seems to have been
unusually forehanded in renouncing intervention end
accenting the principle of equality under the law before
there was any provision for law-enforcement by the^
community. This was certainly an act of faith on its
part. It is no coincidence, however, that at Buenos
Aires in 1936 the same inter-American Conference that
adopted the treaty commitment on nonintervention CAISO
adopted the principle of formal consultation, among the
American republics for the purpose of dealing by concerted action with situations of common concern. This was
followed, in successive inter-American Conferences, by
the creation of the necessary instruments, The

9 James W. Gantenbein, editor, The Evolution of Our
Latin American Policy, p. 245.
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establishment of the consultative meetings of Foreign
Ministers at Lima in 1936 was the first step in that
direction. Today we have, in the Treaty of Reciprocal
Assistance which was signed at Rio de Janeiro in 1947,
a provision for action by the community as a whole to
meet any armed attack against any of its members
whether outside or inside the community. Thus, our
inter-American community has now assumed active
responsibility for protecting the rights of its
member states, and if such situations as jeopardized
the order of the Caribbean at the turn of the century
should recur, the United States would now have no right
to deal with them on its own. It would have to look to
the community for regulatory action.
Rauch points out that the administration used in its
Latin American policy, under the Good Neighbor Policy,
principles that could apply to the entire world:
. . .That area was made a laboratory offering a
preview of the policy for Europe and Asia which isola
tionists prevented the administration from carrying out
until after the Second World 'War began. Latin America
even offered a test in miniature of the effects of
collective security on a potential aggressor nation. ..
As Hull had played a vital role in implementing the
Good Neighbor Policy in the American hemisphere so likewise
he played an essential role in the establishment in the
United Nations of the principles of the Good Neighbor in
world relations.
so.

It is altogether fitting that he should do

For as he had ap-plied tnese principles to regional

10 y, "On A Certain Impatience with Latin America,
Foreign Affairs: An American Quarterly Review, 28:573-574,
July, 1950.
11 Basil Rauch, Roosevelt frorn Munich to Pearl Harbor,
p. 95.
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a f f a i r s with success, so now he s e t out t o apply them t o t h e
order of world r e l a t i o n s .

This i s the r o l e t h a t Hull had

played i n l a y i n g t h e basis f o r t h e United Nations,
Of g r e a t importance i n t h e movement towards a world
order ( t h a t would be a s i n c l u s i v e a s p o s s i b l e ) was the work
t h a t Hull d i d i n t h e Moscow Conference i n bringing Russia i n
as a n a c t i v e p a r t i c i p a n t i n t h e formulation of and the
adoption of t h e United Nations C h a r t e r ,

General John R.

Deane was a member of t h e American delegation t o t h i s
Conference,
Mr. H u l l ,

He went i n the capacity of m i l i t a r y advisor t o
The Conference met i n Moscow, October 19 t o

November 1 , 1943.

General Deane gave, t h e following r e p o r t

of t h e r o l e Hull performed i n t h e Conference: .
Agreement on t h e 'Four-Power Declaration' was t h e
o u t s t a n d i n g achievement of t h e Moscow Conference, I t
h a s been widely publicized, but c h i e f l y i t provided f o r
u n i t e d a c t i o n a g a i n s t t h e enemy, unanimity on surrender
t e r m s , t h e n e c e s s i t y t o e s t a b l i s h en i n t e r n a t i o n a l
o r g a n i z a t i o n ( t h e i n c e p t i o n of t h e United Nations),
agreement not t o employ m i l i t a r y f o r c e within t h e
t e r r i t o r i e s of o t h e r s t a t e s a f t e r the war except a f t e r
j o i n t c o n s u l t a t i o n , and postwar r e g u l a t i o n of armaments.
The Declaration was conceived by Secretary Hull and
s t e e r e d through the conference by the sheer force of h i s
p e r s o n a l i t y . Agreement upon i t s terms was not d i f f i c u l t ,
b u t i t was d i f f i c u l t t o o b t a i n Soviet consent t o
i n c l u d e China a s a s i g n a t o r y . China's f o r t u n e s were
t h e n a t t h e i r lowest ebb, a condition not c a l c u l a t e d t o
i n d u c e Soviet r e s p e c t . On t h e other hand, China's
continued p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n t h e war a g a i n s t Japan was of
extreme importance and h e r r e c o g n i t i o n a s one of t h e
f o u r b i g powers would provide a f i l l i p of inestimable
v a l u e t o Chinese morale. Acting on President Roosevelt's
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instructions, Secretary Hull outplayed and out waited
the Soviet contingent and, with the support of Eden,
won the day. It was the crowning achievement of
Secretary Hull's career.^2
The answer to the query why Franklin D. Roosevelt
kept Hull as his Secretary of State is found in the results
of the Moscow Conference and the response of the United
States Senate.

By keeping Hull in his Cabinet, Roosevelt

managed to utilize Mr. Hull's prestige in the United States
public opinion and Congress.

Sherwood explains the reason

why Hull remained:
. . .But he well knew why Roosevelt did not wish to
lose a Secretary of State whose prestige was so high and
influence so strong with the United States Senate. Here
again,. Roosevelt was mindful of the ghost of Woodrow
Wilson, who had seen victory won on the battlefield only
to be lost on Capitol Hill when a minority of Senators
proved able to raise an uproar powerful enough to
repudiate the President and the League of Nations.
Roosevelt's concept of his dependence on Hull was
justified by the enormous success of the Moscow
Conference in October, and its consequent profound
effect on Congressional opinion. On November 5, as
Hull was returning from Moscow, the Senate approved by a
vote of eighty-five to five the Connally Resolution
providing for post-war collaboration to secure and
maintain peace for the world and for the establishment
of a general international organization that might become
a new League of Nations

12 John R. Deane, The Strange Alliance: The Story of
Our Effort at Wartime Co-ooeration with Russia, p. 23.
13 Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active
Service in Feace and War, p. 2S4.
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Even Hull's friendly critics recognized his over
cautious and slow disposition.

Stimson said, that as

Secretary of State, Hull succeeded far better than he had
expected of him.14

Others, not so considerate of his

feeling, had little good to say for the aging Hull.
Sherwood pointed out Roosevelt's frequent impatience with
Hull, and even at times how the President exercised
special precautions to prevent Hull's attendance at big
power conferences.Hull's suggestions concerning what
the President's speeches should contain were frequently
considered to weaken rather than to strengthen the
speeches.1^
Churchill recognized Hull's limitations.

He realized

that Hull was not one of the President's intimates.
Churchill wrote of Hull:

"He did not seem to me to have

full access at the moment to the President."

Notwithstand

ing Churchill's high regard for many of Hull's good
qualities, he was impressed with Hull's capacity for
littleness in some matters.

Hull's picayunish attitude in

relations to the Free French and the problem of the French

14

Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 372.

15 Ibid., p. 652.
16 Ibid., pp. 756-757.
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Caribbean Island, caused Churchill to write:
"I was struck by the fact that amid gigantic events
one small incident seemed to dominate his mind."17 And
again, "He pushed what was little more than a departmental
point far beyond its proportion."16
However, perhaps the following paragraph is as fair
an appraisal of the factors or characteristics that drew the
President and the Secretary together or kept them apart:
Temperamentally the President and Mr. Hull had
almost nothing in common. In contrast to Mr. Roosevelt,
the Secretary was extremely serious, cautious, and
hesitant, making an intimate relationship difficult.
The evidence indicates that the President had a high
regard for Mr. Hull; that he relied greatly on his
Congressional experience and his continued close contact
with former colleagues. He respected and subscribed to
Mr. Hull's principles and valued his ability to spot
objections to any proposed course. Fundamentally the
two men were agreed on major policies am there was no
acrimonious debate between them. It may be that at
times Mr. Roosevelt lost patience with the Secretary's
caution, and deliberation, but the record does not
substantiate the oft-repeated charge that the president
ignored Mr. Hull or by-passed the State Department. The
Secretary was kept as fully informed as the President's
habits permitted, and his views carried great weight
with his chief. Actually the two men, one daring and
pliable, the other circumspect and inflexible, made a
good teem.19

17

Winston S. Churchill, The Grand Alliance, p. 666.

18

£bid., p. 667.

19 William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, The
Challenge to Isolation: 1937-1940, pp. 7-8.
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